(06-26-2021 10:23 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-25-2021 07:24 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  The Navy is planning to decommission 15 ships (14 warships) this year:

- 7 Ticonderoga cruisers at ages ranging from 28-34 years, design life 35 years, no replacement
- 4 LCSs at ages ranging from 5-10 years, good riddance
- 1 LSD at age 37, design life 40
- 2 SSNs at ages 34 and 37, design life 35
- 1 fleet tug at 41 years

The Navy is building 8 ships (4 warships) this year:

- 2 Virginia-class submarines
- 1 Burke-class destroyer
- 1 Constellation-class frigate
- 1 John Lewis-class oiler
- 1 ocean surveillance ship
- 2 Navajo class towing, salvage, and rescue ships

Net decreases of 7 ships and 10 warships. I am beginning to think the Navy doesn't want to be a navy any more.

FWIW---this is why I keep thinking we need to figure out how to make the LCS useful for our current world landscape. On a minimally related topic---I've been amused watching videos on YouTube discussing the absolute mess the Aussie's have made of trying to procure submarines to replace their 6 aging front line subs from the 1980's. lol---They might have made a bigger mess of it than we did with the LCS. At least we arent alone in doing dumb crap.

I kinda wish we'd just agree to build them some Virginia class boats. Seems like that would be a win if we have a dozen more Virginia's in the South China Sea that we didnt have to pay for. Wouldnt hurt is we also made them upgrading their Canberra's to handle the F-35 a mandatory part of the deal. That would give China 3 more light carriers to worry about at no expense to ourselves. Problem is, even if we wanted to, we dont really have the ship building capacity that would allow us build excess production to sell off while meeting our own needs.

I remember seeing that they were going in with the French on AIP diesel electric boats a few years ago, what happened with that?

(06-26-2021 10:23 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-25-2021 07:24 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  The Navy is planning to decommission 15 ships (14 warships) this year:

- 7 Ticonderoga cruisers at ages ranging from 28-34 years, design life 35 years, no replacement
- 4 LCSs at ages ranging from 5-10 years, good riddance
- 1 LSD at age 37, design life 40
- 2 SSNs at ages 34 and 37, design life 35
- 1 fleet tug at 41 years

The Navy is building 8 ships (4 warships) this year:

- 2 Virginia-class submarines
- 1 Burke-class destroyer
- 1 Constellation-class frigate
- 1 John Lewis-class oiler
- 1 ocean surveillance ship
- 2 Navajo class towing, salvage, and rescue ships

Net decreases of 7 ships and 10 warships. I am beginning to think the Navy doesn't want to be a navy any more.

FWIW---this is why I keep thinking we need to figure out how to make the LCS useful for our current world landscape. On a minimally related topic---I've been amused watching videos on YouTube discussing the absolute mess the Aussie's have made of trying to procure submarines to replace their 6 aging front line subs from the 1980's. lol---They might have made a bigger mess of it than we did with the LCS. At least we arent alone in doing dumb crap.

I kinda wish we'd just agree to build them some Virginia class boats. Seems like that would be a win if we have a dozen more Virginia's in the South China Sea that we didnt have to pay for. Wouldnt hurt is we also made them upgrading their Canberra's to handle the F-35 a mandatory part of the deal. That would give China 3 more light carriers to worry about at no expense to ourselves. Problem is, even if we wanted to, we dont really have the ship building capacity that would allow us build excess production to sell off while meeting our own needs.

I was just reading an article that said we have half as many shipbuilding facilities as we used to because the others went out of business.

In other words, the problem was a lack of orders for new ships. If the Aussies ordered 12 new ships, I'm sure we could open up a new factory sometime in the next decade.

(06-26-2021 10:23 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  FWIW---this is why I keep thinking we need to figure out how to make the LCS useful for our current world landscape.

I'm not sure that is doable. For one thing, they can't take a hit. Their basic approach to damage control is if you take a hit anywhere, abandon ship. I don't know how you can take that into a fight.

Quote:On a minimally related topic---I've been amused watching videos on YouTube discussing the absolute mess the Aussie's have made of trying to procure submarines to replace their 6 aging front line subs from the 1980's.

One big problem they've had is too much intervention by politicians with little or no understanding of the situation. Here is an example where Senator Pauline Hanson shows her ignorance:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYF08jJi9Hg

(06-28-2021 09:27 AM)U_of_Elvis Wrote:  

(06-26-2021 10:23 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-25-2021 07:24 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  The Navy is planning to decommission 15 ships (14 warships) this year:

- 7 Ticonderoga cruisers at ages ranging from 28-34 years, design life 35 years, no replacement
- 4 LCSs at ages ranging from 5-10 years, good riddance
- 1 LSD at age 37, design life 40
- 2 SSNs at ages 34 and 37, design life 35
- 1 fleet tug at 41 years

The Navy is building 8 ships (4 warships) this year:

- 2 Virginia-class submarines
- 1 Burke-class destroyer
- 1 Constellation-class frigate
- 1 John Lewis-class oiler
- 1 ocean surveillance ship
- 2 Navajo class towing, salvage, and rescue ships

Net decreases of 7 ships and 10 warships. I am beginning to think the Navy doesn't want to be a navy any more.

FWIW---this is why I keep thinking we need to figure out how to make the LCS useful for our current world landscape. On a minimally related topic---I've been amused watching videos on YouTube discussing the absolute mess the Aussie's have made of trying to procure submarines to replace their 6 aging front line subs from the 1980's. lol---They might have made a bigger mess of it than we did with the LCS. At least we arent alone in doing dumb crap.

