...with the upcoming Roe decision, this case, and its underpinnings could prove significant in how various States handle their response vis a vis the Supremacy Clause as recognzed in McCulloch v. Maryland.

UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON

Quote:The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause generally immun-
izes the Federal Government from state laws that directly
regulate or discriminate against it. See South Carolina v.
Baker, (1988). Congress, however, can
authorize such laws by waiving this constitutional immun-
ity. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, (1988).

The question before us is whether a Washington State
workers’ compensation law falls within the scope of this
congressional waiver.

In McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819), this
Court held unconstitutional Maryland’s effort to tax the
Bank of the United States when Maryland imposed no com-
parable tax on any other bank within the State. Chief Justice
John Marshall explained that, under the Supremacy Clause,
“the States have no power, by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the
general government.” The Court thus inter-
preted the Constitution as prohibiting States from interfer-
ing with or controlling the operations of the Federal Gov-
ernment.

Over time this constitutional doctrine, often called the in-
tergovernmental immunity doctrine, evolved. Originally
we understood it as barring any state law whose “effect . . .
was or might be to increase the cost to the Federal Govern-
ment of performing its functions,” including laws that im-
posed costs on federal contractors. United States v. County
of Fresno, (1977). We later came to un-
derstand the doctrine, however, as prohibiting state laws
that either “regulat[e] the United States directly or discrim-
inat[e] against the Federal Government or those with whom
it deals” (e.g., contractors). North Dakota v. United States,
(1990) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added);
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (not-
ing that “[a]ll agree” with this aspect of the plurality opin-
ion); see also Baker; County of Fresno.
As to the latter, discrimination-related
prohibition, a state law is thus no longer unconstitutional
just because it indirectly increases costs for the Federal
Government, so long as the law imposes those costs in a
neutral, nondiscriminatory way.

We have said that a state law discriminates against the
Federal Government or its contractors if it “single[s them]
out” for less favorable “treatment,” Washington v. United
States, (1983), or if it regulates them un-
favorably on some basis related to their governmental “sta-
tus,” North Dakota, (plurality opinion).

Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Fed-
eral Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does
not clearly and unambiguously waive the Government’s im-
munity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered