(09-24-2013 04:53 PM)ChicagoOwl (BS 07) Wrote:  

(09-24-2013 04:05 PM)talon owl Wrote:  The most egregious error comes at the 1:09 mark, when on a critical 3rd and long before the half we effectively have nobody covering UH's best receiver (#3 Greenberry) and they complete an easy pass for a long gain and eventually score a TD to take the lead at the half.

So UH double covers/brackets our best receiver and we let their's run free on 3rd downs if UH does something crazy like put him in the slot. Had to be an assignment bust there, right?

Wow.
So who is that on? Safety not moving down or linebacker not sliding over or..?

Looks to me like a simple blitz that was read, picked up and exploited... and then a missed tackle so a 10 yard gain becomes 25 You CAN jump that "hot route" but I suspect (based on the depth of the DB) that we were giving up the hot route if they saw it... and clearly they did.

Or we missed a signal somewhere

(09-24-2013 01:00 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  

(09-23-2013 07:49 PM)JOwl Wrote:  If you think that you just need a TD and FG to tie, clearly you're going to go up-tempo, rather than crazy-fast.

Everything from here on out is pointless because this is wrong.

I agree with your subsequent math, but that isn't the situation at hand. You don't play for a TD and a FG to tie. You play for the 2 TDs to win... and go at whatever tempo allows you that option. You MAY end up settling for a TD and a FG to tie, but that is NOT how you manage the clock. Since you don't know what the other team will do... if you don't recover the onside kick... you go CF for the first score... If you end up in a situation where the first score is a TD, then you go for 2, because another TD still produces a win and if you make it, a FG (if necessary) gives you OT. NOW you see if you get the onside kick... and if you do, you go at a tempo designed to score with little time left... Planning on a TD and the win, settling for a FG and a tie.

You NEVER play for a tie... until that is your best hope.

I'm still not sure how I'm failing to make this point clear. First, let me concede that Bailiff was playing a strategy that was indistinguishable from going for 2 TDs (going for the win). But then he was posed with the situation of 4th and 9 (I think) from (I think) the UH 33. At that point he had two legitimate options: attempt the field goal, or go for the first down. _That_ is where his strategy diverged from the strategy of going for 2 touchdowns. He chose to kick the field goal rather than try to retain possession.

And given that he was down 11 at the time, his choice to kick the field goal was the best available option given the information that he had.

My problem with how he called the game is that he could/should have had _more_ information at that point in time -- he should have already known how his two point attempt would work out. If it was successful, he would've been down 10 and could be assured the field goal was the smart play. If it was unsuccessful, he would've been down 12 and would've know the field goal was not the smart play, since he really needed 2 TDs, and thus he would've gone for it.

I don't know what issue you take with my hypothetical. Would these be okay?
Strat 1:
<FGTD: 60%
FGTD: 20%
2TD: 20%

Strat 2:
<FGTD: 78%
FGTD: 0%
2TD: 22%

Let's say that in both the team is playing all out, with the only difference being that in the 2nd one your coach refuses to attempt any FGs for the rest of the game. Which strategy would you want your coach to employ if you're trailing by 11 late in the game?

-- With strat 1, you have a 40%*20% =8% chance of OT and a 20% of winning outright, for a net 8%*50% + 20% = 24% chance of winning.
-- With strat 2, you give up any chance of OT but only gain a 2% chance of winning outright, for a net 22% chance of winning.

In the situation of being down 11, I would want my coach to employ Strat 1 with its 24% chance of winning, and I think you would too. Coach will kick a field goal if he's forced to, rather than risk an unlikely 4th down conversion.

But what if I know I'm down 12 rather than 11? Then I would go with strat 2, and its 22% chance of winning (don't try a FG no matter what because it does you no good; take the risk on every 4th down).
If I'm only down 10, then I definitely employ strat 1, since I no longer need the 2pt conversion and therefore am at 20%*50% + 20% = 30% chance of winning.

Obviously in that last paragraph I'm talking about the two possible states to be in after attempting the 2PC on the first TD. Had I done that, I would've had a 60% chance of being down 12 and a 40% chance of being down 10. Thus accounting for those probabilities, going for two early would've left me with a 60%*22% + 40%*30% = 25.2% chance of winning.

