RE: OT: Newtown Tragedy and Gun Control
Well, here is kind of a quick and dirty version.
The real problem was that so much bad paper got into the system. Once that happened, the rest was inevitable. The banks realized they had too much risk on their books. A CDO is basically a risk-sharing device, like insurance. If I sense that I have too much risk, then I enter into a risk-sharing device with you, you take part of the risk in exchange for some compensation, the exact form and amount determined by the specific nature of the device. Now you lay some of your risk off on a third party through some kind of risk-sharing arrangement, and your counterparty lays some of his risk off on a fourth party, and so forth. As long as the system performs within certain limits, it works fine, everybody makes money, no problem. With a performing system, these deals are particularly lucrative to the Wall Streeters who set them up, but they are performing a valuable service and should be compensated.
The problem was that these arrangements had all been entered into with expectations of loss based on historic trends, and the amount of bad paper was so huge that it blew those trends out of the water. Hambone used the example of AAA paper with an expected default rate of 2%, and an expected recovery rate (essentially, foreclosure sale proceeds) of 80% (he expressed it as 20% loss rate). What happened is that a larger than expected number of loans defaulted, and (and Hambone points this out very clearly) the recovery rates were much less than expected. And because the risk-sharing devices had proliferated, the shock was felt throughout the system.
What would have happened without the risk-sharing devices? The banks that made the loans would simply all have failed. Since that was basically all banks, the banking system would have totally failed. There would have been less damage in the rest of the system. The recession would still have happened, it would almost certainly have been as bad if not worse. The number of people who got wiped out and ended up upside down on their mortgages would have been the same. All the risk-sharing devices did was shift the risk from the banks who made the bad loans to the large financial trading institutions who cooked up the risk-sharing deals. That's actually exactly what they are supposed to do, just that nobody was prepared for it to happen on such a scale. The problem was that we not only had bad paper in the system, but nobody knew how bad, so the risk-sharing blew up. Suppose insurance companies had underpriced premiums for years, then a major storm blew in, none of the insurance companies had the funds to pay off, so your house gets wiped out and there's no insurance, and the same happens to everybody else. That's the best analogy I can come up with.
So how did the bad paper get into the system and why did nobody realize how bad? We had this huge push to get everybody into a house. Democrats wanted to do it because they thought it would help the lower classes to get them into houses, so they pushed initiatives like CRA (which gets targeted for criticism because of visibility,but in fact it was not CRA so much as other initiatives that caused the problem). Republicans were scared that the economy would crater completely after 9/11 and they would get blamed, so they wanted anything to pump up the growth numbers, and a housing bubble was anything, so they kind of looked the other way. I have seen an analysis suggesting the all of the economic growth 2000-2008 and all of the subsequent decline can be attributed solely to the housing sector; pull out housing and the economy has essentially flat-lined for a decade. I have not verified it, but it seems plausible, and that is a very telling statistic. So there was encouragement from both sides of the political aisle to make home loans to people who could not afford them. This manifested itself in so many ways that it's hard to say which part was more to blame than which other part. And at the same time there was this notion that these are home loans, they'll perform like home loans, and that's some of the safest paper we have. As for those who say the the problem was "deregulation," absolutely all of this process remained as highly regulated as any part of our economy has ever been. Basically the politicians put pressure on the regulators to pressure the banks into making these loans, and cover it up when they did. It was actually through the regulators that the signals were sent to follow the political will for making more loans. So for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways, regulators pushed banks to make loans outside their normal risk profile in order to satisfy the political goals of both major parties. When banks who made these high-risk loans realized what a bunch of junk they had, they took steps to lay off the risks. And the investment banking community, thinking they were getting AAA paper instead of junk (and the part that told them it was AAA paper was highly regulated too, and the regulators helped cover up the problems based on the pressure they got from the politicians), were all to happy to make a quick and (they thought) easy buck on the deal.
The other thing that happened is that the banks who lowered their underwriting standards to make these bad loans got dinged by the regulators, but they still had to take on so many bad loans to satisfy a different group of regulators, so they started going to third party originators like Countrywide, who bribed Chris Dodd to make sure the regulations gave them cover. So the bank calls an originator, like Countrywide, and says, "The affirmative action regulators tell me I need more loans in ZIPcode 55555 or they're going to write me up for red-lining, but the bank examiners tell me I'm already making too many bad loans. So I'll pay you to originate X loans in ZIPcode 55555 and sell them to me." Now Countrywide can't find any more qualified buyers in ZIPcode 55555 that the bank can. But they're not going to keep the note, so it's really no skin off their back if the buyer defaults, they just need to make X loans and collect their origination fees. So a buyer comes in, no W-2, no problem, here, I have a blank one in my desk, let's figure out how much money you need to make to qualify for a loan on that place, and presto, here's a W-2 to match. And the bank that gets the note says, hey, Countrywide did the due diligence so it's AAA paper, and the regulators look the other way.
What would I have done differently? I was pretty heavily involved in bailing out the last round of bank failures (1990), and based on that experience I was proposing this back in the 90s. I think it would have prevented the problem:
1. Make CRA and other programs federally guaranteed. Affordable housing is a great goal, but if you want people who can't afford houses to buy them, then instead of forcing banks to take stupid risks, you take them off the hook. If the bank gets a non-conforming loan app, they send it to the feds and the feds can guarantee it if it meets whatever their guidelines are. This by the way is a pretty effective way for the feds to monitor a bank's lending activities in ZIPcode 5555. If the feds approve, they charge something like a 1/4% override on the interest rate to fund loan losses. If the loan defaults, it goes to the feds for workout. And maybe have a program where if you default on one of these, the house goes back to the feds, you can stay in it and lease it for, say 5 years, at whatever you can afford to pay, and if you get back on your feet any time in the five years, then you an step back into the mortgage. One thing this would have greatly mitigated is the huge losses in home values when the foreclosures started, which was probably the biggest reason for the overall economy to collapse.
2. Put in a provision that if you initiate a mortgage and sell it, you have to keep at lest 25%. With some skin in the game, you do your due diligence properly in underwriting. No more fake W-2's (although that is an extreme case, most of the mistakes were not so egregious). This, by the way, was a provision in a bill around 2001 or so. Countrywide obviously didn't want this, so they got their b1tch Chris Dodd to kill it, and in return Countrywide gave him a sweetheart deal on financing his dream castle in Ireland, tra la.
What would I have done when the fit hit the sham? First of all, I think my two ideas would have prevented it. And a lot of professionals in the industry agree with me. But if not, I would have found a way to insulate the real banks and let the traders jump out of the windows in their Wall Street offices. Yeah, those banks wrote bad paper, but they did it under pretty extreme duress. And if we could have kept them whole, we'd have this whole thing way behind us by now.
(This post was last modified: 12-20-2012 12:46 PM by Owl 69/70/75.)
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