(04-06-2022 02:04 PM)CrimsonPhantom Wrote:  

Quote:Questions remain how the Lightning Carrier concept will operate in the fleet without a capability to tank F-35Bs organically or without airborne early warning aircraft like the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aboard. USNI News understands that there is set to be broader testing with the concept later this year.

[url=https://news.usni.org/2022/04/03/navy-and-marines-divided-over-the-amphibious-fleets-future-as-delays-and-cancellations-mount-in-fy-2023-budget-request?mc_cid=65768f0ee5]

The Lightning Carrier concept has attracted a lot of attention and opinions, both pro and con, over the last few years. I think it is good that the concept is at least getting some testing now.

Here's the problem with the existing situation. First the LHAs/LHDs are too big and expensive ($3.8B now) to be risked close enough into shore to conduct a viable amphibious assault. Back in my Gator Navy days, we felt that the LHAs/LHDs were putting way too many eggs in one basket, and that one (un)lucky rocket or torpedo could wipe out your whole assault. Acknowledging that problem, current USN doctrine requires them to stay 25-50 miles offshore, and from there we do not have any viable ship-to-shore connectors for moving tanks of heavy artillery ashore. Boats are too slow, helos and V-22s can't lift the load, and LCACs are too unreliable for combat.

Second, the LPD-17 (San Antonio) class ($2.2B) are also too expensive to be risked close into shore. The USN plans on carrying a whole amphibious ready group (ARG) on an LHA/LHD and an LPD-17. So what we have is a set of "amphibious" ships that can haul a lot of Marines and equipment around, but can't get them ashore for an assault. So the Marines are getting rid of tanks and heavy artillery, and getting out of the amphibious assault business, becoming instead an ultra-light infantry force that's not far removed from a bunch of Boy Scouts with BB guns.

The Marines have really been put into a bind by two developments. At the same time as the USN was converting its "amphibious" fleet from a set of ships that could conduct assaults to a set of ships that can't, the Army has pushed the Marines closer and closer to a baby army force. This started IMO in Vietnam, when Westmoreland sent the Marines north to I Corps instead of south to the Mekong Delta, where Marines and Navy could have formed a formidable joint riverine force, which Army and Navy never truly achieved. From there through Afghanistan and two bouts with Iraq, the Army has kind of used the Marines as their caddies, throwing them an operation here and there while forcing them to become more and more like baby army with a baby air force. The obvious end game is that at some point the need for an independent Marine Corps will disappear, and they will be absorbed into the Army.

The Marines have also opined on the future of the amphibious fleet. Their idea is a light amphibious warship (LAW) which is too small, too slow, and not at all stealthy. They see the LAW as the support ship for their expeditionary advance base operations (EABO) concept, which puts a very small detachment ashore in harm's way, from there to conduct anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-air operations.

The whole idea strikes me as incredibly stupid, the result of one bad decision following another for the past 5 decades. The Marines are in serious danger of talking themselves out a mission, resulting ultimately in their being absorbed by the Army.

So here's what I would do.

One, I'd have the Marines take a page from what the Royal Marines did when faced with budgetary extinction half a century ago--reinvent themselves as a combination commando and amphibious force. Combine the special operations command (SOCOM) and the Marines, like the Brits did, with the Army, Navy, and Air Force keeping Green Berets, SEALs, and AFSOC as complementary organizations of about 10,000 each, like y the British SBS and SAS. Marines would give the air superiority mission back to the Navy (Guadalcanal was a long time ago) and with it their F/A-18s, and focus instead on getting Marines ashore and providing close air support (CAS) once they get there. The Marines have historically punched above their weight because they have combined infantry, artillery, armor, and air and a lower command level than any of the other services. Come up with a Marine combined arms amphibious regiment of an infantry battalion, a tank company, three artillery batteries (tube, rocket, and anti-air), and an air detachment. A force of commandos plus 30 amphibious regiments would result in a much smaller Marine Corps, maybe in the 140,000 range, but it would be a more focused and elite organization.

That Marine detachment would run to 3,000-4,000 personnel, so have the Navy build a modern version of the classical amphibious squadron/ready group (PhibRon/ARG) to haul it and get it ashore--a smaller LHA/LHD like the Spanish Juan Carlos, a LPH like hte French Mistral, an LSD/LPD like the British Albion, a conventional LST with a beaching bow, an LKA/LPA that could be a converted merchantman, and an assault fire support frigate with 155mm guns, a rocket battery like an enlarged LSMR, and counterbattery radar. At current prices that squadron would cost about $4B, or basically the cost of one LHA/LHD.

What to do with the LHAs/LHDs and LPD-17s? Convert the LHAs/LHDs to Lightning Carriers and convert the LPD-17s to the ABM/BMD ships that HII has proposed for the same hulls. The ABM/BMD ships can deploy in/around major ports like Guam, Yokosuka, Pearl, Anchorage, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Chesapeake Bay, Jacksonville/Miami, New Orleans, and Houston/Corpus Christi to provide protection that we currently do not have.

A lot of people have criticized the Lightning Carrier concept for being too small and for lacking E-2 and refueling capabilities. If we operate the Lighnings paired with supercarrier CVNs, the CVN can handle those duties, and the Lightnings can carry the vast majority of helos, freeing up flight deck space on the CVNs for more fighter/attack aircraft.

We have 10 LHAs/LHDs plus one under construction. We have 11 CVN aircraft supercarriers. Form two-carrier battle groups with one CVN and one Lightning Carrier, and expand the numbers of each to provide 12 carrier battle groups (CVBGs) or 6 of Marc Mitscher's WWII four-carrier carrier task forces (CTFs). Start building a new class of somewhat smaller conventional carriers (CVs), maybe somewhere between Kitty Hawks (80,000 T) and Midway (55,000 T). As those come online, replace the Lightning Carriers on a 1-for-1 basis, until we have 12 CVN supercarriers and 12 conventional CVs.