Walt, it's not just the odd of getting 2 hits in 3 outs, but also the possibility of getting 3+ hits and scoring multiple runs in an inning. It doesn't happen all the time, but when it does it's very valuable.

Overall, the value of the sacrifice bunt largely depends on the scoring environment, or how many runs are expected to be scored each game. The higher the run environment the lower the value of the sacrifice. With the new bats the run environment in college baseball is significantly lower than it used to be, and Rice games are even lower than college baseball in general with our excellent pitchers and mediocre offense. The Book is a sabermetric analysis of baseball strategies which devotes an entire chapter and 50 pages to the sacrifice bunt. It determines that sac bunts are frequently a good idea in low-run environments, which it defines as 4 runs per team per game. So far this year we've scored about 4.5 runs a game while our opponents have scored only 3.3, which means our opponents are in a very low environment while we are only in a slightly below average one (average is ~4.7) so you can argue it either way.

All that said, many other factors come into play. Much of the value of the sac bunt comes from when the batter reaches base anyway via error, speed, quality bunt, etc, so where the defense is positioned and the skill of the bunter is significant to the analysis too. Overall, we appear to be right near the break even point. Also, for what it's worth, late in a close game with runners on 1st and 2nd with no outs is one of the best times to bunt.

...and I enjoy his commentary. Is he always right? Of course not. But I love his posts.

(04-06-2013 10:02 PM)NicevilleWRC Wrote:  Walt, it's not just the odd of getting 2 hits in 3 outs, but also the possibility of getting 3+ hits and scoring multiple runs in an inning. It doesn't happen all the time, but when it does it's very valuable.

Overall, the value of the sacrifice bunt largely depends on the scoring environment, or how many runs are expected to be scored each game. The higher the run environment the lower the value of the sacrifice. With the new bats the run environment in college baseball is significantly lower than it used to be, and Rice games are even lower than college baseball in general with our excellent pitchers and mediocre offense. The Book is a sabermetric analysis of baseball strategies which devotes an entire chapter and 50 pages to the sacrifice bunt. It determines that sac bunts are frequently a good idea in low-run environments, which it defines as 4 runs per team per game. So far this year we've scored about 4.5 runs a game while our opponents have scored only 3.3, which means our opponents are in a very low environment while we are only in a slightly below average one (average is ~4.7) so you can argue it either way.

All that said, many other factors come into play. Much of the value of the sac bunt comes from when the batter reaches base anyway via error, speed, quality bunt, etc, so where the defense is positioned and the skill of the bunter is significant to the analysis too. Overall, we appear to be right near the break even point. Also, for what it's worth, late in a close game with runners on 1st and 2nd with no outs is one of the best times to bunt.

although you were talking to Walt, I appreciate the info.

To clarify, your last sentence, best means in terms of eventually scoring a run, right?

I'm a huge proponent of the Earl Weaver big-inning strategy, at least early in the game. Extra innings, 1st and 2nd, nobody out, even Weaver would bunt. His philosophy was to play for one run if and only if one run would win the game. Top of an extra inning, obviously you don't know that one run will win the game, but you do know that scoring one run will massively increase your win expectancy. Anytime you get to the middle of an extra inning with the score tied, the odds are way against you. Basically the home team has 6 outs to your 3 at that point. So taking a lead in an extra inning is hugely important.

That's actually the bigger inning strategy based on the data, at least at the MLB level. And at the NCAA level, with less capable and efficient defenders, the value of putting the ball in play--anywhere--and making a defender handle it only increases the value of that strategy. But more importantly, in that situation, you worry less about how many runs you can expect from each strategic alternative, and more about which alternative gives you the best chance of scoring ONE run.

I have a fundamental belief about baseball that shapes my thinking about offensive strategy. I believe it's impossible to get a base hit. I can't for the life of me figure out how a hitter can stand at the plate and determine how fast the ball is traveling, whether or not it's going to curve and which way, if it's a ball or strike whether or not to swing, calculate the geometry of how to make bat and ball meet and where, then move all the appropriate muscles so as to put the bat in a place where it runs into the ball - all in a couple of tens of a second. And then if he hits the %*&) thing make it go somewhere the 8 defensive guys can't get to it. I think the guys that can master all the skills involved well enough to hit safely even 2 or 3 times out of 10 are amazing.

