(06-12-2021 12:14 PM)UTEPDallas Wrote:  

(06-12-2021 11:48 AM)BCSvsBS Wrote:  

(06-12-2021 11:23 AM)bill dazzle Wrote:  The "power" designation will still be "a thing" with fans and the media as we move into the future — for good, bad or both.

Too many folks (including some on this board) either 1. fail to understand or 2. understand but don't acknowledge that "power" in college football is about 95 percent money/resources (and the other 5 percent results). This is why the American and the Mountain are not "power" leagues in football and never will be perceived as such by objective folks. However, both those leagues have "major" to "high-major" football (and basketball, too) programs.

As I've noted many times on the board, I consider the Big East a "power league" in men's basketball because each of the league's 11 programs is of "major to high-major to blueblood" quality. The "worst" BE program is, at the minimum, a "major" program (in terms of results, resources — or both). The same can be said of all the programs in the P5. That cannot be said of the AAC, Mountain West, A10, etc. (in which some programs are essentially in the "mid-major" to "major" category).

Of note, the AAC is as much a "power league" as the Big East overall because it sponsors football, plays strong baseball (the BE does not), has massive enrollments and budgets, etc.

And yet some fail to be able to distinguish between the two.

The American Athletic Conference has sent a letter to the Group of conferences known as the "Autonomous 5". In that letter, the American Athletic Conference is requesting to become a member of that group. They have given examples of why they meet the performance standards or criteria to become a member. This in no way shape or form alters their Media Contracts, Bowl Contracts or any other financial compensation. It merely means that they are requesting to become a member of the group that creates and decides Autonomous Legislation outside/within the current framework of the NCAA.

Some people just have to harp ad nauseum on financial differences between conferences. Yet in the tweet that started all this conversation, they never once mentioned financial compensation. They only referenced that the A5 and G5 designations could change. While many of the "Power Conference" fans took issue with this, they failed to understand that the "A" was being used for Advantage 5 (which alludes to financials) as well as Autonomous 5 (Which alludes to Legislation).

I ask that people please understand the difference. Yes the AAC will still lag far behind the rest of the Autonomous 5 in Financials as they are also the Advantaged 5. The AAC is just attempting to be included in the creation and adaption of Autonomous Legislation, for now. Which would make that group the "Autonomous 6"

Why would the A5 become the A6? What’s the incentive? I quite frankly don’t see any.

The last thing the P5 or A5 want is to give any legitimacy to an outsider.

One could argue that well, it's better to be in the group that gets to initiate new policies (the As) rather than being in the group that can only react to them by either adopting them as well or ignoring them (the non-As).

But IMO, not really. I would speculate that the real reason Aresco is pursing "A" status for the AAC is because of its symbolic value. Once the AAC is formally recognized as being separate from the "Gs" in one domain, that can be leveraged to help it wedge itself free in other domains (such as the CFP money distribution structure).

And the more domains that the AAC gets included with the Power conferences and separates from the Group conferences, the more the media narrative will build that the AAC really is a "P" itself. That greater prestige could translate in to many tangible benefits, such as better ability to hire coaches, recruit players, attract fan interest. Which could then lead to better bowl and media deals and eventually, in a long enough causal chain, maybe actual in-fact "P" status in a full sense.

It's a step in that direction. A wedge in the door, a crack in the dam, however you want to put it.

Which is why if I was the commissioner of another "G" conference like the MAC, I would either oppose that step right now, or else insist that if the AAC gets "A" status that we do too. Don't let the AAC get even one break in the chain, so to speak. "Me too" it, and vigorously. Because if the AAC does break away, those left behind will be the worse for it.

(06-12-2021 10:36 PM)BruceMcF Wrote:  

(06-12-2021 01:11 PM)ken d Wrote:  As proposed, there would no longer be a G5. All ten conferences would be competing for the spots reserved in the playoff for the six highest ranked conference champions. None of them would be guaranteed a spot in the playoffs. Whether the media would continue to use the term P5 to refer to the "high resource" conferences is anybody's guess. My guess is that they would.

