I remember one of Tom Clancy's books where a sub runs into massive waterlogged piece of timber that had fallen off a vessel transporting logs.

Actually, there were a lot of "hitting unidentified objects" during the Cold War for submarines too.

Maybe they accidentally found the Malaysian airplane that disappeared years ago.

I can make such jokes as I served in the US Navy for over a decade. And like many things, I would NEVER recommend either of my boys follow my footsteps to join what is now a "woke" and incompetent organization that is controlled by leftist political hacks more interested in social engineering than actually acting as a global deterrent to our enemies.

(10-08-2021 03:38 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  I remember one of Tom Clancy's books where a sub runs into massive waterlogged piece of timber that had fallen off a vessel transporting logs.

Yep Sum of All Fears. The ballistic missile boat Maine hits a giant redwood log being shipped to Japan. This gives away it's position to the USSR attack boat Admiral Lunin which leads to the Maine being attacked and sunk. This further pushes the president to thinking the USSR carried out the nuke attack on Denver and is trying to cripple our first strike ability.

Great book, absolute **** movie

Sailors didn't know what to do in USS Bonhomme Richard fire, Navy probe finds

Quote:When a fire broke out aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard in July 2020, its sailors did not know how to react and its leaders didn't take control, a Navy investigation found.

The 400-page report, officially released on Wednesday, found that 36 individuals, including the ship's commander and five admirals, were responsible for numerous errors and breakdowns that followed after the vessel was purposely set on fire while it sat pier-side in San Diego.

“Although the fire was started by an act of arson, the ship was lost due to an inability to extinguish the fire,” the report said.

Once the blaze started, “the response effort was placed in the hands of inadequately trained and drilled personnel from a disparate set of uncoordinated organizations that had not fully exercised together and were unfamiliar with basic issues to include the roles and responsibilities of the various responding entities,” the document notes.

“Overall, this command investigation concluded that the loss of the ship was clearly preventable, and this is unacceptable,” Naval Operations Vice Chief Adm. Bill Lescher told reporters on Wednesday.

The ship was docked at Naval Base San Diego for maintenance when the fire began on July 12 of last year. It burned for more than four days, injuring 63 people, including 40 sailors and 23 civilians, and rendering the ship unsalvageable.

The blaze was started in the Lower V space — which included such equipment as plywood pallets and CO2 bottles — but investigators found that there was confusion early on as to where it was and how to fight it.

A junior sailor who walked through the ship following her watch around 8:10 a.m. noticed a “hazy, white fog” but didn’t report it “because she did not smell smoke.”

But once several others noticed the smoke shortly thereafter, communication faltered and no one established command and control of the situation.

Two firefighting teams eventually attempted to find a usable fire hose, but many were missing or cut and had not been repaired through routine maintenance.

Flame retardant was finally used nearly an hour into the blaze, but the team had to retreat after a few minutes and was not replaced.

Making matters worse, firefighters didn’t pour water onto the fire until two hours after it began, and for the first three hours, the ship’s senior officers did not try to integrate civilian firefighters with its crews.

After the disaster, the investigation found that Bonhomme Richard Capt. Gregory Thoroman “created an environment of poor training, maintenance, and operational standards that led directly to the loss of the ship,” while the second in command, Capt. Michael Ray, was also responsible, as he was meant to maintain crew readiness through drills and exercises.

It was also found that the ship’s sailors were woefully lacking in their firefighting drills. The crew had failed to administer flame-fighting chemicals in 14 consecutive drills prior to the blaze.

Following the report’s release, Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member James Inhofe (R-Okla.) called the incident a “massive failure” and said the Navy “must take immediate and comprehensive corrective actions,” to prevent another such disaster.

“As China increasingly threatens the Indo-Pacific, we certainly can’t afford to lose a large warship from our fleet. I expect the Navy to identify and implement the actions necessary to repair these readiness and leadership gaps,” Inhofe said in a statement.

And Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.), whose district includes a major shipyard for Navy warships, called the missteps around the fire a “faceplant” for the service.

“Our sailors are trained to combat fires with a sense of urgency, and regrettably, this sense of urgency was not present in the early hours of the blaze,” Wittman said in a statement. “This was a $3.5B loss, one that came as the Navy faces competing pressures from a resurgent China and a restrictive budget. This isn’t just one step backwards — this is a faceplant.”

The Navy commissioned the Bonhomme Richard in 1998 for $750 million — about $1.2 billion by today’s standards — though officials estimated it would cost more than double that to repair at $2.5 billion.

The service deemed such a salvage a wash and had the ship decommissioned in November and towed away to be dismantled in April.

The Navy in July brought charges against Seaman Apprentice Ryan Sawyer Mays for his part in the fire.

U.S. Pacific Fleet head Adm. Samuel Paparo has yet to decide whether any other sailor will be relieved of command or face other punishment, but “no disciplinary or administrative options have been taken off the table,” Lescher said.

Link

The Pentagon definitely has plenty of money for the consultants advising them to take the actions leading to these results.

The problem I have with the LHAs/LHDs like the Bonhomme Richard goes back to my days in the Gator (amphibious) Navy. We thought they were putting too many eggs in one basket. They haul around a huge number of men and an immense amount of cargo, so much that they are too big (and have become too expensive, the latest are running $3.8B apiece) to risk in combat. One lucky (or unlucky) missile or torpedo can wipe out your whole assault.

So the Navy has decided upon a concept of operations (CONOPS) where they remain 25-50 miles offshore. I suppose this helps avoid shore-based missiles, but not sure it helps against submarines. The problem is that from that far out, there are no viable ship-to-shore connectors for landing tanks or heavy artillery--boats are too slow, helos and V-22s can't lift the weight, and air-cushion LCACs have been deemed too unreliable for combat.

The Marines have responded by ditching their tanks and artillery, and are now looking for a mission for an ultralight infantry force that amounts to little more than a bunch of boy scouts with BB guns. They have spent the last 50+ years being relegated to "baby army" with a "baby air force," ever since Westmoreland sent them north to I Corps instead of south to the Mekong Delta, and now this. To anyone who respects the tradition of, "the few, the proud," this is a very sad development.

So here's what I'd do.
- Have the Marines do what the Royal Marines did when faced with budgetary extinction in the 1960s and 1970s. Become a smaller, elite force focused on amphibious expeditionary and commando operations. Probably merge the Marines with SOCOM. End up with a Marine Corps of 130-150,000 (probably 30,000 commandos and 90,000 fleet marines, plus admin and training). Give the Marine commandos the task of figuring out how to do counterinsurgency (COIN) ops, the way we tasked them to figure out amphib ops before WWII, since we obviously have nary a clue how to do COIN now. Give the Marine air superiority mission back to the Navy (Guadalcanal was a long time ago) and focus Marine air on ship-to-shore movement and close air support (CAS).
- Reconfigure the Navy's amphibious force around smaller and more versatile ships that can actually do amphibious operations. I would propose a modern amphibious squadron (PhibRon) built around a smaller LHA/LHD (like the Spanish Juan Carlos), a new LPH (like the French Mistral), a simpler LPD/LSD (like the British Albion), a true LST with a beaching bow, a LPA/LKA, and a shore attack frigate. You give up the 20-knot speed that the Navy has insisted upon, because the fastest you can push an LST hull through the water is about 18 knots, but if 2 knots is a killer, then you had serious strategic errors beforehand.
- Convert the existing LHAs/LHDs to interim "Lightning Carrier" CVLs by adding a ski jump bow and converting troop berthing and equipment spaces to additional hangar and aircraft maintenance spaces. They should carry around 40 aircraft, including 24 F-35Bs. Operate them as part of 2-carrier battle groups (CVBGs) or 4-carrier task forces (CTFs). Start design and construction of some conventional carriers (CVs), basically updated Kitty Hawks, which will start to come into the fleet about the time that the service lives of the CVLs start to expire (10-15 years). Stop building Fords ($15B) and go back to building Nimitzes ($9B) and Kittys ($6B) for 2 carriers for the price of 1. You'd have 12 nuclear CVNs and 12 conventional CVLs right away, transitioning ultimately to 12 CVNs and 12 CVs, in 12 CVBGs or 6 CTFs.
- Convert the other overbuilt and overpriced amphibs, the San Antonio class, to the anti-ballistic missile/ballistic missile defense (ABM/BMD) ships that Huntington Heavy Industries (HHI) has proposed for the same hulls. These would provide additional anti-missile defense for the homeland as well as advance bases in places like Guam, Japan, and Europe that are threatened by Chinese or Russian missiles.

