IDGAF about Russia.

Trump & friends, in happier times

Reports: Trump Gave Classified Info To Russians During White House Visit
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/15/528511980...ouse-visit

lol NPR. What a bunch of liars.

Interesting of Note:

Who hasn't been here since this bot farm was struck....

(10-14-2026 01:26 AM)GeminiCoog Wrote:  lol NPR. What a bunch of liars.

National Propoganda Radii

Yandex, Putin’s invasion, and Ukraine’s drone defence: an explainer

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/10/1...ned-a93953

I just find it hilarious that the left is still trying to say that Trump's a "Russian asset and Putin puppet" when it's been proven time and time again that he isn't. You'd think they'd learn by now to let it go.

(10-15-2026 09:19 PM)GeminiCoog Wrote:  I just find it hilarious that the left is still trying to say that Trump's a "Russian asset and Putin puppet" when it's been proven time and time again that he isn't. You'd think they'd learn by now to let it go.

I would not go that far---but I would say Trump has shown an increasing tendency to treat the nations enemies better than his allies. That kind of behavior never plays out well over the long term. When it comes to Ukraine, he seems very comfortable requiring massive concessions from Ukraine----but has been reluctant to place any pressure on Russia to make any reasonable concessions. I think Trump was correct in the campaign---this thing should be solved in 24 hours. There is a very logical compromise deal to be made (for instance, his original deal was an excellent example of a reasonable compromise that froze the lines in place and created an international security arrangement for Ukraine)---but any compromise like that requires concessions from BOTH sides---and that is where Trump has failed miserably as a functional mediator. For example, the deal he is currently pushing would require Ukraine to withdraw from the entire Donbass area (which would include their entire prepared multi-layered "fortress city belt" defense line---leaving them much more vulnerable to future attack)---while not providing any specifically defined security arrangement. Ukraine would have to leave itself open and hope that whatever security agreement comes after is adequate to keep them safe with no more fortress belt. Given their experience with the previous Budapest Memorandum security arrangement---you can see how the Ukrainians might not see "hoping for a good mutual security deal" on the backside of a full withdrawal might not seem like a great deal for them (sort of a fool me once kinda thing). Honestly, I cant explain Trumps behavior---and can only assume it stems at least partially from his anger over the prior impeachment regarding his "perfect phone call" to Z in his previous term.

(10-16-2026 11:43 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(10-15-2026 09:19 PM)GeminiCoog Wrote:  I just find it hilarious that the left is still trying to say that Trump's a "Russian asset and Putin puppet" when it's been proven time and time again that he isn't. You'd think they'd learn by now to let it go.

I would not go that far---but I would say Trump has shown an increasing tendency to treat the nations enemies better than his allies. That kind of behavior never plays out well over the long term. When it comes to Ukraine, he seems very comfortable requiring massive concessions from Ukraine----but has been reluctant to place any pressure on Russia to make any reasonable concessions. I think Trump was correct in the campaign---this thing should be solved in 24 hours. There is a very logical compromise deal to be made (for instance, his original deal was an excellent example of a reasonable compromise that froze the lines in place and created an international security arrangement for Ukraine)---but any compromise like that requires concessions from BOTH sides---and that is where Trump has failed miserably as a functional mediator. For example, the deal he is currently pushing would require Ukraine to withdraw from the entire Donbass area (which would include their entire prepared multi-layered "fortress city belt" defense line---leaving them much more vulnerable to future attack)---while not providing any specifically defined security arrangement. Ukraine would have to leave itself open and hope that whatever security agreement comes after is adequate to keep them safe with no more fortress belt. Given their experience with the previous Budapest Memorandum security arrangement---you can see how the Ukrainians might not see "hoping for a good mutual security deal" on the backside of a full withdrawal might not seem like a great deal for them (sort of a fool me once kinda thing). Honestly, I cant explain Trumps behavior---and can only assume it stems at least partially from his anger over the prior impeachment regarding his "perfect phone call" to Z in his previous term.

See, that's a fair point. I mean I get it. Ukraine wants to go back to pre-2014 borders. Sadly, that's not gonna happen.

(10-16-2026 11:57 AM)GeminiCoog Wrote:  

(10-16-2026 11:43 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(10-15-2026 09:19 PM)GeminiCoog Wrote:  I just find it hilarious that the left is still trying to say that Trump's a "Russian asset and Putin puppet" when it's been proven time and time again that he isn't. You'd think they'd learn by now to let it go.

I would not go that far---but I would say Trump has shown an increasing tendency to treat the nations enemies better than his allies. That kind of behavior never plays out well over the long term. When it comes to Ukraine, he seems very comfortable requiring massive concessions from Ukraine----but has been reluctant to place any pressure on Russia to make any reasonable concessions. I think Trump was correct in the campaign---this thing should be solved in 24 hours. There is a very logical compromise deal to be made (for instance, his original deal was an excellent example of a reasonable compromise that froze the lines in place and created an international security arrangement for Ukraine)---but any compromise like that requires concessions from BOTH sides---and that is where Trump has failed miserably as a functional mediator. For example, the deal he is currently pushing would require Ukraine to withdraw from the entire Donbass area (which would include their entire prepared multi-layered "fortress city belt" defense line---leaving them much more vulnerable to future attack)---while not providing any specifically defined security arrangement. Ukraine would have to leave itself open and hope that whatever security agreement comes after is adequate to keep them safe with no more fortress belt. Given their experience with the previous Budapest Memorandum security arrangement---you can see how the Ukrainians might not see "hoping for a good mutual security deal" on the backside of a full withdrawal might not seem like a great deal for them (sort of a fool me once kinda thing). Honestly, I cant explain Trumps behavior---and can only assume it stems at least partially from his anger over the prior impeachment regarding his "perfect phone call" to Z in his previous term.