I kinda wish we'd just agree to build them some Virginia class boats. Seems like that would be a win if we have a dozen more Virginia's in the South China Sea that we didnt have to pay for. Wouldnt hurt is we also made them upgrading their Canberra's to handle the F-35 a mandatory part of the deal. That would give China 3 more light carriers to worry about at no expense to ourselves. Problem is, even if we wanted to, we dont really have the ship building capacity that would allow us build excess production to sell off while meeting our own needs.

I remember seeing that they were going in with the French on AIP diesel electric boats a few years ago, what happened with that?

Somehow they have bumbled into a deal that builds the French AIP diesel electric boats for a price tag thats twice as high as a Virginia class nuclear sub and the subs dont even start arriving until the 2030-2050 period---which means they now have a period where they will have no subs at all---and when they finally DO get them---its very possible they will be getting decades old submarine technology that might be obsolete by then. Part of the problem is the French Barracuda is a nuclear sub---so it needs to be converted to a AIP sub for the Aussies. One fix for part of the problem would be for the Aussies to just go with the nuclear boats.

Frankly, I think they should talk to the Swedes about building the Aussies a larger version of the Gotland class subs that would have more range and endurance. The Germans and Japanese also have off the shelf options that are more affordable and can arrive earlier than the French deal they have.

(06-28-2021 10:35 AM)Captain Bearcat Wrote:  I was just reading an article that said we have half as many shipbuilding facilities as we used to because the others went out of business.
In other words, the problem was a lack of orders for new ships. If the Aussies ordered 12 new ships, I'm sure we could open up a new factory sometime in the next decade.

Shipyard capacity is a huge problem. We currently have just two yards that can build nuke submarines--General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, CT, and HII Newport News, VA--both on the east coast. That limits us to a maximum of three subs a year--1 SSBN and 2 SSNs. Until we build out the new Columbia SSBNs, we have no way to replace the 4 Ohio SSGNs, probably our best naval strike asset, which are nearing the ends of their useful lives.

We no longer have the capability to build nuke subs at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, now a badly backlogged repair and maintenance facility, also on the east coat. And we no longer have Mare Island Naval Shipyard or any other west coast submarine building capability. We need a west coast sub construction facility to generate more new subs faster, and a west coast sub maintenance facility to ease the backlog at Portsmouth.

Another problem I have is price. The Columbias are going to come in around $8-9B each, the Columbia-based SSGNs at around $8B each, and the replacement for the Virginias at around $5.5B each. That's going to mandate a very small sub force, and indeed a very small Navy. I think we are stuck with the Columbias, but I would try to base the SSGNs on the Ohios, which should come in around $5 billion, so we could afford maybe 20 of them, and build out the SSNs as Virginias or something cheaper. The Navy plans to build 12 SSBNs ($108B), 5 SSGNs ($40B), 33 more Virginias ($93B), and 28 Virginia replacements ($154B), total 78 subs for $395B. I would propose the 12 SSBNs ($108B), 20 SSGNs ($100B), 30 Virginia VPMs ($93B), and 30 smaller SSNs ($60B), total 92 subs for $361B. I would also build 30 AIP SSKs for coastal, littoral, and choke point use, to free up the nukes for blue water missions, at about $750MM each, total $23B, for a total force of 122 subs for $384B.

One thought I have had is license-buying a number of the French Barracudas, which come in at about $2 billion each, and try to get Naval Group to build or reopen a facility on the west coast, like they have done with Brazil and are supposedly doing in Australia. There are some obvious issues there, particularly with technology transfer, but if we committed to a run of 30 boats or so, we could probably make it happen. One problem is that I don't know how quiet the Barracudas are--their predecessors, the Rubis were pretty noisy--and there would be awkward issues handling the technology around that. Another problem would that it would put our smaller subs being built on the west coast, were we really need our biggest ones because of distances, but there are Panama Canals and polar submerged transits to deal with that.

You don't go to diesel boat builders to make you a nuc. The Aussies apparently thought doing the opposite was okay for some strange reason. Honestly, if AIP was their first choice they should have made a deal with the Japanese. Japan is the closest sub builders to them so support was in the same time zone.

The real issue is they didn't want to go nuc, even though it would give them everything they need.

Oh well, some Frenchmen are eating well and laughing their asses off now.

(06-28-2021 12:17 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 10:35 AM)Captain Bearcat Wrote:  I was just reading an article that said we have half as many shipbuilding facilities as we used to because the others went out of business.
In other words, the problem was a lack of orders for new ships. If the Aussies ordered 12 new ships, I'm sure we could open up a new factory sometime in the next decade.

Shipyard capacity is a huge problem. We currently have just two yards that can build nuke submarines--General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, CT, and HII Newport News, VA--both on the east coast. That limits us to a maximum of three subs a year--1 SSBN and 2 SSNs. Until we build out the new Columbia SSBNs, we have no way to replace the 4 Ohio SSGNs, probably our best naval strike asset, which are nearing the ends of their useful lives.

We no longer have the capability to build nuke subs at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, now a badly backlogged repair and maintenance facility, also on the east coat. And we no longer have Mare Island Naval Shipyard or any other west coast submarine building capability. We need a west coast sub construction facility to generate more new subs faster, and a west coast sub maintenance facility to ease the backlog at Portsmouth.

Another problem I have is price. The Columbias are going to come in around $8-9B each, the Columbia-based SSGNs at around $8B each, and the replacement for the Virginias at around $5.5B each. That's going to mandate a very small sub force, and indeed a very small Navy. I think we are stuck with the Columbias, but I would try to base the SSGNs on the Ohios, which should come in around $5 billion, so we could afford maybe 20 of them, and build out the SSNs as Virginias or something cheaper. The Navy plans to build 12 SSBNs ($108B), 5 SSGNs ($40B), 33 more Virginias ($93B), and 28 Virginia replacements ($154B), total 78 subs for $395B. I would propose the 12 SSBNs ($108B), 20 SSGNs ($100B), 30 Virginia VPMs ($93B), and 30 smaller SSNs ($60B), total 92 subs for $361B. I would also build 30 AIP SSKs for coastal, littoral, and choke point use, to free up the nukes for blue water missions, at about $750MM each, total $23B, for a total force of 122 subs for $384B.

