(11-01-2023 09:35 AM)stinkfist Wrote: (11-01-2023 12:36 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote: Build the strongest military in the world, able to prosecute successfully JFK's 2-1/2 wars standard, and never have to use it because nobody dares pick a fight with us and we don't go around picking on them.
does the US not already have such?
Nope. At least nothing even remotely close to the 2-1/2 war standard.
A large part of the problem is that we have been wasting a large part of our military capacity in wars that we have not fought to win, going back at least to Vietnam. In addition to the lives, limbs, and equipment that we have lost in the MidEast in the last 20 years, our readiness has atrophied because plinking goat herders in pickup trucks is poor training for a peer war. Additionally spending for that effort has come at the expense of maintenance and training that are essential for continued readiness.
I'm most familiar with the Navy, so will provide a few examples from that branch, with the understanding that the others have similar issues. Our submarine fleet is the smallest it has been in some time, and getting smaller, as we are retiring the Los Angeles class years before the expiration of their design service lives, and not replacing them on a 1 to 1 basis. We are down to two shipyards that can build nuke subs, both on the east coast, and thus do not have the capability to regrow numbers. About 30% of that smaller sub fleet is currently unable to get underway because of maintenance and repair backlogs. In my active duty days we had 15 aircraft carriers, each with an air wing of 90-100 aircraft; today we have 11 carriers with air wings of 60 or so. That's roughly a 50% reduction in combat aircraft. Our newest aircraft carrier class, the Fords, cost about $15B each, roughly the cost of a nuke Nimitz ($9B) plus a conventioanally powered Kitty Hawk ($6B), and they have reliability issues with their catapults, arresting gear, weapons lifts--and toilets. We do not have a viable anti-submarine warfare (ASW), naval gunfire support (NGFS), or mine warfare (MIW) capability. We have a bunch of very expensive amphibious ships (one LHA/LHD costs up to $4B) that cannot conduct opposed amphibious landings. So the Marines have gotten rid of their tanks and artillery and are getting out of the amphibious assault mission to chase some expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concept that looks like a bunch of boy scouts with BB guns.
No, we are not. ready for 2-1/2 wars. Nowhere close.
What do we have to do? At least for the Navy,
1) Grow the fleet. The Navy is planning a fleet in the 300-350 ship range, at an average cost of $2.8B/ship. That is not adequate, particularly considering that the ships the Navy proposes to build do not address the current ASW, NGFS, and MIW shortfalls. We need a return to the 600-ship goal of the 1980s (we got to 594 before the post-Cold-War drawdown). We can do that by adopting ADM Elmo Zumwalt's high/low concept of building some expensive multi-mission ships of the kind that the Navy wants, and fillilng out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships to reduce cost/ship to $1.5B.
2) Cut down the amount of time that ships spend on deployment, to make more time for maintenance and training at home. To some extent, growing the numbers will help because 100 deployed ships out of 300 means the average ship is deployed 4 months/year, whereas with 600 ships that deployment time is reduced to 2 months/year, freeing up 2 more months for maintenance and training. Another step that would help is building alliances that can take over some of our current commitments. An alliance with the British Commonwealth would enable transferring some European commitments to the Royal Navy, some Indian Ocean commitments to India, and some WestPac commitments to Australia, India, Malaysia, and Singapore. Finally, we probably need to re-evaluate some commitments to determine whether they should be retained or dropped.
3) Implement more realistic training, and more of it. Between WWI and WWII, the USN engaged in an annual Fleet Problem which involved a major portion of the fleet and which simulated WWII developments like Pearl Harbor and island-hopping. The Royal Navy for years conducted a major SpringTrain exercise out of Gibraltar, the 1982 version of which was given a lot of credit for preparing ships that deployed to the Falklands for that effort. The Brits also have a Perisher course for prospective submarine COs which I think we should adopt for all ship COs and a rigorous FOST (Fleet Office Sea Training) program that all ships must pass before deployment. The first deployment of the Queen Elizabeth was delayed becuse it initially flunked FOST.
4) Increase the number and capacity of shipyards to grow and maintain the fleet (and maintenance is the biggie there). I have proposed adopting some European ship designs, to save money with cheaper designs plus the expectation that some European yards would be willing to build/rehabilitate yards in the USA to build such ships. They usually build 5-10 ships of a class for their own navies, a small order for the USN would be 20 or so, and such runs could generate ROIs that would justify the kinds of investments that the French Naval Group made at Itaguai to build the Riachuelo conventional subs plus a nuke sub or two for the Brazilian navy.
5) And for all branches, never fight a war that you don't intend to win.