With that in mind, I'm a fan of "see it and hit it" offense. I think good hitters: 1. know which pitches they can hit well & which they can't, 2. learn to recognize pitches that will be in the "hitting zones" and which won't, and 3. get good swings on pitches they can hit hard and layoff (or spoil with 2 strikes) those they can't.

If I were a coach - & we should all take a moment to be thankful I'm not, I'd send my hitters to the plate thinking only of getting good swings on pitches they can handle. I think sending a guy to the plate thinking about working the count, trying to shoot the ball into the hole between 1st and 2nd with a runner on 1st or lifting a fly ball to the outfield with a runner on 3rd with less than 2 outs only clutters the mind and increases the chances of failure. I think many of the hitting approaches advocated so passionately by some on this board only complicate things to little or no obvious benefit. I certainly don't believe all that stuff is more fundamentally sounds than asking hitters to focus only on pitch recognition and taking good swings.

Because I believe hitting is so hard, I'm no fan of giving away outs (i.e., moving runners up via the bunt or grounders to the right side). It still takes a base hit to score a runner bunted to second. I say give yourself as many chance as possible to get that hit. And as has been said, sometimes swinging outs move runners up. I also wonder about the use of practice time. Is it wise to use limited practice time to divide a player's focus between hitting and bunting or would it be better to have all players focused singularly on becoming the best hitter he can be? I say focus on hitting. Once again, I don't believe it's more fundamentally sound to strategically give up outs - just different.

The one allowance I would make for a singles hitting team like this one is I'd be EXTREMELY aggressive on the bases. I'd advocate for runners going from 1st to 3rd on every base hit to rightfield and I would always send a runner home from 2nd on a base hit to the outfield - every time, always! We'd lose a lot more runners on the bases. But think of it like this... If only half our runners score from 2nd on a base hit, aren't we better off than holding him at 3rd to send another hitter up from a team hitting about .280?

All that being said, I don't think slavish following of either book (either my KISS book or other's more intricate manual) is best. I think the factors that go into these decisions are FAR beyond the knowledge of anybody on this board. Do yourself a favor, go to a Fall Ball practice (when things are a bit more relaxed) and ask Wayne what goes into a bunt call. The answer will amaze you! How has the hitter practiced? Does the runner get a good jump? How healthy are both?, How are the hitters after the bunter doing? What is the game situation? How does the pitcher handle bunt attempts - how well does he hold the runner on; what does he throw? How does the opposition defend the bunt? And more.

I think always sending a guy up to bunt with a runners on and no outs or always taking the 1st pitch in order to work the count is not a good approach. Just like never bunting or never calling for a batter to take a pitch is wrong. The best approach depends on the situation.

One last point... It helps me to remember that offensive baseball is dominantly about failure - most of the time the runner doesn't score, the batter doesn't get a hit, the hitter doesn't drive in the run or move the runner up. So looking back on a decision as a bad one simply because the run didn't score is holding that decision to an unfair standard.

The probabilities of baseball have been analyzed in excruciating detail. There are very few situations where bunting runners over increases the number of runs that you are likely to score in the inning (one situation where it does is runner on 2nd nobody out, bunt him over to 3rd, which makes no conceptual sense to me because the events that score a runner from 3rd but not 2nd are relatively rare, but that's what the stats say). But what bunting a runner over CAN increase is your likelihood of scoring ONE run. So in a situation where 1 run wins it, bunt. That's what Earl Weaver says. Bill James did some research suggesting that visiting teams should never bunt, while home teams should bunt more often. That's about as nerdy as I care to get tonight.

Good stuff in the posts above. I'll add a couple of things

1. With a team OBP of .350 and extra base hits suddenly very rare, the odds of a big inning are very small, absent a significant contribution from opposing defenses. I did a simple simulation that says absent errors you will get 3 or more runners on base in only 22% of the innings, and only half of those will see 4 or more. Without extra base hits or errors, you can expect only 1 multi-run inning per game, and half of those are likely to be a 2 run inning.