One thought I have had is license-buying a number of the French Barracudas, which come in at about $2 billion each, and try to get Naval Group to build or reopen a facility on the west coast, like they have done with Brazil and are supposedly doing in Australia. There are some obvious issues there, particularly with technology transfer, but if we committed to a run of 30 boats or so, we could probably make it happen. One problem is that I don't know how quiet the Barracudas are--their predecessors, the Rubis were pretty noisy--and there would be awkward issues handling the technology around that. Another problem would that it would put our smaller subs being built on the west coast, were we really need our biggest ones because of distances, but there are Panama Canals and polar submerged transits to deal with that.

Now see---a new shipyard is the kind of thing that would make a ton of sense in a real well considered "national infrastructure" spending plan that was about getting us ready for the next century. Im sure its nowhere to be found in the current bloated idiocy being proposed on the Hill.

(06-28-2021 12:16 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 09:27 AM)U_of_Elvis Wrote:  

(06-26-2021 10:23 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-25-2021 07:24 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  The Navy is planning to decommission 15 ships (14 warships) this year:

- 7 Ticonderoga cruisers at ages ranging from 28-34 years, design life 35 years, no replacement
- 4 LCSs at ages ranging from 5-10 years, good riddance
- 1 LSD at age 37, design life 40
- 2 SSNs at ages 34 and 37, design life 35
- 1 fleet tug at 41 years

The Navy is building 8 ships (4 warships) this year:

- 2 Virginia-class submarines
- 1 Burke-class destroyer
- 1 Constellation-class frigate
- 1 John Lewis-class oiler
- 1 ocean surveillance ship
- 2 Navajo class towing, salvage, and rescue ships

Net decreases of 7 ships and 10 warships. I am beginning to think the Navy doesn't want to be a navy any more.

FWIW---this is why I keep thinking we need to figure out how to make the LCS useful for our current world landscape. On a minimally related topic---I've been amused watching videos on YouTube discussing the absolute mess the Aussie's have made of trying to procure submarines to replace their 6 aging front line subs from the 1980's. lol---They might have made a bigger mess of it than we did with the LCS. At least we arent alone in doing dumb crap.

I kinda wish we'd just agree to build them some Virginia class boats. Seems like that would be a win if we have a dozen more Virginia's in the South China Sea that we didnt have to pay for. Wouldnt hurt is we also made them upgrading their Canberra's to handle the F-35 a mandatory part of the deal. That would give China 3 more light carriers to worry about at no expense to ourselves. Problem is, even if we wanted to, we dont really have the ship building capacity that would allow us build excess production to sell off while meeting our own needs.

I remember seeing that they were going in with the French on AIP diesel electric boats a few years ago, what happened with that?

Somehow they have bumbled into a deal that builds the French AIP diesel electric boats for a price tag thats twice as high as a Virginia class nuclear sub and the subs dont even start arriving until the 2030-2050 period---which means they now have a period where they will have no subs at all---and when they finally DO get them---its very possible they will be getting decades old submarine technology that might be obsolete by then. Part of the problem is the French Barracuda is a nuclear sub---so it needs to be converted to a AIP sub for the Aussies. One fix for part of the problem would be for the Aussies to just go with the nuclear boats.

Frankly, I think they should talk to the Swedes about building the Aussies a larger version of the Gotland class subs that would have more range and endurance. The Germans and Japanese also have off the shelf options that are more affordable and can arrive earlier than the French deal they have.

Back when they picked the French I think they had concerns about Japan supporting an arms export program long term, vs. the French have been arms dealer to the world forever.

A hybrid fleet of Swedish diesel electrics and a few nukes could be a good option for them.

(06-28-2021 01:19 PM)U_of_Elvis Wrote:  A hybrid fleet of Swedish diesel electrics and a few nukes could be a good option for them.

The Collinses were Swedish and after the problems with them, I think they are reluctant to go that way. And they don't have any domestic capability to maintain nukes.

(06-28-2021 01:10 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 12:17 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 10:35 AM)Captain Bearcat Wrote:  I was just reading an article that said we have half as many shipbuilding facilities as we used to because the others went out of business.
In other words, the problem was a lack of orders for new ships. If the Aussies ordered 12 new ships, I'm sure we could open up a new factory sometime in the next decade.

Shipyard capacity is a huge problem. We currently have just two yards that can build nuke submarines--General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, CT, and HII Newport News, VA--both on the east coast. That limits us to a maximum of three subs a year--1 SSBN and 2 SSNs. Until we build out the new Columbia SSBNs, we have no way to replace the 4 Ohio SSGNs, probably our best naval strike asset, which are nearing the ends of their useful lives.

We no longer have the capability to build nuke subs at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, now a badly backlogged repair and maintenance facility, also on the east coat. And we no longer have Mare Island Naval Shipyard or any other west coast submarine building capability. We need a west coast sub construction facility to generate more new subs faster, and a west coast sub maintenance facility to ease the backlog at Portsmouth.

Another problem I have is price. The Columbias are going to come in around $8-9B each, the Columbia-based SSGNs at around $8B each, and the replacement for the Virginias at around $5.5B each. That's going to mandate a very small sub force, and indeed a very small Navy. I think we are stuck with the Columbias, but I would try to base the SSGNs on the Ohios, which should come in around $5 billion, so we could afford maybe 20 of them, and build out the SSNs as Virginias or something cheaper. The Navy plans to build 12 SSBNs ($108B), 5 SSGNs ($40B), 33 more Virginias ($93B), and 28 Virginia replacements ($154B), total 78 subs for $395B. I would propose the 12 SSBNs ($108B), 20 SSGNs ($100B), 30 Virginia VPMs ($93B), and 30 smaller SSNs ($60B), total 92 subs for $361B. I would also build 30 AIP SSKs for coastal, littoral, and choke point use, to free up the nukes for blue water missions, at about $750MM each, total $23B, for a total force of 122 subs for $384B.