What was proposed was a playoff structure, not the contractual arrangement underlying the playoff structure, so as proposed it depends on whether there are five conferences which go into the negotiation on the playoff structure as a group whether there will be a new Group of Five under the new structure or not.

It could, for example, be replaced by a Group of Three, if the AAC and MWC decide to go into the negotiations individually, and the MAC, CUSA and SBC negotiate as a common block. That would likely rebound to the disadvantage of the AAC, MWC and the Group of Three, but it would likely end with a better revenue share for the "Group of Three" than if they negotiated individually.

It could, for example, be a Group of Fools, if each of the five go into the contract negotiations and negotiate individually.

Perhaps---my guess is you have a point---but it likley would not matter to the AAC for 2 reasons.

1) They simply do not want to be seen as an equal partner in the G5.

2) Right now, the G5 gets roughly a 20% share. The AAC gets basically an equal share of that 20% with a slight ability to increase or decrease that amount due annual performance. To put that in prospective----the AAC gets roughly 4% of the total CFP payout as a member of the G5 pool (thats 20% of 20%). If the AAC walks away from the pool and negotiates a deal with 5%, 6%, 7%, or even 8% of the CFP total revenue as part of the individual conference negotiation process----the AAC is unlikely to care if the AAC/CUSA/MAC/MW/SB combined portion is just 17% or 18% of the total CFP payout. The AAC will have accomplished its goals. It will have broken away from the G5 in the CFP structure and will be better off financially as a result of the individual negotiation. Even if they dont increase their payout (which would be an unlikely outcome in my opinion)---the AAC still accomplishes one of its biggest stated goals (separating from the G5).

But the idea that the AAC gets a larger share than what roughly 20% of what the other non Contract Bowl conferences get presumes that the AAC has a bargaining position, based on its veto over the early change to the system, and that the hypothetical Go4 is a passive participant without a bargaining position, despite having four vetoes over the early change to the system.

If the hypothetical Go4 insists that their base payout is about four times the AAC base payout, they have the leverage to get it. When it comes time to play hardball to force something through two contradictory veto positions, pressuring 11 schools and 11 Presidents and 11 NCAA Div 1 votes to try to swing 6 to force Aresco to budge is going to be the more direct and more attractive option than pressuring 48 schools and 48 Presidents and 48 NCAA Div 1 votes to try to swing the agreed bargaining position of the group.

There are four moving parts to the present agreement. There is the per school APR payment, which come from the broadcast rights, there are the base payouts of the bulk of the broadcast rights, there are the participation payments, which are the smallest piece at present, and there are the Contract Bowl payments, which is a second revenue source, which not only are directed to the P5 but which define the P5, since the base payouts are defined in terms of Contract Bowl conferences and non-Contract Bowl conferences.

In the context of a required unanimous supporting vote in the CFP management council, a hypothetical Go4 is in a much stronger bargaining position than an isolated AAC, but OTOH a group position cannot be as flexible as an individual bargaining position. So the hypothetical Go4 might have the APR payment pushed up to $1m, the base payouts at least the same share as before and the base payouts at least four times the AAC base payout.

In the current process, with four vetoes in hand, they may well have the clout to get that. But if they are going to be intent on making sure that the pressure from the P5 is directed at getting the AAC position to crack, they probably have to give up on increasing their overall share.

In that context, the most fruitful line for the AAC to use its flexibility could well be to pushing for an increase in the participation payments share of broadcast rights, since it expects to get the participation payments more often than any of the hypothetical Go4 conferences.

Evidently, as a Go5, the five conferences could push for more, but if the hypothetical Go4 is going to establish a hedgehog position to direct the attention of the PTB to cracking the AAC position on the base payment, pushing for more risks opening up cracks in the positions.

One word: Semantics.