I have other ideas for submarines and surface ships, but these changes would upgrade our naval air, amphibious, missile defense, and commando/counterinsurgency forces substantially, for less money than the Navy currently plans to spend.

US Navy to deny all vaccine religious exemptions, disciplining those that speak out

Quote:Leaked documents reveal that the United States Navy plans to deny all religious accommodations for Biden's vaccine mandate, which is in direct violation of Navy policy.

According to a document obtained by The Post Millennial from NAVSEA, the vaccine is mandatory for all US Navy personnel, both civilian and military, as a condition of employment.

"We are moving quickly towards a workforce where vaccinations are a condition of employment. Frankly, if you are not vaccinated, you will not work for the US Navy," Vice Admiral Bill Galinis said in a statement.



Galinis said that vaccination is mandatory in order to fully execute the Navy's missions and added that the pandemic negatively impacted the ability to effectively serve the fleet.



In documents obtained by conservative author Liz Wheeler, the United States Navy plans to issue blanket denial of all religious exemptions. They say granting COVID vaccine exemptions to service members that have taken other vaccinations in the past undermines the seriousness of exemption requests.

The document, which serves as an exemption disapproval template, was issued to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations from Corry Station.

A couple examples of requests that are to be denied include:

• Good order and discipline: "This service member has taken previous Department of the Defense and Department of the Navy mandated vaccines; to allow an exemption for this one specific vaccine, undermines the seriousness of the religious accommodation request and fairness to those that complied and received the COVID-19 vaccine as ordered."

• Health and safety: "Unvaccinated Sailors pose a health risk to themselves and others; no current alternative exists to mitigate this global pandemic safety issue."
Wheeler also reported that despite the US Navy's claims that they need Sailors to be vaccinated in order to complete their missions, an email to IWTC Corry Station stated that mission was achieved despite being in a global pandemic.

Furthermore, Wheeler added that blanket denial of religious exemptions directly violates US Navy policy.

Religious exemption requests for vaccines must be "screened by a Chaplain, reviewed by the CO & fwd'd to the first O-6 in the chain of command for endorsement, then sent from O-6 to Chief of Naval Personnel, VADM John Nowell," Wheeler said.

According to two sworn affidavits from Sailors, CDR Schley said that Captain Ratkus ordered her to deny all religious exemptions which she knows is in direct violation of policy. The Sailors said they overheard her complain about CPT Ratkus forcing her to deny exemptions.

In addition, the United States Navy has been actively targeting service members that have spoken out against the vaccine mandate.

According to documents obtained by The Post Millennial, the Navy suspended high-level security clearance for service members voicing that they are unwillingly to comply.

"The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the intent to suspend your access to classified information and assignment to a sensitive position in the interest of national security," a commanding officer said in a letter.

The commanding officer also ordered them to surrender their security badges.

Wheelers twitter thread unrolled.

I bet the highly paid consultants placed by defense contractors recommend more military spending and long term orders for more new ships.

How to Modernize the Navy with Dr. Jerry Hendrix


Hendrix discusses Frigates with Devin Nunes. US will be building New Frigates designed by the French and Italians. First one in 2025. By 2030 have 8-10. Hendrix talks about bringing Frigates back online from the ghost fleet. The Pentagon rather use them as target practice. China is building a new ship every 6 weeks. The podcast is about 20 minutes long and worth the listen.