2. It is interesting that we really don't attempt steals, yet we bunt often. as of this morning we have 41 sac's (which suggests at least 50-60 bunt attempts) but only 40 stolen base attempts. the stolen base and the bunt are often lumped together in SABRmetrics as overvalued strategies that too often give away outs. I'd love to see a split on when we attempt steals. I think the right time to steal might be 2 outs and runner on first--risk reward feels pretty good at that point.

for comparison sake, in the American League in 2012 there were 2000 stolen base attempts and 455 successful sacrifices.

3. Someone somewhere has certainly quantified this, but if you forego the sacrifice after the leadoff hitter reaches first, you introduce a non-trivial chance of grounding into a double play. looking at year to date stats, our opponents have 8 fewer sacrifices than the Owls but have grounded into 10 more double plays. A GDP is a substantially worse outcome than a successful sacrifice and so it needs to be figured in.

4. At the risk of being overly simplistic, if your only means to reach base are a walk or a hit, the sac allows you to score a run with only one single. Absent the sacrifice and absent errors, it will almost always require either two hits or two walks to plate a run.

a bit more on yesterday.

1. our leadoff reached base in 2,3,6,7,9,12 innings. one of those was by error, but accounting for that our leadoff man's OBP was far above the aggregate, which makes the dearth of offense all the more frustrating

2. we didn't sacrifice in the 3rd and instead went GDP. We sac'd all other times except the 12th, when Stringer walked and then Stainback failed to sacrifice. Of course the situation even after the failed sacrifice was more favorable than all the other innings, as we had 2 men on with one out. No matter of course absent a subsequent hit, error, or multiple walks.

3. We scored single runs in 2 of the 5 innings in which we employed the bunt strategy. Obviously we didn't score any runs in innings where the leadoff didn't get on.

(04-07-2013 07:37 AM)MemOwl Wrote:  Good stuff in the posts above. I'll add a couple of things

1. With a team OBP of .350 and extra base hits suddenly very rare, the odds of a big inning are very small, absent a significant contribution from opposing defenses. I did a simple simulation that says absent errors you will get 3 or more runners on base in only 22% of the innings, and only half of those will see 4 or more. Without extra base hits or errors, you can expect only 1 multi-run inning per game, and half of those are likely to be a 2 run inning.

2. It is interesting that we really don't attempt steals, yet we bunt often. as of this morning we have 41 sac's (which suggests at least 50-60 bunt attempts) but only 40 stolen base attempts. the stolen base and the bunt are often lumped together in SABRmetrics as overvalued strategies that too often give away outs. I'd love to see a split on when we attempt steals. I think the right time to steal might be 2 outs and runner on first--risk reward feels pretty good at that point.

for comparison sake, in the American League in 2012 there were 2000 stolen base attempts and 455 successful sacrifices.

3. Someone somewhere has certainly quantified this, but if you forego the sacrifice after the leadoff hitter reaches first, you introduce a non-trivial chance of grounding into a double play. looking at year to date stats, our opponents have 8 fewer sacrifices than the Owls but have grounded into 10 more double plays. A GDP is a substantially worse outcome than a successful sacrifice and so it needs to be figured in.

4. At the risk of being overly simplistic, if your only means to reach base are a walk or a hit, the sac allows you to score a run with only one single. Absent the sacrifice and absent errors, it will almost always require either two hits or two walks to plate a run.

I don't have statistics to back me up but it seems as if the sacrifice makes sense, particularly since we do not have a prolific hitting team. I was surprised that the other team hits into more DPs. It seems that quite often, when we pass up the sacrifice or fail to execute it, we hit into a DP.

The benefit of the sacrifice, particularly when there are no outs, is that you get the runner in scoring position. He can score on a single. If by luck we get him to third, somehow, with only one out, all sorts of good things can happen. In a close game, this puts pressure on the defense and pitcher. He can score on an error, on a ball that would otherwise be an out that gets by the drawn in infield, on a passed ball or a wild pitch. And given what seems to me to be an aversion to getting hits with runners on base, getting a little bit of help from the defense is critical.

