The AAC is entering a period of dramatic transition, but nowhere is the contrast in institutional competence more evident than the divergent paths taken by Memphis and USF. One program is operating like a lean, agile private equity firm. The other is a tech startup torching cash for manufactured relevance -- trading long-term solvency and competitiveness for the cheap dopamine hits of social media likes, catalyzing crushing debt that will constrain them for decades.
Dramatically divergent philosophies define this game. Consistently, Memphis is demonstrating decision-making based on value, structure, and long-term alignment. USF is allowing class insecurity, branding, and short-term, unsustainable optics to project an illusion of strength and financial health. How much value genuinely exists in buying your way to relevance when it's completely void of infrastructure, donor base, or even the institutional discipline to sustain it all?
A comparison of football hiring allows one to scrutinize ground zero of these opposing strategies. Consider this. When Arkansas paid a premium to poach Ryan Silverfield and his staff, Memphis Athletic Director Ed Scott immediately pivoted, redirecting the capital to finance Charles Huff's buyout at Southern Miss, turning a liability into an asset with the savvy of a corporate raider. In Huff, Ed Scott delivered a battle-hardened CEO-type leader with real recruiting chops validated at multiple destinations. He’s a proven program builder, demonstrating genuine autonomy with the results to back it up. This is what a healthy, upwardly mobile athletic department does. They take the opportunities presented and maximize ROI.
Let's contrast that with USF. Upon losing Golesh to Auburn, they eschew the entire landscape of high-quality coaching options to hyper-focus on a single candidate with little demonstrated high-level leadership. The record shows that Hartline has never independently run an offense, never managed a full staff, and was effectively demoted when Day had to bring in Chip Kelly to run the offense -- nothing in that resume screams "ready-made CEO material." Was he an elite recruiter or simply benefiting from the sheer institutional momentum and gravitas of the Ohio State brand with the accompanying NIL infrastructure? Ryan Day publicly stating that they were "embracing" the change, in a world of corporate-speak laden optics, is hardly an endorsement.
The Bulls are reportedly paying Hartline roughly $3.5M annually and another $6.2M for assistants. This for an "offensive coordinator" who was superseded. If an individual can’t be relied upon to manage half of a team, is it reasonable to believe they can run the entire program? For an "elite offensive mind", seems odd for Hartline to hire a tarnished retread in Tim Beck, an individual whose head coaching tenure at Coastal Carolina just sputtered out due to an unimaginative, regressive offense. Making matters worse, part of the package involved bringing in Hartline's brother, previously a low-level analyst on Beck's staff, and giving him a massive promotion to QB coach. By any measure, these were not smart hires nor were they defensible uses of critical funding.
Compare that to Memphis and Charles Huff. During his introductory speech, Coach Huff promised a dynamic offense where they would snap the ball as quickly as possible, leveraging the fastest personnel available in the portal. Immediately, Huff hires Decker as offensive coordinator for the Tigers -- a proven modern and innovative offensive play caller who has demonstrated competence and the ability to simplify an offense, maximizing lower-tier talent, at every stop; delivering highly ranked offensive units at the national level. Wasting no effort, Huff followed this by recruiting Guidry -- the former Miami defensive coordinator with whom he had a prior relationship at Marshall. The same defensive coordinator who helped to engineer Marshall's demolition of #8 Notre Dame in South Bend.
None of this even broaches the massive financial disparities between institutions. USF is attempting to project financial strength. They're actually demonstrating nothing but deflection and misdirection, kicking the can down the road.
Consider they couldn't prevent Providence from poaching Bryan Hodgson after managing their best basketball season in a generation. A first-year head coach wins the AAC regular season, the conference tournament, Coach of the Year, and qualifies for the NCAA tournament after an almost fifteen-year drought. Instead of having the solvency to lock him down with an extension and NIL backing, they allow a small regional school to pluck him away with little resistance. Championship execution? Perhaps for Providence, but not for a $100M+ athletic department with 50K+ students.
No discussion of USF is complete without highlighting the magical thinking involved in their OCS efforts, which warrants peeling back the reality beyond the hype machine. The facts are that debt service alone is costing the University roughly $20M a year, for the next 20 years, and that's only half of the picture. Aside from the Truist Bank financing, the school is on the hook for the other half. To make this possible, USF initiated a campaign of "borrowing" from university reserves -- a literal patchwork of internal funds, student-linked money, and a one-time asset monetization.
If that sounds like financial insanity, that’s because it is. They're transparently bleeding operating funds from their own cash reserves and endowment pools:
- $50M extracted via the USF Foundation. Advancing cash on future gifts, meaning they're borrowing against donations that haven't even materialized yet.
- Raiding the Capital Improvement Trust Fund, siphoning an additional $31M of state-controlled assets which in reality is student-generated capital -- they’re diverting funding that is earmarked to benefit their student body to service the stadium.
- Depleting auxiliary funds, again intended to service students, earmarked for housing, dining, parking, etc.
- Selling off their University-owned long-term media/spectrum-related assets to squeeze an additional $34M.
They are quite literally compromising the student experience to subsidize a stadium that they can't afford. It's no wonder the Florida Division of Bond Finance director, J. Ben Watkins III, explicitly flagged concerns that the plan relies heavily on highly speculative and volatile projected stadium revenues and donations, not on existing, stable athletics revenue. He warned that under-performance could force budget cuts or additional subsidies. Clearly not a glowing endorsement.
The bottom line? Operating capital that could go to academics, operations, or to bolster reserves is being diverted to athletics at an unprecedented and unsustainable rate. Before a single coach is paid, a single player receives revenue shares, or a single game is played; they're writing a $20M check for principal and interest every single year over the next two decades. This money is non-discretionary, and Truist Bank gets that money off the top.
Guess what happens if ticket revenue is mediocre, donations are inconsistent, revenue sharing and NIL siphons money away, or the conference-generated revenue declines due to various factors? You have to keep raiding the institution to keep the lights on.
USF is a cautionary case study in institutional malfeasance and certainly not a sustainable model for replication. Consider their well-documented track record: making exactly the wrong decisions at every major fork in their athletic department history. Is this the kind of institution one should refer to as a template for success? No, USF isn't a model, it's a self-inflicted warning label.