One thought I have had is license-buying a number of the French Barracudas, which come in at about $2 billion each, and try to get Naval Group to build or reopen a facility on the west coast, like they have done with Brazil and are supposedly doing in Australia. There are some obvious issues there, particularly with technology transfer, but if we committed to a run of 30 boats or so, we could probably make it happen. One problem is that I don't know how quiet the Barracudas are--their predecessors, the Rubis were pretty noisy--and there would be awkward issues handling the technology around that. Another problem would that it would put our smaller subs being built on the west coast, were we really need our biggest ones because of distances, but there are Panama Canals and polar submerged transits to deal with that.

Now see---a new shipyard is the kind of thing that would make a ton of sense in a real well considered "national infrastructure" spending plan that was about getting us ready for the next century. Im sure its nowhere to be found in the current bloated idiocy being proposed on the Hill.

If the Aussies gave us $3 billion each for 12 new Virginia-class subs, that's $36 billion. The profits on that sale would easily pay for a new shipyard.

There's plenty of good sites for shipyards - we used to have twice as many as we do now. The biggest limiting factor for keeping shipyards open has been a lack of orders for new ships.

(06-28-2021 02:57 PM)Captain Bearcat Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 01:10 PM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 12:17 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(06-28-2021 10:35 AM)Captain Bearcat Wrote:  I was just reading an article that said we have half as many shipbuilding facilities as we used to because the others went out of business.
In other words, the problem was a lack of orders for new ships. If the Aussies ordered 12 new ships, I'm sure we could open up a new factory sometime in the next decade.

Shipyard capacity is a huge problem. We currently have just two yards that can build nuke submarines--General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, CT, and HII Newport News, VA--both on the east coast. That limits us to a maximum of three subs a year--1 SSBN and 2 SSNs. Until we build out the new Columbia SSBNs, we have no way to replace the 4 Ohio SSGNs, probably our best naval strike asset, which are nearing the ends of their useful lives.

We no longer have the capability to build nuke subs at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, now a badly backlogged repair and maintenance facility, also on the east coat. And we no longer have Mare Island Naval Shipyard or any other west coast submarine building capability. We need a west coast sub construction facility to generate more new subs faster, and a west coast sub maintenance facility to ease the backlog at Portsmouth.

Another problem I have is price. The Columbias are going to come in around $8-9B each, the Columbia-based SSGNs at around $8B each, and the replacement for the Virginias at around $5.5B each. That's going to mandate a very small sub force, and indeed a very small Navy. I think we are stuck with the Columbias, but I would try to base the SSGNs on the Ohios, which should come in around $5 billion, so we could afford maybe 20 of them, and build out the SSNs as Virginias or something cheaper. The Navy plans to build 12 SSBNs ($108B), 5 SSGNs ($40B), 33 more Virginias ($93B), and 28 Virginia replacements ($154B), total 78 subs for $395B. I would propose the 12 SSBNs ($108B), 20 SSGNs ($100B), 30 Virginia VPMs ($93B), and 30 smaller SSNs ($60B), total 92 subs for $361B. I would also build 30 AIP SSKs for coastal, littoral, and choke point use, to free up the nukes for blue water missions, at about $750MM each, total $23B, for a total force of 122 subs for $384B.

One thought I have had is license-buying a number of the French Barracudas, which come in at about $2 billion each, and try to get Naval Group to build or reopen a facility on the west coast, like they have done with Brazil and are supposedly doing in Australia. There are some obvious issues there, particularly with technology transfer, but if we committed to a run of 30 boats or so, we could probably make it happen. One problem is that I don't know how quiet the Barracudas are--their predecessors, the Rubis were pretty noisy--and there would be awkward issues handling the technology around that. Another problem would that it would put our smaller subs being built on the west coast, were we really need our biggest ones because of distances, but there are Panama Canals and polar submerged transits to deal with that.

Now see---a new shipyard is the kind of thing that would make a ton of sense in a real well considered "national infrastructure" spending plan that was about getting us ready for the next century. Im sure its nowhere to be found in the current bloated idiocy being proposed on the Hill.

If the Aussies gave us $3 billion each for 12 new Virginia-class subs, that's $36 billion. The profits on that sale would easily pay for a new shipyard.

There's plenty of good sites for shipyards - we used to have twice as many as we do now. The biggest limiting factor for keeping shipyards open has been a lack of orders for new ships.

I dont see orders being a problem as long as China and Russia keep misbehaving. Frankly, Im with Owl69 in that I'd like to see us build some cheaper AIP subs to free up all our nuke subs for blue water sub duty.

Navy Guidance: Trans Men Can ‘Use Facility That Corresponds To Their Gender Identity,’ Misgendering Leads To ‘Unlawful Hostile Work Environment’

Quote:Naval intelligence officers were sent guidance on LGBT pronouns and bathroom usage, informing them that repeatedly misgendering a co-worker leads to an “unlawful hostile work environment.”

In an email obtained by The Daily Wire, Naval officers were told that under updated Title VII protections they cannot repeatedly misgender someone without facing consequences, potentially legal. The updates are in response to a Supreme Court case that ruled that discrimination based on transgender status is “sex discrimination.”

“Intentionally and repeatedly using the wrong name and pronoun to refer to a transgender employee could contribute to an unlawful hostile work environment,” the email reads. “Accidental misuse of a transgender employee’s preferred name and pronoun does not violate Title VII.”