Furthermore, with a lethargic offense (someone pointed out the BA is increasing, but we still have problems scoring runs) and a very good pitching, we are not going to get a lot of runs and we do not need to. Picking up the one run here and there will usually be sufficient. So why not get the one run instead of swinging away and getting none.

Three final thoughts

1. There is a lot of energy to debate whether or not to sac, but I believe the underlying issue in the offense is a .700 team OPS (comparison: 2012 full season with same bats was .774). Since we can't do anything to fix that, it is human nature to focus on the visible symptom of low OPS, which is OG's commitment to bunting after the leadoff reaches base

2. OG may have scouting reports or other data on the degree to which college teams are prone to make an error fielding a sac bunt, and that data might inform his strategy.

3. Here is some data that directionally supports Walt's view that the difference in fielding skills between college and MLB is important to consider. In 2012 AL, there were 8.5 unearned runs for every 100 earned runs. So far this year for the Owls, we are scoring 22.5 unearned runs for every 100 earned runs.

Following Earl Weaver's "3-run HR" approach, and going for the big inning with this Rice offense would be ludicrous. How many times this season has the offense produced 3+ hits in a single inning? Without the time to look it up, I would guess that we've accomplished that feat no more than 10 or so times over our first 33 games and 310 innings. And let's not forget that our 3-run, 4-hit, 9th inning outburst on Friday night included a successful sac bunt AND a 2-run throwing error. For better or worse, this year's offense is hitting just .271, with below-average extrabase power and basestealing proficiency, and with a relatively high strikeout rate. Consequently, especially given our strong pitching and defense, how can one argue with bunting whenever (or in most cases) we get a leadoff runner on base; particularly if the score of the game is still within just one or two runs either way? Unfortunately, we still have one guy in our lineup who has failed repeatedly and consistently to get the bunt down...and it hurt us badly yesterday.

Those who truly know my thoughts on the subject know I do not always advocate bunting, and I'm not a particularly big fan of bunting with the leadoff runner on 2B, or the squeeze bunt (with less than two outs) when one of you're better batters is at the plate. As Coatza adeptly pointed out in his post, it all depends on the given game situation, and how the offense is doing that particular day. BTW, one other factor that favors the sac bunt and getting the runner into scoring position, especially at the college level, is that it increases the pressure on the pitcher and defense.

The .706 OPS (.271/.342/.364 slash) is the problem. In looking at OPS, .700 is pretty much the Mendoza line. What makes it even more frustrating is that our pitching is holding opponents to .608 (.230/.292/.316 slash) so we are wasting a lot of good pitching. There is NO strategic approach that is going to produce a significant number of runs from a .706 OPS.

With that being the strategic context, bunting makes a lot of sense. No point in playing for the 3-run homer if nobody in your lineup can hit one. And with that pitching, one-run tactics should win some games. The solution is not in-game tactics but recruiting or developing some better hitters.

Why not steal more? I'm very surprised Leon Byrd has only 3 steals with an on base percentage of over .400.

(04-07-2013 08:44 AM)Fort Bend Owl Wrote:  Why not steal more? I'm very surprised Leon Byrd has only 3 steals with an on base percentage of over .400.

One of my pet peeves for years. Many teams with no better than average team speed steal far more bases and at a better rate than we do-- year in and year out. I've long advocated getting in an assistant coach who really understands baserunning, and can teach how to watch the pitchers move to get a better jump...and for us to take bigger leads. However, it is what it is. And after getting caught stealing at a better than 50% rate during our first 10+ games, The OG has pretty much limitted base stealing to situation where either the pitcher has a VERY slow delivery to the plate and/or the catcher has a poor arm.

Walt, agree on the steals. Even if this is a bad base stealing team, at .700 OPS the odds favor stealing more. With a team OPS in the .775 range, you need to succeed at about a 70-75% rate for the steal to be a net positive. With OPS down at .700, that required success rate has to go down, probably not to 50%. But that's where you need to work on proficiency--better leads, reading pitchers, better running technique.

There is some strategic advantage to forcing the action, even when the numbers don't back you up 100%. Running more does put you more in control, regardless of outcome. And there is always strategic advantage to being unpredictable. Not knowing when you will put a runner in motion creates problems for the defense and in pitch calling.