The extra knowledge you gain by going for it early has bought an extra 1.2 percentage points of win likelihood, due to the ability to tailor the strategy to the situation. When you don't go for 2 until the end, you have no opportunity to go back and retroactively change your approach if you miss.

(09-24-2013 01:00 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  

(09-23-2013 08:02 PM)JOwl Wrote:  

(09-23-2013 07:23 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  Tautoligical argument. Bailiff kicked the field goal because he ended up in a 4th down situation and needed 2 scores, one of which COULD have been a FG because he kicked the previous point... not because he "played for the field goal". I'm certain he tried to pick up the first down on 3rd down and not merely move the ball to the middle of the field, playing for the field goal.

I know you don't actually believe that by kicking the FG, Bailiff was actually playing for 2 TDs. Yet that's what you said.

No I did not. I said that he was playing for 2 TDs when a situation arose that gave him little choice but to accept a FG. If you want to criticize his decision, it would have been HERE... and not on the 2 pt conversion. I believe we were in a 4th and 4, after 2 incomplete passes (playing fast for a TD) and then settling on 3rd down for a 6 yard rush for the FG. It was the 2 incomplete passes combined with the reality that a 57 yard FG was asking much more than a 50 yard FG would have asked, and we DID have a chance to get 10 yards on a run (we got 6) as they were backing out. Until 3rd down and ten from the UH 40, I believe he was playing for a TD. On 3rd, I think he HOPED to get a first, or to get perhaps 8-9... but to at least get 4 to make the kick more assured.

I think I made the point better up above, but I'll say it again: at the point where Bailiff decided to kick the FG, he was definitely playing for the field goal. He may have been playing all out for the TD on the first 3 downs, but on 4th he quite obviously was playing for the field goal. Had he known at that point that a field goal would do him no good, he would've played differently (wouldn't have kicked a FG). And he didn't have to be the Amazing Kreskin to know that a FG would do him no good -- he simply needed to have tried the 2PC after the first touchdown rather than wait to try it on the 2nd touchdown.

(09-24-2013 01:00 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  

Quote:I think you're confused: I don't care that kicking the FG seemed right because it would've just left us down 8. What I care is that the decision _was_ wrong, because we ended up missing the 2-point conversion.

Well now I AM confused. You started the thread by asking if anyone else was pissed that Bailiff DIDN'T go for 2 after scoring to make it 31-19 (pre-pat), and now you seem pissed that we did.

Yeah, this is probably one my worst-worded comments. I tried to explain it but I'm deleting the explanation. Let's just say I didn't convey what I was thinking.

I definitely agree with Bailiff's decision to attempt the field goal when down 11, what I disagree with was his decision to kick the EP to put us at -11. Had he made the right decision after the first TD and had it had the same outcome as our later 2PC attempt, then when the 4th down came up we would've been -12 and he would've known the FG was the wrong move.

(09-24-2013 01:00 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  

Quote:Let's go back to my hypothetical with the 15-point deficit followed by late TD. For the moment just take that as a standalone, only tangentially related to the Rice situation and not dispositive of anything in that discussion. What would you do if you scored a TD with 3 minutes left to put you down 9 (pending the PAT)? Would you go for two now or wait? Do you see one strategy as substantively better than the other?
My answers are that I see going for two immediately as the substantially better approach, for the reasons I outlined in my hypothetical. I'm assuming you disagree, or am I wrong?

I'll play along, but the decisions are different because the situations are different.

In this example, you NEED 2 tds. You just got one. You need one more. You also need two 2 pt conversions to win or 1 and 1 to tie. Fail on either and you need an additional score. Of course you try for it on the first one, because you can't win if you don't.... and if you fail, you need 2 scores so you are in (what you call) crazy fast offense.

Cool. I'm glad we agree on that. Let me make sure of _why_ we agree. I say you go for it after the 1st TD because knowing the outcome of the 2pt attempt gives you useful information about how to play from there on out.
-- If you make it, you're just playing for one TD to tie, so assuming your D gets you the ball right back you'll probably play a "normal" hurry-up, and be looking to drive the ball down and punch it in with as little time left as possible. Scoring on a long bomb immediately would be good but not ideal, because the other team has time left.
-- If you miss it, you play as fast as possible, doing anything you can to get a score and another possession.