Here is the book mentioned in the podcast:

To Provide and Maintain a Navy: Why Naval Primacy Is America's First, Best Strategy

Quote:The national conversation regarding the United States Navy has, for far too long, been focused on the popular question of how many ships does the service need? "To Provide and Maintain a Navy," a succinct but encompassing treatise on sea power by Dr. Henry J "Jerry" Hendrix, goes beyond the numbers to reveal the crucial importance of Mare Liberum (Free Sea) to the development of the Western thought and the rules based order that presently governs the global commons that is the high seas. Proceeding from this philosophical basis, Hendrix explores how a "free sea" gave way to free trade and the central role sea borne commercial trade has played in the overall rise in global living standards. This is followed by analysis of how the relative naval balance of power has played out in terms of naval battles and wars over the centuries and how the dominance of the United States Navy following World War II has resulted in seven decades of unprecedented peace on the world's oceans. He further considers how, in the years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, both China and Russia began laying the groundwork to challenge the United States maritime leadership and upend five centuries of naval precedents in order to establish a new approach to sovereignty over the world's seas. It is only at this point that Dr. Hendrix approaches the question of the number of ships required for the United States Navy, the industrial base required to build them, and the importance of once again aligning the nation's strategic outlook to that of a "seapower" in order to effectively and efficiently address the rising threat. "To Provide and Maintain a Navy" is brief enough to be read in a weekend but deep enough to inform the reader as to the numerous complexities surrounding what promises to be the most important strategic conversation facing the United States as it enters a new age of great power competition with not one, but two nations who seek nothing less than to close and control the world's seas.

(11-13-2021 06:04 PM)CrimsonPhantom Wrote:  US will be building New Frigates designed by the French and Italians.

Except we are not exactly doing that. Our surface navy has a potential hole at the top of the capability chain with the pending premature retirement of the 22 remaining Ticonderoga cruisers, and a big hole at the bottom because since we retired the Knoxes and the Perrys prematurely, we don't have any dedicated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates. When the Berlin wall fell we decided that we would never have to play ASW again, and that is proving to be a major miscalculation. Both the Ticonderogas and the Burke destroyers focus primarily on anti-air warfare (AAW). You don’t really want something as expensive as a Tico ($3B today) or a Burke ($1.8B) chasing subs. The LCSs were going to be ASW ships, but their engines are too noisy and blank out their sonars, so they are useless for that (or anything else, for that matter—the faster we turn them into diving reefs, the better).

The FREMMs (the French-Italian ships) are pretty good general-purpose escorts, for ASW and anti-surface warfare (ASuW), like destroyers in WWII. With them plus a potential new class of specialized ASW frigates, we could plug the bottom end ASuW/ASW hole. But that’s not what we are doing. Instead we are modifying the FREMM design to carry the AEGIS AAW radar system, and apparently building 20 of them as cheaper and much less capable (32 missile tubes versus 122) replacements for the Ticos that the Navy wants to retire early.

In another thread, I proposed a fleet structure to address each of the Navy’s mission needs. I am repeating it here, adding annotation for what the Navy has and/or is proposing to build:

Role/Mission – My Proposal – Navy’s Proposed Fleet

Nuclear strike – 12 SSBNs – Same
Conventional strike – 20 SSGNs, 30 Virginia VPM SSNs – 5 SSGNs, 28 Virginia VPMs
Fleet air defense and strike – 12 CVNs – 11 CVNs
Aviation escort – 12 CVL/CVE conversions initially, replaced by 12 CVs – None
ASuW and Land Attack – 8 battlecarriers – None
ASW hunter-killer – 8 ASW helo carriers – None
ASuW and escort – 20 cruisers – None
AAW – carriers, cruisers, 40 AAW destroyers (Burkes) – 40 Burkes, 20 FFG(X) (the FREMMs)
ASuW and ASW – 60 GP escorts – None (FREMMs converted to AAW)
ASW – 80 ASW frigates – None
ASW and convoy escorts – 30 ASW corvettes – None
Patrol and ASuW--30 missile patrol boats – None
ABM/BMD – 12 ABM/BMD conversions – Secondary role for Burkes
Power projection – 60 amphib ships – 13 LHA/LHD, 25 LPD/LSD
Mine warfare – 30 mine countermeasures (MCM) ships – None
Submarine warfare/ASW – 30 Virginia VPM SSNs, 30 smaller and cheaper SSNs (Barracudas?), 30 SSKs – 28 Virginia VPMs, 31 Virginia replacement SSNs