Since OPS is on the table, I will take this moment to reprise the trivia question that I don't think anyone answered. What team won a World Series with the highest OPS among those with at least 125 plate appearances belonging to a pitcher? Team and pitcher.

Hints: The pitcher is in the HOF and he's not Babe Ruth. Boston won 3 World Series with Ruth, one he was primarily an OF, one he didn't lead the team in OPS, and one he didn't have 125 plate appearances.

thanks to everybody for the debate.

(04-07-2013 07:55 AM)MemOwl Wrote:  Three final thoughts

1. There is a lot of energy to debate whether or not to sac, but I believe the underlying issue in the offense is a .700 team OPS (comparison: 2012 full season with same bats was .774). Since we can't do anything to fix that, it is human nature to focus on the visible symptom of low OPS, which is OG's commitment to bunting after the leadoff reaches base

2. OG may have scouting reports or other data on the degree to which college teams are prone to make an error fielding a sac bunt, and that data might inform his strategy.

3. Here is some data that directionally supports Walt's view that the difference in fielding skills between college and MLB is important to consider. In 2012 AL, there were 8.5 unearned runs for every 100 earned runs. So far this year for the Owls, we are scoring 22.5 unearned runs for every 100 earned runs.

Unless that difference in errors comes from poor fielding on sacrifice bunts, it is more evidence in favor of foregoing the sacrifice. Those numbers suggest that putting the ball in play, even without a hit, will lead to a positive outcome for the offense.

(04-07-2013 07:55 AM)MemOwl Wrote:  Three final thoughts

1. There is a lot of energy to debate whether or not to sac, but I believe the underlying issue in the offense is a .700 team OPS (comparison: 2012 full season with same bats was .774). Since we can't do anything to fix that, it is human nature to focus on the visible symptom of low OPS, which is OG's commitment to bunting after the leadoff reaches base

I completely agree with this - but not necessarily "we can't do anything to fix that". The imponderable question for me is: "How best to address this?"

It seems to me there are two approaches to take:

1. Accept the OPS as a given and work on other aspects of the game - bunting, stealing, working counts, etc.
2. Focus singularly on the area of weakness - improving OPS by getting better swings on hittable pitches.

It's a guess which approach has a better chance of working with this group of players. I lean towards approach 2 because:

- Given limited practice time, I think it's more realistic to achieve dramatic improvement in 1 area rather than multiple areas. And who's to say our OPS won't actually drop if we diverted practice time to the other areas?
- This is a continuation of the approach being preached since the beginning of Fall Ball - pitch recognition and getting good swings on hitter's pitches. And our offense IS improving. We're better now than we were a month ago. I like our chances of being better still a month from now.
- Getting good at bunting, stealing and the rest does not obviate the need to hit. It still takes a base hit to score a run in most cases. It still takes extra-base hits to score multiple runs in most cases.
- I think hard hit balls put more pressure on defenses than do bunts.

(04-06-2013 10:15 PM)OptimisticOwl Wrote:  

(04-06-2013 10:02 PM)NicevilleWRC Wrote:  Also, for what it's worth, late in a close game with runners on 1st and 2nd with no outs is one of the best times to bunt.

although you were talking to Walt, I appreciate the info.

To clarify, your last sentence, best means in terms of eventually scoring a run, right?

Best overall strategy, which includes scoring 1 or more runs. If you are up 1 run late, one additional run is very important. If you are down 1 run late, the 2nd go-ahead run is almost as valuable as the first.

(04-07-2013 09:19 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  Since OPS is on the table, I will take this moment to reprise the trivia question that I don't think anyone answered. What team won a World Series with the highest OPS among those with at least 125 plate appearances belonging to a pitcher? Team and pitcher.

Hints: The pitcher is in the HOF and he's not Babe Ruth. Boston won 3 World Series with Ruth, one he was primarily an OF, one he didn't lead the team in OPS, and one he didn't have 125 plate appearances.

Don Drysdale of the '65 Dodgers.

Full disclosure: I used baseball reference. I first looked at Steve Carlton of the '80 Phillies. Then went to Big D, whose career was before my time.