RE: The Xi Jinpooh Chronicles: Communism's Last Stand
This is getting a bit far away from Xi, and it is super long, so I apologize in advance for the hijack, but it is an issue that is near and dear to me, and if we have to oppose China, this discussion becomes relevant at that point.
The way I see it, we need the nuclear triad—ICBMs, bombers, and SSBNs—along with defenses to nuclear attack—anti-ballistic missile/ballistic missile defense (ABM/BMD), air defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Outside that, the Army should have primary responsibility for continental overland war, the Air Force should provide air defense and close air support (CAS) to the Army, the Navy should have primary responsibility for sea control, the Navy and Marines should have joint responsibility for the littoral regions (coastal waters to about 50 miles inland), and Marines should have primary responsibility for asymmetric warfare.
The Navy seems obsessed with shiny new (and expensive) toys, and wants to build a 355-ship fleet. With 51 legacy ships, they would need to build 304 more, as follows:
- Carriers: 7 Fords ($14B each) + 5 legacy, total $98B
- SSBN: 12 Columbia ($7.5B), total $90B.
- SSN: 5 large payload submarines ($7.8B), 28 SSGN Virginia VPM ($2.8B), 33 SSN(X) future attack submarines ($5.5B), total $305B
- Blue-water surface fleet: 15 Burke III DDG/replacements ($1.8B) + 8 legacy, 61 future large combatants ($2.8B), 20 FFG(X) guided missile frigates ($1.2B), 38 future small combatants ($1.3B), total $267B
- Amphibious force: 8 LHA/LHD ($3.9B), 12 LPD-17 ($1.9), 8 L(X) future amphibious ship ($2.6B), total $75B + 10 legacy
- Auxiliaries: 16 T-AO oilers ($0.5B), 11 T-AKE(X) replenishment ships ($0.9B), 30 other auxiliary ships ($0.4B), + 28 legacy, total $31B
- Total 304 ships (+51 legacy, 355 total), $866B total, over 30 years $28.9B/year, $2.84B/ship
That fleet has several obvious holes, mostly from having too few and too expensive ships:
- Carriers are most effective in battle groups (CVBGs) of 2 to 4, and 12 are not enough to form many CVBGs.
- The LHA/LHD-based amphibious force cannot conduct an effective amphibious assault, because doctrine dictates that the LHA/LHD remain 25-50 miles offshore for safety, and we have no viable ship-to-shore connectors to get tanks and artillery ashore from there.
- There is virtually no naval gunfire support (NGFS) capability to support amphibious operations. This plus the LHA/LHD issues essentially prevent opposed assaults. This has forced the Marines to struggle to find a viable mission.
- We are way short of ASW platforms, because of decisions to retire early the Spruance destroyers, Perry frigates, and S-3 patrol aircraft.
- There is no viable mine countermeasures (MCM) capability.
- Our so-called Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) have no viable mission capability, littoral or otherwise, leaving us badly exposed in any coastal/littoral combat engagement, such as in the first island chain versus China, or the eastern Mediterranean or Baltic versus Russia, or the Persian/Arabian Gulf versus some rogue state or terrorist organization.
- We don’t have a dedicated BMD/ABM capability.
First, I would fire every flag officer responsible for this debacle. Then rather than shiny new toys, start from missions and task organization and build ships to fill the resulting task forces:
- 12 carrier battle groups (CVBG), each with 1 Nimitz, 1 smaller carrier, and 1 SSGN, primary mission power projection, secondary mission sea control.
- 8 surface action/hunter-killer groups (SAG/HUK), each with 1 battleship, 1 ASW helo carrier, and 1 SSN/SSGN, primary mission sea control, secondary mission amphibious support.
- 10 amphibious squadrons (PhibRons), with 1 each LHA/LHD, LPH, LPD/LSD, LST, LPA/LKA, and NGFS frigate, primary mission amphibious assault, secondary mission littoral combat.
- 15 coastal squadrons (CoastRons), each with 3 corvettes, 1 patrol boat, 2 mine countermeasures ships, and 2 AIP submarines, primary mission littoral combat.
- 20 escort squadrons (CortRons), each with 1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, and 4 ASW frigates, primary mission escorting other groups, secondary mission NGFS for assaults.