That is, you get to play smarter, picking the proper approach from the two above, than you would if you just kicked the EP. If your defense gets you the ball back right away and you're down 8, you don't know if it's better to score absolutely as fast as possible, or to run it down and then punch it in.

In other words, the benefit to going for it early is the information it gives you on how to play. And since you are going to go for the 2PC on one of your two touchdowns, you might as well give yourself that information right away -- it doesn't cost you anything.


The only reason I brought up this scenario was as an analogy. I think it's a simpler situation than the Rice game, and more clearly illustrates the value of "information" to the coming-from-behind coach. If he knows exactly how high that mountain is that he needs to scale, then he's going to do a better job of scaling it than he would do if he's just guessing.

So now let me extend that analogy. In our game, we were down 18. That meant we needed TD+1 and TD+2 and FG to tie the game, or we needed 3 TDs (with at least 1 extra point) to win the game. There are some similarities to the down-15 scenario. In our -18 scenario, going for 2 early would give us valuable information on how to play the rest of the game. In the -15 scenario, that info would tell us whether we're playing for 1 score or 2 scores. In our 18-point scenario, that would tell us whether we need to play for 2 TDs or a TD and FG. Also like the 15-point scenario, there's no downside to going for the 2PC on the first TD vs the 2nd TD if we're FG+2TD, (and no downside to missing a 2PC if we score 3TDs).

(09-24-2013 01:00 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  This wasn't the situation you described. Why do you need to change the situation, changing the most pertinent details to make your point? You said, down 31-19 with the PAT pending, do you kick it or go for 2? In THIS situation, you need a TD, an EP, a 2Pt conversion and a FG just to tie. If you miss the 2pt conversion, then you need 2 TDs, period... as you describe... BUT and this is a HUGE BUT... You don't PLAY for a tie. You play to win (which is 2 tds anyway) and then SETTLE for a tie. In that event, I kick the EP to make it 31-20. I then try and score as fast as I can and go for 2. If I make it, I can now play for the win with a TD and settle for a tie with a FG.... meaning if I get into a 4th and 4+, I don't HAVE to go for it. If I DON'T make it, THEN I need another TD to win and the FG option for the tie is off the table. All you're doing by going for 2 earlier is to potentially take the FG option off the table sooner. I understand that twice going for the 2 pt conversion gives you a probability of winning with just 1 more TD... but I have to believe that if you are THAT confident you can make two 2pt conversions, you really shouldn't have any trouble making 4th and 3 (functionally the same play) should it arise.

I get your point, but the odds of 2 TDs are the same either way... making the 2pt tries moot... and favor 1TD, a FG and a 2pt try for a tie... going into overtime after scoring what, an unanswered 18 points and giving up nothing over 1td a FG and TWO two point tries for a win. In the former, you can win, lose or tie (sending you to overtime). In the latter, you can only win or lose... and you lose (without 2tds) the moment a 2pt try fails.

But now I'm confused again, because a recap seems to show that down 31-19 we DID go for 2, and your original premise said it was a mistake NOT to go for 2?

Despite the fact that making it gives you a sliver of a chance to win with another 2pt conversion, I would not have done that because it eliminates the possibility of a tie from a FG if necessary, but it didn't end up mattering because we didn't score another touchdown.

Feel free to respond or not. I've said more than enough anyway. It doesn't really matter because we didn't score anyway. I DO appreciate the math you're running through... I just think that you don't EVER play for a tie until you have to... but you also don't close off your options until you have to.

That uncertainty you seem to want -- leaving the FG as a valid option solely because you don't know the outcome of the 2PC -- is a _bad_ thing. It is not good to just think a FG might be valuable; it is good to know definitively that the FG is valuable or is not valuable.

In other words, if the FG isn't go to be enough to tie anyay, then it's a _good_ thing to have that option off the table sooner. Obviously it's not good to miss the 2PC, and ideally you make if, but if you're gonna miss it it's better to know that early so you don't waste a possession kicking a field goal that's going to leave you with a 2-point loss.

This is equivalent to my 15-point example, where if you were going to miss the 2PC anyway, then you would know it's not the right move to run the clock down before scoring your 2nd TD. The equivalent here is knowing it's not the right move to attempt a FG rather than go for it on 4th downs. In both cases, you don't have a time machine, so you can't base your strategy off the outcome of the 2PC if you wait until after the 2nd TD to try it.

