(08-07-2025 09:25 PM)ODUsmitty Wrote: Shere,
Trust me as I am losing sleep over this issue that pisses you off.
From the third tenet of the Budapest agreement you posted; "Third, Ukraine wanted guarantees or assurances of its security once it got rid of the nuclear arms. The Budapest Memorandum provided security assurances."
I am confident that such "assurances" included potential invasions of the Ukranian Crimea peninsula and the more recent Eastern Ukranian attempt at annexation.
I don't give a damn about the semantics of such agreements, but the US wanted no new nuclear states, and made a deal with Ukraine to ensure that did not happen. I am no fan of Z-skyy, but if I were a Ukranian, I'd be pissed. We made "assurances" aka promises to be there when the Russian bear came calling, and we have given a very measured and limited response.
Apologies if inconvenient for you, but when I give my word, I honor it. Our country did not do that, and likely should have never made that promise in the first place. However, assurances were given and we have hedged. So stay pissed as long as you desire, but in this instance, we have been hypocrites.
Be well,
Smitty
Wrong. Read it.
I provided links.
We could have signed a treaty. We did not. Its well documented. NA Treaty O. Not a budapest treaty.
A memo
Third, Ukraine sought security guarantees. The United States and Britain were prepared to provide security assurances but not “guarantees,” as the term implied a commitment to use military force. The U.S. government would not provide such a guarantee. In any case, it is doubtful the Senate would have consented to ratification of such an agreement.
U.S. and British Commitments
The Trilateral Statement contained nearly verbatim the text of the December 5, 1994 Budapest Memorandum, promising security assurances once Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state (it did so in November 1994). The memorandum committed the United States, Britain and Russia to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders and not to use or threaten to use force against Ukraine.
The memorandum committed the United States and Britain to seek UN Security Council assistance for Ukraine, but it did not commit those two countries take to military action with their own forces against Russia if it violated its commitments—as Russia did in 2014, when it seized Crimea and fought in Donbas, and in 2022, when it launched an all-out invasion. In response to Ukrainian questions when negotiating the assurances, U.S. officials said the United States would take action if Russia violated its commitments but that would not include sending American military forces.
The officials did not discuss specific steps Washington would take. That reflected failure, on the part of Americans and Ukrainians, to foresee in 1993-94 what Russia did in 2014 and 2022. Had Ukrainian officials foreseen those actions, Kyiv almost certainly would have sought more solid guarantees, which the United States and Britain were not prepared to give. Negotiations would have been at an impasse. What would have happened then is unclear.
Keeping Nuclear Weapons? At What Cost?
Absent the 1994 agreements, many seem to believe Ukraine could have maintained a nuclear arsenal. In fact, it would have encountered likely insurmountable challenges. Soviet warheads were believed to have a relatively short shelf-life, and most of the infrastructure to build and support the warheads was located in Russia.
To sustain an independent nuclear arsenal, Ukraine would have had to make a huge investment to build the necessary infrastructure at a time when the country’s economy was sharply contracting. Ukrainian officials briefly considered what it would take to retain some strategic nuclear weapons if there were a political decision to abandon the policy of becoming a non-nuclear weapons state. They concluded that Ukraine could not afford the needed infrastructure.
Had Ukraine nevertheless tried to keep nuclear weapons, it would have incurred significant political and economic costs. The deepening of relations with the West—including the 1994 EU-Ukraine partnership and cooperation agreement, 1996 declaration of a U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership, and 1997 establishment of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership—would not have happened with a nuclear-armed Ukraine.
Moreover, the United States and Europe would not have launched the large-scale assistance programs of the later 1990s to help Ukraine reform, modernize and address specific problems such as shutting down the Chornobyl nuclear plant. Ukraine would have been blocked from low-interest loans from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Of course, many in Ukraine might now regard these costs as bearable in order to sustain a nuclear arsenal. Alternative histories are by nature speculative. Had Ukraine attempted to keep nuclear arms, would Russia in 1994 have tolerated that? War might well have broken out then, and Ukraine would have faced Russia without Western support.
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/buda...ndum-myths
Xxoo
And if you were ukranisn i wouldnt give two shite what you think