(06-21-2021 07:50 PM)BruceMcF Wrote:  But the idea that the AAC gets a larger share than what roughly 20% of what the other non Contract Bowl conferences get presumes that the AAC has a bargaining position, based on its veto over the early change to the system, and that the hypothetical Go4 is a passive participant without a bargaining position, despite having four vetoes over the early change to the system.

Not only that, but the truth is that the current CFP distribution model for the G5 is already pretty skewed towards performance. E.g., there have been years where the AAC has received $25 million from the CFP while the Sun Belt has received $14 million. That's almost a 70% difference in revenue distribution. I doubt there's much appetite within the G5 to make it even more "merit based".

So to me, if the point of negotiating separately is to significantly boost AAC pay, it isn't really about getting a larger slice of the G5 pie. What it has to actually be about is getting a larger slice of money from beyond the G5 pie, meaning the P5 pie. And then you're trying to convince the SEC commissioner that Georgia and Florida should get less so UCF and ECU can get more.

I'm not sure that's gonna fly.

(06-21-2021 08:42 PM)quo vadis Wrote:  So to me, if the point of negotiating separately is to significantly boost AAC pay, it isn't really about getting a larger slice of the G5 pie. What it has to actually be about is getting a larger slice of money from beyond the G5 pie, meaning the P5 pie. And then you're trying to convince the SEC commissioner that Georgia and Florida should get less so UCF and ECU can get more.

I'm not sure that's gonna fly.

As far as negotiating positions, "we want 1/6th of the conference shares, independent of the per school APR money, and we want the APR money to be hold it's share of the broadcast revenue, or we drag this out and you wait a year for the money train to start" has promise for squeezing a bigger slice of the pie. 1/5 of 5/6 of the conference split and 1/5 of 6/7 of the conference split ... it's 16.7% versus 17.1%.

And if you don't get your ambit claim and end up with the same seventh share of the conference cut but actually keep the per school payment in proportion to the broadcast revenue income, it's still a financial win. Without a common front, the APR money could easily lose ground ... get a bump to $500K or $750K when the media money has grown 300%-400%.

(06-21-2021 07:50 PM)BruceMcF Wrote:  But the idea that the AAC gets a larger share than what roughly 20% of what the other non Contract Bowl conferences get presumes that the AAC has a bargaining position, based on its veto over the early change to the system, and that the hypothetical Go4 is a passive participant without a bargaining position, despite having four vetoes over the early change to the system.

If the hypothetical Go4 insists that their base payout is about four times the AAC base payout, they have the leverage to get it. When it comes time to play hardball to force something through two contradictory veto positions, pressuring 11 schools and 11 Presidents and 11 NCAA Div 1 votes to try to swing 6 to force Aresco to budge is going to be the more direct and more attractive option than pressuring 48 schools and 48 Presidents and 48 NCAA Div 1 votes to try to swing the agreed bargaining position of the group.

There are four moving parts to the present agreement. There is the per school APR payment, which come from the broadcast rights, there are the base payouts of the bulk of the broadcast rights, there are the participation payments, which are the smallest piece at present, and there are the Contract Bowl payments, which is a second revenue source, which not only are directed to the P5 but which define the P5, since the base payouts are defined in terms of Contract Bowl conferences and non-Contract Bowl conferences.

In the context of a required unanimous supporting vote in the CFP management council, a hypothetical Go4 is in a much stronger bargaining position than an isolated AAC, but OTOH a group position cannot be as flexible as an individual bargaining position. So the hypothetical Go4 might have the APR payment pushed up to $1m, the base payouts at least the same share as before and the base payouts at least four times the AAC base payout.

In the current process, with four vetoes in hand, they may well have the clout to get that. But if they are going to be intent on making sure that the pressure from the P5 is directed at getting the AAC position to crack, they probably have to give up on increasing their overall share.

In that context, the most fruitful line for the AAC to use its flexibility could well be to pushing for an increase in the participation payments share of broadcast rights, since it expects to get the participation payments more often than any of the hypothetical Go4 conferences.