So, the Navy will have big holes in ASuW, ASW, MCM, and coastal/littoral warfare. Also, with fewer SSGNs (the optimum conventional strike platforms) the Navy’s strike power will be severely reduced, and the Navy will be relying on the Burkes for ABM/BMD protection, instead of having dedicated ships. And the Marines are getting out of the amphibious warfare business, so power projection ashore will be dicey at best.

And based on CBO or other best available sources, my proposed 600-ship fleet would cost the same $840B to build, or $28B/year over 30 years, as the Navy’s proposed 355-ship fleet, because my cost/ship is roughly half the Navy’s--$9B Nimitzes and $6B conventional CVs versus $15B Fords, $2B Barracudas versus $5B Virginia replacements, $5B Ohio-based SSGNs versus $8B Columbia-based SSGNs, a cheaper amphibious force than $3.8B LHAs/LHDs and $2.2B LPDs, and including smaller, cheaper units like SSKs, corvettes, and patrol boats.

USS Gerald R. Ford Needs Parts from Carrier Kennedy for Repairs; Navy Says ‘Cannibalization’ Won’t Delay JFK Schedule

Quote:The Navy is taking parts from an aircraft carrier currently under construction and placing them on USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) so the lead ship is ready to deploy next year, USNI News has learned.

The parts are coming from the future USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), the second ship in the Ford class of aircraft carriers that is currently under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Va.

Capt. Clay Doss, the Navy’s acquisition spokesman, told USNI News the parts taken from Kennedy for Ford range from pumps to limit switches.

“Examples of parts include HMI screens for stores elevators as well as motor controllers, power supplies, small pumps, limit switches and valve actuators for various systems throughout the ship,” Doss said. “This is not unusual early in a program and will occur less often as supply support matures.”

Doss described the decision to take parts from Kennedy for Ford as a “project management tool” the service uses across programs.

“It occurred only after confirming the parts or materials were not available in the supply system and/or that alternate sources were not available,” Doss told USNI News. “A replacement plan was also required in each case. None of the parts transferred to CVN 78 are projected to impact the CVN 79 construction schedule.”

In a separate statement, Naval Sea Systems Command said the procedures were in line with Navy maintenance rules.

“In accordance with the Navy’s Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual, cannibalizations are being used as part of the process to augment readiness of CVN 78, and are only initiated after non-availability of materials has been established in the supply system or verification that alternate sources are not available,” Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Alan Baribeau told USNI News in a statement.

Ford, the lead ship that has faced multiple delays and struggled with the reliability of several new technologies aboard, is set to deploy in 2022, USNI News recently reported.

A spokesperson for HII said the shipbuilder and the Navy are creating a supply network for the carrier class so the ships have access to spare parts.

“A common shipbuilding practice for the first ship in class is to share parts between ships in order to maximize readiness until a class-wide supply system is established,” Duane Bourne told USNI News. “A relatively small volume of materials from the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) has been used on first-of-class U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) without impacting schedules. We are working with our Navy customer to build a supply system to include spare parts for the Ford class.”

The ship is currently in port for a six-month maintenance phase known as a Planned Incremental Availability after wrapping up shock trials over the summer.

“Everything is on track. We’re still looking to get out as scheduled after the six-month availability. No big show-stoppers that they’ve come across at all. So very, very positive news coming from the captain and from the shipyard. And then as we come out of that, I think we’re going to be set very well to get back in that operational mindset and get ready for the deployment,” Rear Adm. Gregory Huffman, the commander of Carrier Strike Group 12 who will lead the Ford CSG on its first deployment, told USNI News in an interview last month.