See, that's a fair point. I mean I get it. Ukraine wants to go back to pre-2014 borders. Sadly, that's not gonna happen.

Like I said---BOTH sides will have to make concessions. I agree. It aint going back to the 2014 lines. I dont even think Ukraine should expect to go back to the 2022 borders. The deal I think is there to be made is freezing the lines in place and supplying Ukraine with a Article 5 level security guarantee (be it from NATO or from some coalition of EU nations---that also includes at least 2 nuclear powers---one of which will likely have to be the USA). If we can create a defense coalition that includes nuclear powers France and UK---and not have the US as part of it---thats the best route for us. That said---Im not sure either side will respect the security arrangement if the US is totally out of it---which is why I suspect we will end up have to be part of the security arrangement to get the deal to work. The details can be hashed out---but the broad outline of the deal I think can be made is freeze the lines (Russia gets what they have conquered---and Ukraine can agree not to recognize the taking, but Ukraine would also agree to ONLY use negotiations to reclaim that territory) and Ukraine gets a legit Article 5 security gurantee from a coalition capable of enforcing it. The deal has to be something that BOTH sides can sell to their public as "victory".

(10-15-2026 09:19 PM)GeminiCoog Wrote:  I just find it hilarious that the left is still trying to say that Trump's a "Russian asset and Putin puppet" when it's been proven time and time again that he isn't. You'd think they'd learn by now to let it go.

We've seen it before. They expect their idiots to believe it. Mueller? Mueller?

Quote:Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian data centres may change how we see disinformation

Olga Boichak, University of Sydney

....
Ukraine’s strikes came after Russian attacks on Ukrainian data centres and internet service providers. They also follow a precedent set by Iran earlier this year when it hit data centres in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in response to American attacks.
....
Typically, data centres use redundancy and backups to make sure losing a single facility does not have permanent negative consequences. Even so, the Iranian strikes resulted in long-term degradation of services and irrecoverable loss of some data.

Russian data centres may have less in the way of international redundancy options. This is due to a particular vision of “digital sovereignty”, which Moscow has actively championed over the past decade.

The idea that nations should have autonomy and control over their own digital data and infrastructures is a sound one. However, Russia’s pursuit of “sovereignty” has enabled it to censor online information and isolate Russian users from global internet services.
....
Disinformation and influence

Disinformation is often considered as the strategic spreading of deliberate falsehoods. Governments have often tried to fight it by removing or debunking these falsehoods on the platforms where they circulate.

However, influence operations work in many different ways. Not all of them propagate falsehoods. Most of them aim to undermine public trust and delegitimise democratic processes and institutions.

In Australia’s 2023 referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, for example, campaigners generated plausible competing narratives to exacerbate political polarisation. In New Zealand, influence operations have involved avalanches of misogynistic abuse to derail public support for policy initiatives.

Russia is known for its orchestrated interventions in democratic politics around the world. The goal of these interventions has often been to sow dissent, distrust, and dismay. Supporting candidates with pro-Russian stances can also be a goal.

Civil society and activist communities have developed creative approaches to tackling this problem. These have included debunking, prebunking (pre-emptively countering false claims), reporting misleading content to platforms, or strategically using humour and memes.

Digital sovereignty can create points of weakness

The data centre attacks in Russia are a reminder that Russian internet services—including influence operations—depend on physical infrastructure. Whether or not the strikes have led to a significant reduction in disinformation bot activity this time around, targeting the physical sources of disinformation may still be an effective way to contain it.

There are over 100 data centres operating on Russian territory. Few of them have backups and resilience plans in place.

Concentrating all digital operations in a relatively small number of physical sites creates a vulnerability. Once this infrastructure is hit, rebuilding can be slow and challenging, especially as Russia is reliant on China to supply advanced semiconductors.

Lessons for democracies

What does this mean for efforts to counter Russian disinformation and influence operations more broadly?

One set of solutions might involve imposing physical or regulatory limits (such as sanctions) on Russian-based platforms and services such as Telegram. Other solutions would require international cooperation to undermine Russia’s capability to inflict harm in the digital environments. This may include supporting Ukraine’s efforts on the battlefront through bilateral security agreements.

In any case, the recent events have shown that Russia’s digital influence extensively relies on physical infrastructures: data centres, scarce semiconductor materials, and a domestic platform ecosystem that has been splintered from the world wide web.

As the Kremlin continues to isolate itself in the name of sovereignty, it is also becoming more vulnerable to attacks and disruptions.

Democracies can draw lessons from these events. Digital sovereignty is not achieved through isolation and vertical control over digital infrastructures. Instead, it is constantly negotiated through geographically distributed backups, frameworks for risk and governance, and strategic alliances that keep critical systems running and make them resilient to attacks.

https://theconversation.com/ukraines-dro...ion-294344

Huh? I can't hear what that fool said. I can't see its drivel any longer, but I STILL have to scroll through MULTIPLE pointless threads by it to get to something I'm actually interested in.

Stop responding and giving it the attention it desperately needs, and it will eventually go elsewhere searching for the attention its mommy didn't give it while it was a child. Its mom probably has green hair and a beer belly many men would be proud of