If I were coaching football, I would go for 2 more often than most. I would also go for it on 4th down more than most. I would do this for two reasons:

1. The odds favor doing those things more than the conventional wisdom, and
2. I would want to create the mindset that we were an attacking team that took chances--not recklessly, but sensibly.

I would do this knowing that some of the gambles would fail--and working to have my team in the proper framr of mind to deal with, and overcome, adversity.

I agree that coaches too often go more conservative than the probabilities of success indicate because they do not want to look bad if it fails.

I believe going for it would show that the coach has confidence in his offense.

(09-24-2013 11:27 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  If I were coaching football, I would go for 2 more often than most. I would also go for it on 4th down more than most. I would do this for two reasons:

1. The odds favor doing those things more than the conventional wisdom, and
2. I would want to create the mindset that we were an attacking team that took chances--not recklessly, but sensibly.

I would do this knowing that some of the gambles would fail--and working to have my team in the proper framr of mind to deal with, and overcome, adversity.

(09-24-2013 08:55 PM)JOwl Wrote:  he should have already known how his two point attempt would work out.

Is the assumption that it would/would not work regardless of when it was tried? That an attempt has the same liklihood of success regardless of the situation (time and score) at the time of the attempt? Not arguing, just asking for clarification.

Also, in the Great Shootout, #1 Texas vs, #2 Arkansas, 1969, Texas went for two after their first TD after being down14-0. Was this the correct strategy?

I think it more likely shows confidence in his contract. Nobody gets fired for punting and losing. Gambling and losing can cost one his job. Fans usually judge whether a given play call was smart or dumb by its success or failure, respectively.

(09-25-2013 12:17 AM)75src Wrote:  I agree that coaches too often go more conservative than the probabilities of success indicate because they do not want to look bad if it fails.

I believe going for it would show that the coach has confidence in his offense.

(09-24-2013 11:27 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  If I were coaching football, I would go for 2 more often than most. I would also go for it on 4th down more than most. I would do this for two reasons:

1. The odds favor doing those things more than the conventional wisdom, and
2. I would want to create the mindset that we were an attacking team that took chances--not recklessly, but sensibly.

I would do this knowing that some of the gambles would fail--and working to have my team in the proper framr of mind to deal with, and overcome, adversity.

(09-24-2013 11:27 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  If I were coaching football, I would go for 2 more often than most. I would also go for it on 4th down more than most. I would do this for two reasons:

1. The odds favor doing those things more than the conventional wisdom, and
2. I would want to create the mindset that we were an attacking team that took chances--not recklessly, but sensibly.

I would do this knowing that some of the gambles would fail--and working to have my team in the proper framr of mind to deal with, and overcome, adversity.

Would you go for 2 after the first score of the game?

(09-25-2013 02:00 AM)OptimisticOwl Wrote:  

(09-24-2013 08:55 PM)JOwl Wrote:  he should have already known how his two point attempt would work out.

Is the assumption that it would/would not work regardless of when it was tried? That an attempt has the same liklihood of success regardless of the situation (time and score) at the time of the attempt? Not arguing, just asking for clarification.

Also, in the Great Shootout, #1 Texas vs, #2 Arkansas, 1969, Texas went for two after their first TD after being down14-0. Was this the correct strategy?

It was the conventional wisdom at the time. Remember, games could end in ties back then. Trailing by 14 (as Texas was) if you scored a TD you went for 2, figuring that you needed two TD's and if you made it you could win with a kick after the second TD and if you failed you could still tie with a successful 2 pointer after the second TD. This was considered more prudent than leaving up to an all-or-nothing 2 pointer after the second TD. Today the conventional wisdom is to kick twice and play overtime.

And to answer your other question, no, I would not normally go for 2 after the opening TD, although doing so worked well for Gus Malzahn and Auburn against Miss St a couple of weeks ago.

(09-25-2013 02:00 AM)OptimisticOwl Wrote:  

(09-24-2013 08:55 PM)JOwl Wrote:  he should have already known how his two point attempt would work out.

Is the assumption that it would/would not work regardless of when it was tried? That an attempt has the same liklihood of success regardless of the situation (time and score) at the time of the attempt? Not arguing, just asking for clarification.