While the Navy previously planned to take delivery of Kennedy in two different phases as a cost-saving measure, last year the service shifted to a single-phase delivery approach. Under the new plan, the Navy will accept Kennedy with all of the modifications necessary to accommodate the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter. The shift came after lawmakers included a provision in the Fiscal Year 2020 defense policy bill requiring that Kennedy be able to deploy with F-35Cs prior to finishing its post-shakedown availability phase.

“Under a single-phase delivery, Kennedy is scheduled to be [delivered] in 2024 with its complete warfare systems and with the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35C) capability that is required by the NDAA,” Bourne told USNI News.

Attack Boat New Jersey Christened as Sub Construction Continues Pandemic Recovery

Its always been amazing to me that the Navy's newest 13+ billion dollar aircraft carrier cannot accommodate the Navy's top front line aircraft (F-35C). Everyone involved in the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford development should be fired---or at the very least not allowed anywhere near any future vessel development/procurement programs. Let them oversee mature areas they cant screw up---like laundry service or repainting ship bottoms.

(11-17-2021 06:46 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Its always been amazing to me that the Navy's newest 13+ billion dollar aircraft carrier cannot accommodate the Navy's top front line aircraft (F-35C). Everyone involved in the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford development should be fired---or at the very least not allowed anywhere near any future vessel development/procurement programs. Let them oversee mature areas they cant screw up---like laundry service or repainting ship bottoms.

Oh, I have complete confidence that they could screw those up, too.

(11-17-2021 07:32 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(11-17-2021 06:46 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Its always been amazing to me that the Navy's newest 13+ billion dollar aircraft carrier cannot accommodate the Navy's top front line aircraft (F-35C). Everyone involved in the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford development should be fired---or at the very least not allowed anywhere near any future vessel development/procurement programs. Let them oversee mature areas they cant screw up---like laundry service or repainting ship bottoms.

Oh, I have complete confidence that they could screw those up, too.

lol----sadly you're probably 100% correct.

(11-17-2021 06:46 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Its always been amazing to me that the Navy's newest 13+ billion dollar aircraft carrier cannot accommodate the Navy's top front line aircraft (F-35C). Everyone involved in the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford development should be fired---or at the very least not allowed anywhere near any future vessel development/procurement programs. Let them oversee mature areas they cant screw up---like laundry service or repainting ship bottoms.

I would like to see a return of the old Navy General Board (NGB) and Bureau of Ships (BuShips) systems. Basically, NGB was an advisory board of senior (mostly flag grade) Naval officers who made recommendations regarding a number of subjects, including fleet composition and ship design, and BuShips was a group of Navy and civilian engineers and naval architects who designed ships to meet the identified need.

I would like to see us implement the Royal Navy approach to ship's officers. Basically they take what the USN calls line officers and split them into two career paths--deck/warfare and engineering (further split into marine, electronics/weapons, and air engineers). Engineering officers run the ship, deck/warfare officers fight the ship. The most senior deck/warfare officer other than the CO is the First Lieutenant (equivalent to XO in USN terminology) and is basically coequal with the Chief Engineer, both reporting directly to the CO, but first among equals because only deck/warfare officers are eligible for command at sea. Senior engineering officer career paths lead to shore commands of maintenance facilities, naval shipyards, and docks. Engineering officers would receive extensive training and education (including advanced degrees) in marine engineering and/or naval architecture. Senior deck/warfare officers could end up running the NGB, and senior engineering officers would provide the makeup of BuShips.

(11-18-2021 11:37 PM)BigTigerMike Wrote:  

What is wrong with this guy? Doesn't he understand Regressives have not a clue how military works. They are only interested in political and social correctness. They would be sitting ducks for any foreign power and its military. The problem we have in this country is now the fools are dictating what our military is.

(11-18-2021 11:37 PM)BigTigerMike Wrote:  

What the heck is this guy talking about? Pretty sure the last time we know an American Navy warship was sunk by an enemy vessel or aircraft during combat was August 6th 1945 (US submarine Bullhead). Honestly, we really havn't fought a Naval engagement against another surface fleet since the Iran tangled with the US Naval forces in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980's. That engagement was pretty small and didnt end well for the Iranians.