An internal whistleblower told The Daily Wire that they are concerned that this updated guidance violates an officer’s religious freedom. They dubbed the new rules “troubling.”

The email also included a slew of LGBT “glossary terms” including “intersex,” “sex-based harassment,” and “transition.” Per the definition, officers would seemingly be guilty of “sex-based harassment” if they used a transgender employee’s wrong pronouns or name.

“Sex-based harassment” is defined as “unwelcome conduct that is severe or pervasive and has no sexual component, but is instead aimed at disparaging an employee because of the employee’s gender or sex.”

The email also included a “myth buster” which told Naval officers that transgender men are allowed to use women’s bathrooms and locker room facilities and vice versa. The email cited the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) fact sheet on bathroom access.

“Employers may have separate facilities for men and women, but may also choose to have unisex or single-use facilities,” the Navy email reads. “However, the EEOC has taken the position that when these facilities are segregated by sex, all men and women, including transgender men and women ‘should be allowed to use’ the facility that corresponds to their gender identity.”

The Navy has become increasingly “woke” following the inauguration of President Joe Biden. According to a slew of declassified memos obtained by The Daily Wire, the Navy held mandated training on “eradicating extremism.” The training told officers that Black Lives Matter is not a political or extremist organization.

The Office of Naval Intelligence also established an “Artwork Working Group” that was created to “address the issue” of inclusion in artwork within the naval offices. An employee raised concerns that the artwork on display in the National Maritime Intelligence Center “did not represent the diversity of people serving in the Navy.”

Naval officers have also been encouraged to read Ibram X. Kendi’s “How to Be an Antiracist” and other books that discuss critical race theory. GOP Rep. Doug Lamborn, who represents the Colorado area that houses the Air Force Academy, lambasted Chief Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday over the Navy’s reading list.

“How does exposing our sailors to the idea that they are either oppressors or oppressed and that we must actively discriminate to make up for past discrimination improve our Navy’s readiness and lethality for great power competition?” Lamborn asked.

US Navy in shambles as leaders prioritize wokeness over combat readiness: report

Quote:A scathing report commissioned by congressional members has found that the United States Navy is in disarray and focusing more on diversity than warfighting.
The official findings, considered a nonpartisan exercise of congressional oversight, discovered that the Navy's surface warfare forces have systemic training and leadership issues, including an intense focus on diversity that eclipses basic readiness skills. The authors of the review conducted long-form interviews with 77 active-duty, retired or detached officers, and enlisted personnel about insights into the culture of the United States Navy following a series of high-profile and damaging operational failures in the Navy's surface warfare community.

A staggering 94 percent of the subjects believed the recent Naval disasters were part of a broader, internal problem. "I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training. I'm sorry that I can't say the same of their ship handling training," said one retired senior enlisted leader. Other interviewed participants also voiced concern that the Navy spends more time on diversity training than on developing warfighting capacity and key operational skills.

"Sometimes I think we care more about whether we have enough diversity officers than if we'll survive a fight with the Chinese navy," lamented one active duty lieutenant. "It's criminal. They think my only value is as a black woman. But you cut our ship open with a missile and we'll all bleed the same color," she added.

One recent destroyer captain noted that "where someone puts their time shows what their priorities are. And we've got so many messages about X, Y, Z appreciation month, or sexual assault prevention, or you name it. We don't even have close to that same level of emphasis on actual warfighting."

Some of the interviewed respondents expressed worry that combat lethality and warfighting preparation are treated in a box-checking manner that can seem indistinguishable from non-combat related exercises.

"The Navy treats warfighting readiness as a compliance issue," said one career commander. "You might even use the term compliance-centered warfare as opposed to adversary-centered warfare or warfighter-centered warfare."

One junior surface warfare officer, still on active duty, confessed: "I don't think that the [surface community] see themselves as people who are engaged in a fight."

Through exercise of Congress's Title I oversight authority, interviewees were offered anonymity to identify issues and engage in candid conversations that personnel wouldn't feel comfortable raising or entertaining inside the chain of command—to encourage nuance and candor as opposed to wider-reach, lower-touch survey methods that are common in military climate assessments.

The report prepared by Marine Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle and Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, both retired, and conducted under the direction of Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), Reps. Jim Banks (R-IN), Dan Crenshaw (R-TX), and Mike Gallagher (R-WI) came in response to recent Naval disasters, including the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard in San Diego, two collisions involving Navy ships in the Pacific, and the surrender of two small craft to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in the Arabian Gulf.

While programs to encourage diversity, human sex trafficking prevention, suicide prevention, and sexual assault prevention "are appropriate," the aforementioned initiatives "come with a cost,' the report's authors wrote.

"The non-combat curricula consume Navy resources, clog inboxes, create administrative quagmires, and monopolize precious training time. By weighing down sailors with non-combat related training and administrative burdens, both Congress and Navy leaders risk sending them into battle less prepared and less focused than their opponents," the authors elucidated, citing an underinvestment in officer training and under-sourced ship maintenance.

At one point, the Navy even handed officers 23 compact discs with reading material for surface warfare wardroom training, replacing a five-month course at the Surface Warfare Officer School Division Officer's Course in Rhode Island.

"We gave ensigns boxes of CDs and told them to train themselves between watches, and that was a colossal failure," one officer recalled.

Another issue identified in the report is a perceived fear among Navy leaders of any negative news articles. "[Admirals] are supposed to lead us into battle but they hide in foxholes at the first sight of Military.com and the Military Times," said one intelligence officer. "The reporters are in charge, not us." Military.com has since released its own take on the findings, titling its recent article: "Featuring Catchy Quotes and Contentious Politics, a New Report Reveals Age-Old Navy Problems."

"COs would be quite risk-adverse," one officer said. "They would have their senior department heads manning a lot of watches, especially on the bridge and things like that to make sure that nothing went wrong, because nobody wanted to end up in the media, and nobody wanted to end up on the cover of Navy Times."

Interviewees described an undercurrent of fear that gripped the surface fleet while commanders are unwilling to delegate and senior ranks are quick to hand down punishments in response to media pressure. The report noted that the rank-and-file felt that the disciplinary actions following the two collisions involving the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald were in response to "public and Congressional outcry rather than the concrete root causes of both unique incidents."

The report argued that Navy leaders placed too much emphasis on controversies that would otherwise disappear from the news cycle: "Many news outlets, including defense news outlets, have shifted to tabloid models where stories are sensationalized and short-lived. The Navy has forgotten how to differentiate between stories that are ignorable and stories that demand corrective measures."

No single president, member of Congress, or high-ranking naval leader was found to be solely responsible for the surface Navy's drift, the report underscored. Rather, slow and profound changes beginning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have eroded the Navy's combat edge as the outlined problems have metastasized over the past three decades.

The report concluded that a major peer-level conflict in the 21st century will play out in the naval theaters of operations. Unlike the surface Navy's last major war, which concluded 76 years ago, such imminent conflict will "not permit significant time for organizational learning once it is underway," the report predicted. "Unless changes are made, the Navy risks losing the next major conflict."

Cotton called the findings "very concerning" and said that Ameri
can sailors are "too often deprived of the training and leadership they need to fight and win at sea." A Navy that puts "lethality, warfighting, and operational excellence at the heart of its culture is absolutely essential to our national security," Cotton stated.

"America counts on the Navy to keep us safe and keep our seas open," Cotton added via Monday's press release, vowing to work with the veterans who composed the report to implement the review's multiple recommendations.

Crenshaw, a former Navy SEAL officer, declared that the findings indicate that the nation's sailors are not receiving the necessary training to perform the essential functions of the Navy: "to find and sink enemy fleets and ensure freedom of navigation." He committed to collaborating with Navy leadership to implement changes to ensure that sailors are "war-ready and capable of defending" America.

Report Questions Navy’s Preparedness

US Naval Academy: Full Speed Ahead on Critical Race Theory

Quote:Military institutions are being destroyed from the inside out by critical race theory – by design! SECDEF Lloyd Austin and the rest of his racist crew have been on a mission for months, as previously reported here, here, here, and here. That last one targets my Navy, but even closer to home is the cultural rot that has been cultivated and promoted at my alma mater, the US Naval Academy. The cancel culture there failed in an attempt to cashier a midshipman for protected speech with which they didn’t agree (as previously reported here in the last of a series of articles exposing the perfidy of USNA “leadership;” MIDN Standage graduated and was commissioned on time with the rest of his class). But their defeat doesn’t mean that the cultural Marxists who tout critical race theory among the faculty and elsewhere at the Academy have magically changed their tune, no siree.

One of my classmates and good friends has taken the Academy’s English Dept to task for their cultural Marxism and rot. He and a lot of other alumni aren’t going to quietly watch while our beloved Academy is destroyed by Leftists! Here is his “summary of action.” Read and beware: if this is happening at USNA, imagine what is happening at other universities across the fruited plain.

His commentary begins:

The Mission Statement of the U.S. Naval Academy: “To develop Midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to graduate leaders who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential for future development in mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship and government.”

The above is much the same mission that the Naval Academy had when I graduated in 1974 to become a Marine Officer. Imagine my shock to find, just as parents and taxpayers are finding throughout the nation, that Critical Race Theory (CRT) is deeply embedded in my alma mater – a major and very expensive source of Navy and Marine Officers.

A fellow alumnus, wanting to put a halt to the precipitous slide to the Left at the Naval Academy (as well as the other service academies), forwarded an email from an English Department Professor that served as a goodbye missive to her colleagues. The below is an excerpt that led me to look at her Curriculum Vitae (CV) and those of other members of the English Department at the Naval Academy:

“My bittersweet news is that I have accepted a position as Associate Professor in the English Department at the University of Miami, where I will take over as Director of the Africana Studies program. The past six years here have taught me so much about myself as a teacher, scholar, disabled person, and Black queer woman in academia, and I will take those lessons with me into the next part of my career.”

A sample of her “academic works”:

God is (a) *****: The Pleasure Principle and Homo-Erotic Spirituality in Shug’s Blueswoman Theology

In the life and the spirit: Homoerotic spirituality in African American literature

Between women TV: Toward the mainstreaming of black lesbian masculinity and black queer women in community

This was a bombshell for me and my wide circle of military friends, many of whom are Naval Academy alumnae. That a person with this shocking CV had been embedded in the Naval Academy for six years, implied that there were other fellow travelers.

A quick check of the Naval Academy English Department Faculty site revealed that a full 40% to 50% of the instructor staff include Marxist polemics among their prized credentials and instructional qualifications. CRT is high on their list of poisonous heterodoxies with which to infiltrate the heart of America’s Military Officer Corps. CRT is, of course, an updated form of Marxism that replaces racial divisiveness and polarization for the economic warfare envisioned by the early Communists. An email exchange with members of the Naval Academy staff prompted many members of the English Department to excise CRT from their CVs, demonstrating clear nefarious intent.

In addition to everything I’ve already said about this pernicious ruinous ideology, parents and taxpayers throughout the country are fighting back to remove it permanently from curricula at all levels.

Unsurprisingly, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin both favor CRT instruction to military officers on specious grounds, while disparaging white service members as privileged supremacists, oppressors and colonizers. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki recently indicated that President Joe Biden – or those who spike his oatmeal – is also a proponent of CRT.

The Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Sean Buck and his Public Affairs Officer (PAO), conversely, has insisted on numerous occasions that CRT is not part of the curriculum at USNA. Meanwhile, he has purposely stacked one of his cherished humanities departments with Marxist demagogues. The Naval Academy has routinely been ranked among the top ten National Liberal Arts Colleges during Buck’s tenure as Superintendent.

In the Fall of 2020, another round of Honor violations ensnared numerous Midshipmen — including members of the football team. Just like felons in Blue cities, all was forgiven and wiped clean! Cheating at USNA is now integral to the learning experience.

If Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) were at the forefront of a Naval Academy education, as previously, fewer Navy destroyers would T-bone into foreign flag super tankers off the coast of Red China. Fewer Fat Leonard ethical scandals would ensnare the entire senior Navy leadership in Asian waters. Midshipmen must put away their Little Red Books of CRT and get back to learning about warfighting!

The way to stop this terrible Marxist CRT scourge is for taxpayers to demand that it stop at every level. The Service Academies are no longer useful to the nation when they train young men and women on how to divide our nation.

Defund the Service Academies, NOW!

Jeff Cole is a Naval Academy graduate, Class of 1974, and a retired Marine Rifleman.

The end.

The English Professor is Marlon Rachquel Moore. The totality of her "research" consists of a pile of stinking anti-white racist garbage. We are probably dumber as a society for having had her be in the world.

(07-14-2021 08:35 PM)CrimsonPhantom Wrote:  Report Questions Navy’s Preparedness

They found six major issues:
1. Insufficient leadership focus on warfighting.
2. A dominant and paralyzing zero-defect mentality.
3. Corrosive over-responsiveness to media culture.
4. Under-investment in surface warfare officer training.
5. Poorly resourced and executed surface ship maintenance programs.
6. Expanding culture of micromanagement

I would say that 1, 4, and 5 were clearly already there during my active-duty time in the early to mid 1970s. 2 and 6 were well on their way, but not as firmly entrenched as they are today. 3 grew largely as a reaction to the media disaster that was Vietnam.

In 4 years at sea, I attended exactly one hour of junior officer training in shiphandling, a session on maneuvering board use. But we knew not to run into anybody else. I find things like the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions, or the Port Royal grounding in front of Honolulu Airport, to be simply inexplicable. I have an explanation for the surrender of the two boats to the Iranians, and the only explanation that seems possible to me, but it would probably come across as too conspiracy-theorish for some on here.

The Chinese Claim They Chased a US Navy Destroyer out of the South China Sea and We Can No Longer Assume They Are Lying to Us

Quote:About a week ago, wire services and networks ran an interesting story that appeared and disappeared in the flash of an eye. It’s a shame because it was a major story, it is plausible, and because we no longer owe the US military the benefit of a doubt when receiving its version of events. Via Reuters, China says it ‘drove away’ U.S. warship on anniversary of tribunal ruling.

China’s military said it “drove away” a U.S. warship that illegally entered Chinese waters near the Paracel Islands on Monday, the anniversary of an international court ruling that held Beijing had no claim over the South China Sea.

The Chinese comments resembled the usual reaction from Beijing following freedom of navigation operations by U.S. warships held almost every month in the South China Sea.

The U.S. Navy destroyer Benfold entered the waters without China’s approval, seriously violating its sovereignty and undermining the stability of the South China Sea, the southern theatre command of the People’s Liberation Army said.

“We urge the United States to immediately stop such provocative actions,” it said in a statement.

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China had no historic title over the South China Sea, a ruling that Beijing said it would ignore.

Think about it for a second. China is claiming that it drove, by unspecified means, a US surface combatant, in this case, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Benfold, out of international waters.

This is how the Navy described events several days later.

USS Benfold was going to conduct a “freedom of navigation operation,” or FONOP, in the South China Sea, specifically near the Paracel Islands.

The US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) has conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands.

The ship is forward-deployed to the US 7th Fleet area of operations that conducts missions in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The USS Benfold (DDG 65) sailed through the South China Sea while performing its routine operations.

The FONOP operation was carried out in accordance with international law and demonstrated navigational freedom in maritime territories that are unlawfully claimed by some nations.

As per the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ships of all countries have the ‘right of innocent passage’ through a territorial sea.

The US 7th Fleet said in a statement: “This freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) upheld the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea recognised in international law by challenging the unlawful restrictions on innocent passage imposed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam and also by challenging China’s claim to strait baselines enclosing the Paracel Islands.

“Unlawful and sweeping maritime claims in the South China Sea pose a serious threat to the freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded commerce, and freedom of economic opportunity for the South China Sea littoral nations.”

The Paracel Islands are a flashpoint for any potential war between the US and China as China is claiming critical international routes of commerce as territorial waters. China is building reefs, recklessly exploiting the natural resources, bullying ships of other nations, and doing everything possible to establish “facts on the ground” that support its ownership of the area. Freedom of navigation is one of the historical missions of the US Navy, and we’ve done that since the era of the Barbary pirates. My personal view is that we are very near to war with China, a view which I explore in How Close Are We to War With China?

In ordinary times, this is the kind of story that one would guffaw at. But since 2016, that has not been the case. In January 2016, two US Navy riverine patrol craft were boarded by Iranian forces in the Arabian Sea. Ten sailors, nine described as male and one described as female (I say “described” because in the Navy of Obama and afterwords, we really aren’t sure what these words actually mean anymore), were taken prisoner to the everlasting shame of a once-great maritime power. And who can forget the ugly, mutinous spectacle of how a Navy admiral refused to obey a US President exercising his Constitutional authority as commander in chief

More recently, Senator Tom Cotton teamed up with Representatives Dan Crenshaw, Mike Gallagher, and Jim Banks to publish “A Report on the Fighting Culture of the United States Navy Surface Fleet.” It paints a sorry picture of a service that can barely, barely sail its ships, much less fight them.














