(06-09-2026 11:38 PM)The Beaver Wrote: (06-09-2026 11:19 PM)msu35 Wrote: (06-09-2026 11:06 PM)The Beaver Wrote: (06-09-2026 10:39 PM)msu35 Wrote: (06-09-2026 10:17 PM)The Beaver Wrote: Next time you accuse me of something please make sure it was something I actually did. I didn't say that you weren't allowed to comment, I said that your comments were totally irrelevant.
If that's your position, so be it. I assert that the intersection between the Ili-Mirer case, the CSC, and the P2 duopoly lies in basic antitrust law. That makes the commentary that I posted very relevant to the thread.
Looking at the rules of the "NIL Go" clearinghouse without looking at the massive consolidation of power in college sports is a mistake. The CSC didn't appear out of nowhere; it was built by the biggest conferences to act as a centralized system to control and limit how much players can be compensated in a professionalized market.
When independent conferences join forces to create a single authority that reviews and restricts player income, they are working together to artificially cap what those players are worth. The Ili-Mirer lawsuit explicitly targets this setup, arguing it is a coordinated effort to keep player pay below true market value -- which is objectively true. It only exists to protect the P4's bottom line, pressured by the unsustainable arms race that was created as a byproduct of House v. NCAA.
Therefore, the lopsided power dynamic and the joint actions of the top conferences are the core of this entire legal dispute. The clearinghouse rules exist because the P4 cartel tried to collectively corner and regulate the market, driven by the massive consolidation of wealth at the very top. This likely won't go well for the conferences involved, and I expect the legal action to be successful. In my opinion, it's about time.
This isn't about anti-trust law and you would know that if you read the article. It is about price-fixing. The CSC and the parties to the House settlement which set it up (the P4 and the NCAA, but only because that is who Andrew House and his associates listed on the lawsuit and later came to terms with,) are being sued because they are using it to put an illegal upward cap on payment to athletes. While most people think of price-fixing as sellers colluding, it is a thing for buyers too and that is what is at issue here.
See, that's where you're mistaken, and no jabs about whether I read the article or not changes that. This is absolutely about antitrust law. The point regarding buyer-side price-fixing is exactly the core of why this issue is so significant. When sellers collude, it harms consumers; when buyers collude, it artificially suppresses the market value of labor. Therein lies the crux.
The intersection between this specific price-fixing mechanism and broader antitrust law is found directly in Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which is the exact federal statute governing the Ili-Mirer v. NCAA complaint. The lawsuit explicitly targets the College Sports Commission's (CSC) "NIL Go" clearinghouse setup as the vehicle for this concerted action.
Because the plaintiffs are seeking class-action status on behalf of all DI men's football and basketball players across 17 "NIL Rights States" (where local laws explicitly protect unrestricted player earnings), the potential financial implications are massive. Under federal antitrust rules, a successful challenge to an illegal upward cap carries mandatory treble damages. Given the high-finance environment and multi-million dollar valuations fueled by the P4's media revenue, a certified class could elevate potential liabilities to an astronomical level that would destroy the cartel.
When combined with the collapsing regulatory authority of the NCAA on the eligibility side -- as seen with the recent state-court injunction granted to Sorsby -- the entire collegiate enforcement framework is facing unprecedented legal exposure. The joint effort to regulate the market without a collective bargaining agreement leaves the current system highly vulnerable, and I look forward to the outcome.
Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1):
Quote:Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
They are being sued specifically over the CSC, which has only "taken effect" this year, with many schools yet to sign on to it. Treble damages, so paying players 3 times what they were worth for a single year, wouldn't put a dent in even the shakiest of P4 schools, let alone the P2 conferences as a whole. And while the lack of legislation around professional sports might well spell disaster for the NCAA it will do nothing to quench the value of the top brands in college sports, nor their right to form leagues and associations with each other, to make those associations exclusive and to offer up so-called national champions in them. And outside organizations do not have an inherent right to inclusion in that.
The assertion that treble damages (e.g. paying players three times what they were worth for a single year) "wouldn't put a dent in even the shakiest of P4 schools" collapses under a simple look at the legal mechanics and numbers.
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15), antitrust damages aren't calculated on a quirky, school-by-school basis where an individual player sues their specific university for a single year of backpay. The Ili-Mirer lawsuit is seeking certified class-action status representing
all Division I men's football and basketball players across 17 "NIL Rights States." This means we're talking about thousands of athletes -- this is not debatable.
In a free market unsuppressed by the CSC's "NIL Go" clearinghouse, the market value of labor for an elite P4 starting quarterback or star basketball player commands anywhere from $500K to $5M+ annually based on media-rights revenue. The artificial "upward cap" imposed by the CSC suppresses that market value by hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars per athlete.
Let's use very conservative arithmetic here to avoid claims of bias or hyperbole. If the CSC suppresses player value by an average of just $150K per athlete across a class of, say, 2,500 athletes in those states for a single cycle, the actual damages ($150,000 x 2,500) equal $375M. Under federal law, the court doesn't ask nicely. It applies a mandatory tripling of the baseline damages:
$375,000,000 x 3 = $1,125,000,000
So now, that $375M suddenly becomes $1.125B. Again, this was
very conservative and likely not even approaching the true damages.
The assumption that individual "shakiest P4 schools" can simply shrug this off because "many schools have yet to sign on" completely ignores the most brutal rule of federal antitrust law:
Defendants face joint and several liability, and there is NO right to contribution. If the NCAA, the CSC, and the P4 conferences are found liable for a $1.125B judgment, any single defendant can be held responsible for the
entire multi-billion dollar amount. The plaintiffs don't have to politely collect a few million from the "shakiest" schools; they can collect the entire $1.125B payout directly from the wealthiest conferences or the primary cartel entities.
When you inject a $1.125B+ uninsurable antitrust liability into a system already choking on the $2.8B debt settlement from House v. NCAA, the entire financial infrastructure of the collegiate model instantly faces total insolvency. The "shakiest" schools won't just feel a "dent" -- their entire athletic departments will be liquidated or forced into immediate contraction.
Furthermore, the previous assertion that "This isn't about anti-trust law... It is about price-fixing" remains a glaring, fundamental contradiction. To be clear, buyer-side price-fixing (monopsony) is a direct, textbook violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Saying price-fixing isn't antitrust law is like saying murder isn't criminal law. Taking a jab and replying that I "would know that if you read the article" is particularly ironic given the text of the article. From the article, verbatim:
Class-action lawsuit filed against NCAA, power conferences and College Sports Commission over House settlement
Quote:Two California football players have filed a class-action lawsuit against the NCAA, the power conferences and the College Sports Commission, claiming those entities created a new enforcement arm whose policies directly contradict state statutes and violate federal antitrust law by illegally price-fixing.
The bottom line is that the CSC "NIL Go" clearinghouse was designed specifically to act as a centralized, non-market mechanism to suppress labor costs. This is not an opinion. By implementing it without a collective bargaining agreement or an explicit antitrust exemption from Congress, the P4 cartel walked directly into a massive, multi-billion dollar legal problem that won't simply go away -- we all know the Supreme Court's opinion on these matters, and the courts have strongly asserted that the college athletics power structure
is not above the law.
The value of the top brands may not "quench," but their ability to run an illegal, coordinated labor cartel absolutely will. The math is completely unassailable, and the statutory liability is absolute. The law and the math are unambiguous.