Also, in the Great Shootout, #1 Texas vs, #2 Arkansas, 1969, Texas went for two after their first TD after being down14-0. Was this the correct strategy?

To your first question, yes, that's an underlying assumption of mine. I consider it a better assumption than the alternative. But with the slight caveat that you may actually be more likely to succeed after the 1st TD than the second, because after the 1st TD there's some uncertainty on the part of the defense about what you'll be doing, whereas if you wait until after the 2nd to try the 2PC then they'll know for sure what you're doing. However, I can't think of any way to exploit that uncertainty other than line up for the kick and then fake it, and I'm not sure that play is as likely to succeed as running your offense is.

------

To your second question, I was just reading an interesting article on that the other day ( http://community.advancednflstats.com/20...under.html ). I had never considered that strategy (since it goes so much against the conventional wisdom), but it's quite smart if you think about it: if you've decided you're going for two at least once, then it's absolutely the right thing to go for two after the first TD. That way you know how the attempt works out, and can react accordingly. If you made it, you go for one the next time for the (almost) sure win, and if you missed you go for two again, trying to salvage the tie.

Assuming a 45% likelihood of succeeding on the 2pt try (a little low, but in the ballpark, for the NFL; I don't know how right it would be for college) and 100% chance of success on EP kick (rounded up for simplicity), then if you go for two on the first attempt and then condition your decision on the 2nd attempt on how the 1st one worked out, then your possible outcomes are:
Lose by 2 points: 30.25% (fail on both attempts, 55%*55%)
Lose by 1 point: 0% (won't happen: if fail on first then you try again on second, getting either tie or 2 point loss; succeed on first then you kick EP on 2nd)
Tie score : 24.75% (fail first, succeed on second, 55%*45%)
Win by 1 point: 45% (fail on first, kick EP on second, 45%)

Alternatively, if you wait for the 2nd TD to try the 2PC, then your chances are:
Lose by 2 points: 0%
Lose by 1 point: 55% (fail on attempt after 2nd TD)
Tie score: 0%
Win by 1 point: 45% (succeed on attempt after 2nd TD)

So that extra knowledge you gain by going for 2 after the first TD allows you to keep the chance of winning the same, while increasing the chance of getting a tie by 24.75 percentage points (and decreasing your chance of losing by the same amount).

Notice that if you do lose, you're going to lose by more (2pts rather than 1pt), but I don't think anyone cares -- a loss is a loss. You're able to exploit the fact that all losses are equal by trading a "bigger" loss for greater likelihood of a better-than-loss outcome (i.e. a tie). That's a smart trade.

The other course of action, of course, is to to kick two extra points and assure the tie. In the old days, it's a judgment call as to whether to play for the tie or the win; it depends on how you value the tie vs the win. Coach can decide whether 100% chance of tie is worth more or less than 45% chance of win + 24.75% chance of tie.

In the modern college game where there are no ties, if you assume that each team has a 50% chance of winning in OT, then the preferred strategy is clear: go for 2 after the first TD. That way your chance of winning is 45% + 24.75%*50% = 57.4%. Just kicking EPs would give you 100%*50% = 50% chance of winning in OT.

Clearly that analysis is contingent on the likelihood of succeeding on the 2pt try (and on the EP kick, which is slighly less than 100%). But even assuming 100% success on EP, the go-for-2-first strategy is still dominant all the way down to about a 38% assumed success rate on the 2pt try. In other words, getting that knowledge early so you can act on it is extremely valuable.

A commenter on the article noted the '84 Orange Bowl as a case where the coach screwed it up. Nebraska was down 2 TDs late, scored them both, but went for 2 on the _second_ touchdown and failed. Had Osborne gone for 2 after the first TD (and failed) he would've gotten another shot to tie on the 2nd. As it was, he couldn't go back in time and try for 2 on the first TD.

Thanks to both of you. my only additional thought is that, if Bailiff were to lose a game by a point ir two, a game involving choices like this, and rolled out a whiteboach at the press conferencecovered in JOwl-style computations showing he made the mathematically best choice, would we be molified in any degree? i think not.

Of course, the thing both Team JOwl and Team Hambone are ignoring is that the other team gets the ball in either scenario. Anyone care to take a stab at why their plan is better if the other team scores a FG? Obviously an opposing TD is disasterous to either scenario.