Evidently, as a Go5, the five conferences could push for more, but if the hypothetical Go4 is going to establish a hedgehog position to direct the attention of the PTB to cracking the AAC position on the base payment, pushing for more risks opening up cracks in the positions.

Frankly, the way I see it, the group of 5 position has no more leverage (possibly less) than the AAC position. How is the G5 leverage different? It rests on its veto---no different than the AAC. Be it 4 vetos or one---nothing moves forward when a conference exercises its veto.

The problem I see with your argument (and you even allude to it in your post)---is the G4 position for most intents and purposes is directly in opposition to the AAC goals. The positions of the G4 and AAC are incompatible. While they may have been aligned enough to be compatible in 2012---the G4 and AAC goals are in direct conflict for the 2021 renegotiation. Moving a couple of extra million into the performance pool isnt going to paper over this incompatibility. I think the AAC believes they made a grave mistake allowing the P5-G5 landscape to come out of the last arrangement and they intend to completely divorce themselves from that creation.

The AAC has made it clear they would prefer to chart their own course this time. Little has made that more clear than the 7 years of Aresco saying the AAC does not belong in the G5. That began immediately in 2013 and eventually morphed into the "P6" marketing campaign. Then, just last week, it came out that the AAC sent a letter to the P5 asking to be part of the autonomous group and outlining the reasons it believed it should have a contract bowl slot. That letter was signed by Aresco and every single AAC school president. That simply doesnt sound like a conference thats looking to negotiate as an equal partner of the G5. It sounds like a conference that will likely do whatever is necessary to NOT be a G5 member for the next 10 to 15 years (or however long the new CFP extension lasts).

Id also add, Karl Benson---former WAC and Sunbelt commissioner--claims that the AAC is negotiating on its own outside of the G4. Benson describes a CFP dynamic in which there are basically 3 negotiation groups right now---P5, G4, and AAC. Benson mentions this in the first 3 or 4 minutes of the following interview from about a month ago. This was apparently before it was known the 12 team model would be recommended. Its a pretty interesting interview about the financial aspects of the CFP negotiations....and it explains yet another reason the AAC may wish to negotiate individually.

https://bleav.com/podcast-show/bleav-in-...-football/

(06-22-2021 02:30 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Frankly, the way I see it, the group of 5 position has no more leverage (possibly less) than the AAC position. How is the G5 leverage different? It rests on its veto---no different than the AAC. Be it 4 vetos or one---nothing moves forward when a conference exercises its veto.

As I alluded to above, but I guess never actually set out, it's the shelter that the group of conferences agreed negotiating position provided to a Go5 (or would provided to a hypothetical Go4) President under pressure. The "I'd like to help, but I only have a vote in the one conference, and some of our Presidents won't budge unless the rest of the group agrees". Where the AAC position at any point in time is only six Presidents away from pulling the rug out from under Aresco.

As I mentioned before, it may be the AAC's biggest chance of getting an unequal share is if Aresco can convince the MWC to join them in a "Group of Two" ... that puts the AAC/MWC group and the remaining three, should they group up, in more level footing when it comes time for the P5 to play hardball and put the squeeze.

Of course, a structural advantage going into a negotiation doesn't guarantee a win ... it's always possible that one side in a complex negotiation blunders or loses its nerve.

If the AAC is determined to go it alone in the negotiations, that's on them ... they just shouldn't complain if the decision backfires to the advantage of the P5.

(06-22-2021 05:34 AM)BruceMcF Wrote:  

(06-22-2021 02:30 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Frankly, the way I see it, the group of 5 position has no more leverage (possibly less) than the AAC position. How is the G5 leverage different? It rests on its veto---no different than the AAC. Be it 4 vetos or one---nothing moves forward when a conference exercises its veto.