Honestly, if we tangled with the Chinese, I doubt we'd sail right into the Taiwan Straight and try to slug it out. Im guessing we'd just sit carrier groups 3 or 4 thousand miles away and interdict their oil supply with carrier air power, subs, and roaming bands of tanker hunting squadrons. Even the crappy LCS vessels can interdict unarmed tankers. It might take a while, but eventually shutting off the oil would bring them to their knees.

Navy Issues Contracts in First Step Toward $8B to Rebuild Two Public Shipyards

Quote:The Navy issued the first contracts to companies that will compete for about $8 billion worth of military construction projects at shipyards in Hawaii and Washington state, two of its four public shipyards long overdue for modernization that can support the fleet’s growing repair and maintenance backlog.

This first step in the Navy’s $21 billion plan to modernize its four public shipyards involves an initial $2 million “minimum guarantee” to each of four companies to compete for task orders for projects at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Hawaii, and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Wash., according to yesterday’s Defense Department contract award announcement. Some of the projects that are part of the contract are planned for Guam and “other areas in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”

They are slated to be completed by November 2029.

These initial contracts will be funded by $10 million Navy’s fiscal 2022 military construction funds, the announcement stated, and “future task orders will be primarily funded by military construction (Navy) funds.”

Each of the five companies – Bechtel National Inc. of Reston, Va.; Dragados/Hawaiian Dredging/Orion JV of Honolulu, Hawaii; ECC Infrastructure LLC of Burlingame, Calif.; Kiewit-Alberici SIOP MACC AJV of Vancouver, Wash.; and TPC-NAN JV of Sylmar, Calif. – received firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, multiple-award construction contracts for Naval Sea Systems Command’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program.

“The five companies may compete for future task orders for pre-construction planning, preparation, and constructability reviews associated with construction of waterfront facilities such as warehouses, dry docks, piers, and other site improvements, as well as dredging and incidental design, environmental, and other services related to” SIOP, NAVSEA said in a statement.

“These contracts will help the Navy begin design and renovation work at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard once we’ve completed all the regulatory processes, including agency and government-to-government consultations and public engagement,” said Rear Adm. John Korka, NAVFAC’s commander, and the Navy’s chief of Civil Engineers. “It involves industry partners in our planning efforts, a lesson we learned from our SIOP efforts to date. This will facilitate healthy competition and, ultimately, help us deliver the best solution we can for our Navy and our nation.”

“The Navy depends on our shipyards returning combat-ready ships and submarines to the fleet,” said Korka. “SIOP guides the Navy’s investment plan to achieve that. It’s a once-in-a-century effort that the NAVFAC team is proud to be part of.”

The plan also will modernize its other public shipyards: Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Va., and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Maine. No contract has been announced yet for those facilities, which are the oldest of the four shipyards, dating back to 1767 and 1800, respectively.

The Navy’s 20-year, $21 billion plan, or SIOP as it’s known, would modernize infrastructure at the four naval shipyards by doing critical dry dock repairs, restoring and reconfiguring shipyard facilities, and replacing aging and deteriorating equipment.

But the service has been under congressional pressures to move more quickly at bolstering maintenance and repair capabilities at the shipyards, including critical improvements that are needed in the near-term for those yards to do repairs and maintenance on the growing nuclear-powered fleet.

The shipyard modernization program grew out of a shipyard improvement plan the Navy initially gave Congress in 2013, and it submitted Phase 1 of SOIP to lawmakers in 2018.

“I’m concerned that the Navy will not dedicate the necessary resources to prioritize this effort and that the 20-year time horizon is a very long and probably too long to support a very changing fleet,” House Armed Services readiness subcommittee chairman Rep. John Garamendi (D-Calif.) said during a March hearing. Navy officials told lawmakers they were looking at shorter, 10- to 15-year timeframes.