(09-25-2013 10:19 AM)OptimisticOwl Wrote:  Thanks to both of you. my only additional thought is that, if Bailiff were to lose a game by a point ir two, a game involving choices like this, and rolled out a whiteboach at the press conferencecovered in JOwl-style computations showing he made the mathematically best choice, would we be molified in any degree? i think not.

I would be ecstatic. That would provide serious lulz on all the meat-head boards I post on.

(09-25-2013 10:24 AM)mrbig Wrote:  Of course, the thing both Team JOwl and Team Hambone are ignoring is that the other team gets the ball in either scenario. Anyone care to take a stab at why their plan is better if the other team scores a FG? Obviously an opposing TD is disasterous to either scenario.

If the other team scores a FG, you're actually in a situation most akin to the one Optimistic Owl brought up as an aside (where you're down 14 and just scored a touchdown).

Thinking from the perspective of having been down 18 points, if you allow for one opposing FG that's basically like being down 21 points. If you're down 21 points, your best approach is similar to when you're down 14 points -- i.e., you want to go for a 2PC _before_ your last TD, so that if you hit it you're in a position to win with TDs and if you miss it you can react and go for two again on a later TD to get the tie (and OT) back in play.

If you you're down exactly 21, the ideal play is to again go for two on the first TD.
- If you succeed then you've put yourself in a chance to win rather than tie with 2 more TDs.
- If you fail, you go for 2 on the next TD to put the tie back in play. I walked through the math on this in the response to OO, and this maximizes your chances of winning (vs just having a 100% chance of Then the considerations for TD 3:
- If you succeeded on first attempt, you're playing out the EP string for the win
- If you failed first attempt and succeeded second, your on pace for the tie. I'd rather kick the EP on 3rd TD and go to overtime rather than try another 2PC which has less than 50% chance of success, but the two options are very close
- If you failed on both attempts, now you know you need more than just a 3rd TD (need TD + FG). Once again, this is one of those "I have more knowledge and can therefore pick the more appropriate strategy" situations.

It's my very last point above that shows why the "try 2PC early then react" strategy should be applied to the first and second touchdown (not to first and third, or second and third).

I think my analysis holds up even if you the opponent's FG comes _after_ your 3 TDs. (My analysis so far was that down 18 + opponent FG was the same as down 21, but it's not exactly the same since the FG could come after you score TDs). But I think you're still playing optimatl strategy because worst case is you miss on first 2pt attempt, then score another TD and just kick EP because opponent has scored FG yet, which would put you down 5. Then score another TD, and I assume coach would go for 2 to protect against FG. That still means you've properly played the "down 14 and just scored" strategy I discussed with OO, maximizing chances of victory.

Now throw a safety in there, or a an opponent TD with failed extra point, or something like that and the analysis doesn't hold. But considering how little you cost yourself by attempting the 2, I'm certain those things don't change the right approach.

I hadn't thought through the whole "opponent might score a FG" thing at that point in the game, so really I'm just lucky that my desired strategy was also optimal under that condition as well. Basically I was working from the "we've scored 20 points in 49 minutes, now we need two more scores in the next 11" point of view in deciding what I thought we should do. In light of that, I figured the only way we win or tie is if we get those scores without UH scoring, and also figured the odds of us getting three scores in that timeframe was extremely low. So I thought it was critical to know exactly what kind of scores we needed (would TD+FG cut it or did it have to be TD+TD?).

-------------

And just to clarify: Don't get the impression I think going for two is always best. It just so happens it works out that way in all the scenarios we considered above. Obviously, if you're down 6 and score a TD you don't go for 2 (because all you get if you succeed is a "bigger" win -- and who cares? -- but if you fail you fall back into a tie). Similar thoughts down 13 or up 1 (if you're up 1, don't go for 2 to put it out of reach -- you have less than 50% chance of succeeding; make the _other_ guy go for 2 if/when he scores and force him to take on the <50% chance of scucces).

Does someone need to move JOwl and Hambone to the smack board?!?

(09-26-2013 02:59 AM)mrbig Wrote:  Does someone need to move JOwl and Hambone to the smack board?!?

Just make 'em both go for two. Without helmets, so they will smack themselves.

Then we wouldn't need Michael Burt to head-butt the kicks back

Split thread opened