This was the top-line of the report:

Insufficient leadership focus on warfighting. Perhaps the most concerning comment and consistent observation amongst interviewees was that the service does not promote or advance surface ship warfighting in a meaningful way. Finding and sinking enemy fleets should be the principal purpose of a Navy. But many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions rather than their skills as a warfighter. There was considerable apprehension that the surface warfare community in particular lost its fighting edge in the years following the end of the Cold War. With China building and operating a competitive fleet, the lack of proper attention on warfighting was of deep concern to many interviewees.

A dominant and paralyzing zero-defect mentality. A prevalent theme emerged over the course of the interview process: near universal disdain for the so-called “one mistake Navy,” the practice of treating certain errors with career termination and offering no opportunity for recovery. A former senior leader framed this problem using an evocative historical analogy, suggesting that none of the four key Admirals who led victorious fleets in World War II would have made it to the rank of Captain in today’s Navy. The general unwillingness to rehabilitate one-off mistakes, the disinclination to weigh errors against the totality of a naval career, and the practice of discipline-by-paperwork were broadly understood to be a drain on the Navy’s retention efforts.

Under-investment in surface warfare officer training. The investment in surface warfare officer training pales in comparison to investments in aviation and submarine communities. Compounding its under-investment problem, the surface Navy has “re-imagined” its officer training programs multiple times in the past 20 years, often seeking efficiencies (i.e. even smaller investments) and leaving the commanding officers with inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms.

Poorly resourced and executed surface ship maintenance programs. Nearly every interviewee had a story of a cancelled, delayed, or drastically reduced major maintenance availability. Often this was identified as a problem driven by senior civilian leadership and combatant commanders who consistently accepted the “maintenance risk” to squeeze an extra month or two out of a deployment. But this was also seen as a failure in manning and training the surface community to develop and assess maintenance work packages. Finally, there was an overwhelming perception that the surface Navy is the “billpayer” as aviation and submarine nuclear maintenance packages were seen as too risky to underfund. The cumulative effect of this underfunding and poor execution has left the surface warships less modernized and less ready for combat operations.

Expanding culture of micromanagement. Concerns of micromanagement within the surface warfare community are alarming. Sailors’ concerns were two-fold. The first is that technology has empowered admirals and commodores to exercise greater, arguably unhealthy, levels of control over ship captains. The second was that this control drives a level of toxicity and lack of accountability and initiative in the Navy’s warfighting command hierarchy. Given the increasing likelihood that naval commands may be isolated or cut off from communications in a high-end fight, creating undue dependence on higher headquarters for day-to-day direction could negatively impact future naval combat operations.

Corrosive over-responsiveness to media culture. Sailors believe that Navy leaders are excessively reactive to an unyielding U.S. news cycle, and are unable to distinguish between stories that demand a response and stories that do not. A pervasive sentiment is that Navy leaders have subverted the responsibilities of the chain of command to the pages of Military.com or the Military Times, and make punitive decisions based on negative news reports rather than the service’s own standards of discipline.

Other themes that a majority of interviewees mentioned included:

– The surface Navy wardroom has lost its focus on growing good ship-handlers;

– Sailors are distracted by a tsunami of administrative tasks not related to their ships’ lethality;

– The Navy is too small to accomplish all the missions with which it is tasked by senior civilian leaders and combatant commanders;

– Sailors and officers lack sufficient resiliency and are unprepared for the difficulties of combat, in part because their training has deemphasized persistent exposure to adversity.

The quickness with which the story went away leads me to believe China’s to be much more representative of what happened than the Navy’s response. China made its point to the audience it was trying to reach, that would be those nations with territorial claims to the Paracel and Spratley Islands. Our fearless firefighters in the media shut down the story before Stumblebum Joe, and the Blown Hair Brigade at State were showed to be the feckless poseurs that they are.

I don’t think anyone, right or left, really thinks Joe Biden can afford to hold Beijing to account for much of anything due to the degree to which he and his drug-addled, sex-addicted grifting son are compromised by China’s intelligence services. It is also difficult to believe that Navy leadership, which has to be at least as aware of the Navy’s ineptitude as the rest of us, didn’t give the Benfold orders to skedaddle when faced with Chinese pushback. The US Navy, indeed the US military, is simply not capable of carrying out a limited conflict to defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and protecting the territorial integrity of the nations in the region, including those of our allies. The Chinese know it. Our allies know it. Our military and political leadership know it. Maybe, eventually, the American people will wake up to just how poorly they are being served before too many young Americans have to die to make the point.

I would adopt three ideas from the Royal Navy to try to address some of this (I have great admiration for the RN, I operated a lot with them and my general impression was that we had better kit but they had better sailors, and the Royal Marines are the only outfit that our Marines will even admit might be tougher than they are):

1) FOST (Flag Officer Sea Training), a very intensive and exhaustive shipboard training exercise that includes weapons, sensors, navigation, engineering, and damage control exercises conducted by a fleet training staff, that all ships must pass before being certified for deployment
2) Perisher (so-called because if you flunk your career perishes) course required of all submarine CO's before taking command; I would do for all CO's of all ships
3) Springtrain (although I don't think they do this any more because of cost), a massive annual exercise run generally out of Gibraltar in the spring (hence the name), for a substantial portion of the fleet; Sandy Woodward and a number of ships that went to the Falklands were in the middle of Springtrain when ordered to head south, and Woodward credited that exercise for their high state of readiness in that campaign; we did something similar between WWI and WWII, annual Fleet Problems, where we basically rehearsed the battle plan for Japan in the Pacific and decided what worked and what didn't.

1) develops ships' crews, 2) develops COs, and 3) develops strategy and tactics for task groups/task forces.