- 12 SSBNs and 12 ABM/BMD ships as strategic assets.
- 80 SSGNs/SSNs in addition to the AIP submarines
- Sufficient auxiliary ships to fuel and supply the fleet and to support Marine assaults
Deploy 2 CVBG in WestPac, 1 in the Indian Ocean, 2 in Europe/Med, 3 on each coast in training/readiness/surge, and 1 in major maintenance. Deploy 1 SAG/HUK group in the mid-Pacific, 1 in the Indian Ocean, 1 in the GIUK gap, 2 on each coast in training/readiness/surge, and 1 in major maintenance. Deploy 2 PhibRons in WestPac, 1 in the Indian Ocean, 2 in Europe/Med, 2 on each coast in training/readiness/surge, and 1 in major maintenance. Move surge units to increase numbers anywhere that a problem broke out. The CortRons would be notionally assigned to one of the CVBGs or SAG/HUKs, but I would combine units as missions dictated. In wartime, PhibRons would travel in company with CVBGs or SAG/HUKs, or both.
Go with the Zumwalt high/low mix approach to build some expensive, top-of-the line ships (like the Navy seems to want all to be) and fill out numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships, reducing the average cost/ship to $1.45B, to produce the following 600-ship fleet:
- Carriers: 7 Nimitzes ($8.5B) + 5 legacy, 6 Kitty Hawks ($5.5B), 6 LHA/LHD lightning carrier conversions ($2B), total $105B
- SSBN: 12 Columbia ($7.5B), total $90B
- SSN: 50 SSGN Virginia VPM ($2.8B), 30 SSN French Barracuda ($1.5B), total $185B
- SS (AIP): 30 AIP SSK ($0.8B), total $24B
- Blue-water surface combatants: 8 battleships ($5B), 8 ASW helicopter carriers ($1.5B), 20 cruisers ($4B), 32 AAW destroyers ($1.8B) + 8 legacy, 60 GP escorts ($1.2B), 80 ASW frigates ($0.5B), total $302B
- Green/Brown-water surface combatants: 45 corvettes ($0.4B), 15 patrol boats ($0.2B), 30 mine countermeasures ships ($0.3B), total $30B
- Amphibious: 10 SP Juan Carlos/AU Canberra LHA/LHD ($1.6B), 10 FR Mistral LPH ($0.6B), 10 UK Albion LPD/LSD ($0.5B), 10 LST ($0.4B), 10 LKA/LPA ($0.3B), 10 land attack/NGFS frigates ($0.2B), total $36B
- Ballistic Missile Defense: 12 ABM/BMD converted San Antonio class LPD ($1.2B), $14B
- Auxiliary: 30 T-AO/AOE oilers ($0.5B), 12 T-AKE(X) replenishment ships ($0.9B), 30 other auxiliary ships ($0.4B) + 21 legacy, $38B
- Total: 566 ships (+ 34 legacy and 17 conversions), $827B total, over 30 years $27.6B/year, or spread over 40 years (so that we would hit about 450 by the 30-year mark) at $20.7B/year, which is close to current spending levels
The following points support that concept:
- We can build 1 Nimitz ($8.5B, last one cost $7B) and 1 Kitty Hawk ($5.5B) for the cost of 1 Ford ($14B), and convert the LHAs/LHDs to “Harrier/Lightning Carriers” as an interim step for about $2B each. I like the idea of one nuke and one conventional carrier together in a CVBG. The Harrier/Lightning Carrier has limitations, but operating in company with a CVN offsets a lot of the negatives.
- Replace the current big-deck amphibious ships with more conventional amphibious squadrons that can be risked 3-5 miles offshore—a smaller LHA/LHD like the Spanish Juan Carlos, an LPH with a well deck like the French Mistral, a simplified LPD/LSD like the British Albion, a real LST with an LST bow so it can beach, an LPA/LKA, and a NGFS/land attack frigate . I would live with an 18 knot SOA, which saves money versus the Navy’s current 20+ knot requirement, and allows a true LST.
- We have so much money tied up in the big-deck amphibs that we have to do something with them, or Congress would have a cow over future funding. The LHAs/LHDs can convert to interim “Harrier/Lightning Carriers” and operate with CVNs the way CVEs and CVLs did in WWII, being replaced by Kitty Hawks as their useful lives expire, and there is already a proposal from HII to build an ABM/BMD ship on the San Antonio hull.
