(02-22-2026 12:52 AM)bobdizole Wrote:  We are going to attack. I just can't see Trump the businessman spending all the money required to move all these assets into place as a show of force. By Friday, Iran's military will be crippled.

They might have a little boo boo after we throw our little fit for a week or so, but we won’t be able to make much of a dent in their military.

They have been planning for attack and receiving attacks for decades.

They weren’t born yesterday.

Yes, we will claim we did all this damage and showed them up, but I’m less sure anything will come of it.

Perhaps people will rise up? It’s certainly not out of the question.

But counting on that because of a few strikes is likely going to be a big disappointment. If we really bomb the hell out of the whole country, then yes, it’s more likely.

Unless they rally around the flag after being attacked. That’s also possible.

(02-22-2026 01:20 AM)Todor Wrote:  

(02-21-2026 08:21 PM)bullet Wrote:  

(02-21-2026 04:58 PM)Todor Wrote:  As long as Israel has a total puppet in the White House, there is no amount of money we won’t borrow to use against Iran lol.

So is he an Israeli puppet or a Nazi supporting Nazis in Ukraine? Can't y'all keep your stories straight?

He’s definitely not supporting Ukraine. He’s mocked them, openly insulted their president, and cut their aid.

Trump is a Putin man all the way. Everyone can see it.

Trump will $hit on Ukraine over and over, just like the cesspool deserves.

You're a Pootin man yourself so that should make you happy.

(02-22-2026 01:26 AM)Todor Wrote:  

(02-22-2026 12:52 AM)bobdizole Wrote:  We are going to attack. I just can't see Trump the businessman spending all the money required to move all these assets into place as a show of force. By Friday, Iran's military will be crippled.

They might have a little boo boo after we throw our little fit for a week or so, but we won’t be able to make much of a dent in their military.

They have been planning for attack and receiving attacks for decades.

They weren’t born yesterday.

Yes, we will claim we did all this damage and showed them up, but I’m less sure anything will come of it.

Perhaps people will rise up? It’s certainly not out of the question.

But counting on that because of a few strikes is likely going to be a big disappointment. If we really bomb the hell out of the whole country, then yes, it’s more likely.

Unless they rally around the flag after being attacked. That’s also possible.

They had been planning for decades against this summer's US attacks---yet the US was able to exert complete air superiority over Iran in just few hours (something Russia hasnt been able to do over Ukraine after almost 4 full years of fighting).

As for reaching the goal of "crippling" the Iranian military---that depends on what one means by "crippling". The primary goal is to end their nuclear development threat and heavily degrade the Iranian long range missile capabilities. A lot to accomplish that goal can be done from the air. That said--rather than try to do that all with air strikes, I think the actual US preference is to use the attacks to pressure the Iranian government to agree to a verifiable treaty that ends its nuclear ambitions, reduces its long range missile capabilities, and ends its support of violent proxies in the area.

If the US attacks, I think it will be MUCH different from the quick little hissy fit type strike you are expecting. It will not be just a few rough days for the Iranians like last summer. I think it will be a long grueling continuous air campaign that just grinds on and on----more like what we saw in Serbia against Milosevic or even like the extended pre-invasion air campaign against Saddam's forces in Iraq. Once communications and defense forces are degraded enough---quick hit and run special forces attacks on nuclear installations and key leadership hubs are not out of the question as part of the campaign. With the defense forces in hunker down mode, the people will be difficult to control---and that loss of control is the REAL danger to the regime and why I think they will eventually end up signing a deal in order to preserve their hold on power. If the Iranian leadership is not willing to agree to a deal---then I suspect the grinding air campaign will continue day after day after day----eroding the current leadership's ability to govern until the regime finally wobbles and then falls. Serbia held out against the NATO air campaign for 78 days----but that government was actually popular with its people. I dont think an Iranian government already teetering on the edge of revolt can last nearly as long as Serbia did.

Here is a summary of the Wall Street Journal article concerning risks of a major operation against Iran

Pentagon warnings—led by Gen. Dan Caine (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)—about the risks of military action against Iran, especially a prolonged or sustained campaign. These are framed as standard, conservative military assessments provided to President Trump and civilian leaders during contingency planning

Main risks highlighted:
U.S. and allied casualties — Significant potential losses from Iranian retaliation, including missile strikes on U.S. bases across the Middle East, attacks on troops, or proxy actions by groups like Hezbollah and Hamas targeting U.S. personnel, embassies, or Americans abroad. Iranian threats include sinking U.S. warships, and officials note Iran would likely "fire everything it has" to defend the regime.

Vulnerability during operations — American pilots exposed to Iranian air defenses during repeated bombing runs; Iranian missiles/drones targeting U.S. forces or allies (e.g., Israel, as seen in prior conflicts like the 12-day war in June 2025).