- We also wasted a lot of money on the Zumwalt “destroyers” and the LCSs. The best idea I’ve heard for the Zumwalts is to deploy two of them to the Med and WestPac as fleet flagships, and station the third in San Diego as an R&D platform. I would offer the LCSs to the Coast Guard as cutters. The 45 knots would be useful in chasing down drug runners, and the deficiencies are not as serious in that role. If the Coast Guard doesn’t want them, offer them to some ally (or maybe better, some enemy).
- We can’t afford enough Burkes to solve the ASW shortage, and you don’t really want Burkes chasing subs (or Somali pirates) anyway, so build a large number of GP escorts (mini-Burkes based on European designs like FFG(X)) and purpose-built ASW frigates.
- Include three new and different ship types:
a. Battleships modeled after the 1980s battlecarrier proposal, basically an Iowa-class front end with 16-inch guns and a Russian Kiev-class back end, with a huge VLS field aft of the superstructure, something like 128 regular cells and 32 larger cells for an anti-ship missile like the Russian Shipwreck and possible short or intermediate range ballistic missiles.
b. Some ASW helo carriers like the Japanese Hyugas. They would operate with the battlecarriers to form the ASW backbone of the SAG/HUK groups. They could also carry Marines and helos to support amphibious assaults.
c. Replace the Ticonderogas with true cruisers, a bigger design on the Des Moines class hull, with 8-inch guns forward and aft, AEGIS/AMDR and a large VLS capability. I would consider the proposed WWII flight deck cruiser model, with a smaller flight deck (to leave room for VLS cells) used for helos and UAVs, and the hangar below configured to launch UUV’s and USV’s over the side.
- The 16-inch guns of the battlecarriers. the 8-inch guns of the cruisers, and the 5-inch guns of the NGFS frigates address the NGFS problem.
- I foresee a need for true littoral combatants if we have to confront China in the South China Sea, or Russia in the eastern Med or Baltic, or some rogue nation or terrorist force in the Mideast or some other coastal location. So include a littoral squadron, based on CAPT Wayne Hughes’s ideas in his New Navy Fighting Machine paper.
- The larger Navy would require more sailors, although the high/low mix would minimize that impact. Recent analysis by CBO indicates that the Navy’s current manning level of about 325,000 includes about 135,000 combat, 60,000 combat support, and 130,000 administrative/other. Cutting the admin/other in half, and transferring them 1/3 to combat, 1/6 to combat support, and 1/2 to reserves would free up 22,000 sailors for combat (17% increase) and 11,000 for combat support (19% increase), which should solve the problem, while reducing active headcount by about 32,000. The Navy currently has 284 admirals for 290 ships. Cut that in half, and assume each admiral has a staff of 20, and that gets rid of almost 3000 admin/other right there. And I have this alarming belief that a lot of those admirals were promoted more on the basis of political correctness and adherence to an agenda than on professional military competence. We need warriors in charge, guys like Patton instead of Westmoreland, for example.
- The Marines are searching for a mission. With changes to the phib force and additions to NGFS, assault becomes a viable mission again. I would propose a new Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) which can be hauled by my proposed PhibRon, including an infantry battalion, a tank company, an artillery company, an amphibious armor company, and an air element. That would be about 3200 Marines, or 32,000 Marines for 10 PhibRons worth. This approximates the 1991 stated Marine amphibious lift requirement of 1.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) plus equipment. Since Marines like a three-unit rotation, that would require 96,000 Marines. I would give them a second mission where they would take the lead in asymmetric warfare against rogue nations and terrorist groups. That could probably require another 25-30,000 Marine commando/special forces or so. Add 15-20,000 for training and admin, and the active-duty USMC would be around 140,000. The particular advantages that the Marines bring are a) mobility and b) combined arms (infantry, armor, artillery, air) at a very low level, enabling them to punch above their weight by bringing a tremendous amount of firepower from multiple sources to bear on an objective, and these missions fit well with those advantages.
That’s my approach. I’ve posted bits and pieces before, but this is the full approach. It may not be perfect, but I think it makes a lot more sense that what the Navy is proposing.
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