Depleted munitions and air defenses — Exhaustion of limited stockpiles of interceptors (Patriot, THAAD, SM-3), potentially lasting only ~2 weeks against intense Iranian missile volleys. This strains defenses for regional partners and impacts readiness for other threats (e.g., future conflict with China). Past events (e.g., defending Israel from Iranian barrages in June 2025; prolonged Yemen/Houthi campaign in spring 2025) already revealed "alarming gaps" and forced conservation of scarce weapons.

Overtaxed force and readiness strain — Overextension of personnel and assets in a complex, prolonged operation. Examples include the USS Gerald R. Ford's record-breaking extended deployment (at sea since June 2025, potentially 11 months), with issues like sewage problems, fatigued/overtaxed sailors (some considering leaving the Navy), and risks of accidents/mistakes from high operational tempo (e.g., USS Harry S. Truman losing jets in Red Sea operations in 2025 due to similar strain).

Broader escalation and regional war — High potential for a sustained campaign to draw the U.S. into a wider Middle East conflict, far more complex/dangerous than shorter operations (e.g., recent Venezuela action). Limited allied support increases burdens on U.S. forces; retaliation could complicate protection of partners and lead to entanglement.

Strategic trade-offs — Heavy use of resources/munitions in Iran could undermine preparations for higher-priority contingencies (e.g., China), with prior commitments to Ukraine/Israel already straining supplies.

Options range from limited initial strikes to multi-day/week aerial campaigns (potentially regime-toppling), but prolonged ones carry the highest costs in lives, resources, and strategic positioning.

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-se...lista_pos1

IMO, the limitations and risks point to a limited, but powerful punch to Iran's ambitions.

(02-24-2026 07:38 AM)Tiger1983 Wrote:  Here is a summary of the Wall Street Journal article concerning risks of a major operation against Iran

Pentagon warnings—led by Gen. Dan Caine (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)—about the risks of military action against Iran, especially a prolonged or sustained campaign. These are framed as standard, conservative military assessments provided to President Trump and civilian leaders during contingency planning

Main risks highlighted:
U.S. and allied casualties — Significant potential losses from Iranian retaliation, including missile strikes on U.S. bases across the Middle East, attacks on troops, or proxy actions by groups like Hezbollah and Hamas targeting U.S. personnel, embassies, or Americans abroad. Iranian threats include sinking U.S. warships, and officials note Iran would likely "fire everything it has" to defend the regime.

Vulnerability during operations — American pilots exposed to Iranian air defenses during repeated bombing runs; Iranian missiles/drones targeting U.S. forces or allies (e.g., Israel, as seen in prior conflicts like the 12-day war in June 2025).

Depleted munitions and air defenses — Exhaustion of limited stockpiles of interceptors (Patriot, THAAD, SM-3), potentially lasting only ~2 weeks against intense Iranian missile volleys. This strains defenses for regional partners and impacts readiness for other threats (e.g., future conflict with China). Past events (e.g., defending Israel from Iranian barrages in June 2025; prolonged Yemen/Houthi campaign in spring 2025) already revealed "alarming gaps" and forced conservation of scarce weapons.

Overtaxed force and readiness strain — Overextension of personnel and assets in a complex, prolonged operation. Examples include the USS Gerald R. Ford's record-breaking extended deployment (at sea since June 2025, potentially 11 months), with issues like sewage problems, fatigued/overtaxed sailors (some considering leaving the Navy), and risks of accidents/mistakes from high operational tempo (e.g., USS Harry S. Truman losing jets in Red Sea operations in 2025 due to similar strain).

Broader escalation and regional war — High potential for a sustained campaign to draw the U.S. into a wider Middle East conflict, far more complex/dangerous than shorter operations (e.g., recent Venezuela action). Limited allied support increases burdens on U.S. forces; retaliation could complicate protection of partners and lead to entanglement.

Strategic trade-offs — Heavy use of resources/munitions in Iran could undermine preparations for higher-priority contingencies (e.g., China), with prior commitments to Ukraine/Israel already straining supplies.

Options range from limited initial strikes to multi-day/week aerial campaigns (potentially regime-toppling), but prolonged ones carry the highest costs in lives, resources, and strategic positioning.

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-se...lista_pos1

IMO, the limitations and risks point to a limited, but powerful punch to Iran's ambitions.

I'd say "overtaxed/readiness strain" is the one I think is most likely. Iran's retaliation is likely limited to one big volley with the continuous non-stop attacks degrading the ability for similar follow up retaliations. There is risk from the initial big return volley---but after that----you'll see retaliation attempts that are less coordinated and progressively smaller as the Iranian capabilities are ground down to nothing. I dont see the loss of a ship as likely----they would be fortunate to even hit a US ship---much less sink one. As long as the bigger anti-air systems radars are taken out early like last time, that should allow US air operations to be done from higher altitudes where smaller anti-air systems and shoulder fired missiles cant reach severely limiting aircraft losses from enemy fire (especially when supported by F-18 Growlers). I just dont see the government being able to hold out very long if their forces are stuck in "hunker down mode" while their population is in revolt.