As I alluded to above, but I guess never actually set out, it's the shelter that the group of conferences agreed negotiating position provided to a Go5 (or would provided to a hypothetical Go4) President under pressure. The "I'd like to help, but I only have a vote in the one conference, and some of our Presidents won't budge unless the rest of the group agrees". Where the AAC position at any point in time is only six Presidents away from pulling the rug out from under Aresco.

As I mentioned before, it may be the AAC's biggest chance of getting an unequal share is if Aresco can convince the MWC to join them in a "Group of Two" ... that puts the AAC/MWC group and the remaining three, should they group up, in more level footing when it comes time for the P5 to play hardball and put the squeeze.

Of course, a structural advantage going into a negotiation doesn't guarantee a win ... it's always possible that one side in a complex negotiation blunders or loses its nerve.

If the AAC is determined to go it alone in the negotiations, that's on them ... they just shouldn't complain if the decision backfires to the advantage of the P5.

The reality is the AAC complained almost from the moment the new system came into being. Looking back, the AAC was the only conference that took a pay cut upon entering the new CFP era—meanwhile the G4 all received a massive pay raise with the advent of th CFP era—-and it came largely as a result if the AAC pay cut. It’s hard to see how negotiating alone could come out much worse for AAC than that last negotiation as part of the G5—but we I guess we will see. I think that Karl Benson interview is interesting. He seems quite pessimistic about the G5 chances to do as well financially this time around.

(06-22-2021 09:45 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-22-2021 05:34 AM)BruceMcF Wrote:  

(06-22-2021 02:30 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Frankly, the way I see it, the group of 5 position has no more leverage (possibly less) than the AAC position. How is the G5 leverage different? It rests on its veto---no different than the AAC. Be it 4 vetos or one---nothing moves forward when a conference exercises its veto.

As I alluded to above, but I guess never actually set out, it's the shelter that the group of conferences agreed negotiating position provided to a Go5 (or would provided to a hypothetical Go4) President under pressure. The "I'd like to help, but I only have a vote in the one conference, and some of our Presidents won't budge unless the rest of the group agrees". Where the AAC position at any point in time is only six Presidents away from pulling the rug out from under Aresco.

As I mentioned before, it may be the AAC's biggest chance of getting an unequal share is if Aresco can convince the MWC to join them in a "Group of Two" ... that puts the AAC/MWC group and the remaining three, should they group up, in more level footing when it comes time for the P5 to play hardball and put the squeeze.

Of course, a structural advantage going into a negotiation doesn't guarantee a win ... it's always possible that one side in a complex negotiation blunders or loses its nerve.

If the AAC is determined to go it alone in the negotiations, that's on them ... they just shouldn't complain if the decision backfires to the advantage of the P5.

The reality is the AAC complained almost from the moment the new system came into being. Looking back, the AAC was the only conference that took a pay cut upon entering the new CFP era—meanwhile the G4 all received a massive pay raise with the advent of th CFP era—-and it came largely as a result if the AAC pay cut. It’s hard to see how negotiating alone could come out much worse for AAC than that last negotiation as part of the G5—but we I guess we will see. I think that Karl Benson interview is interesting. He seems quite pessimistic about the G5 chances to do as well financially this time around.

The only ones who took a pay cut were UConn, Cincinnati and South Florida. The other nine AAC schools took a pay raise in the CFP. UConn didn’t like their new situation so they left and now play basketball in a true power league. So let’s not act like the entire AAC took a pay cut going from the BCS to CFP because that’s not the case.

(06-22-2021 10:03 AM)UTEPDallas Wrote:  

(06-22-2021 09:45 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  

(06-22-2021 05:34 AM)BruceMcF Wrote:  

(06-22-2021 02:30 AM)Attackcoog Wrote:  Frankly, the way I see it, the group of 5 position has no more leverage (possibly less) than the AAC position. How is the G5 leverage different? It rests on its veto---no different than the AAC. Be it 4 vetos or one---nothing moves forward when a conference exercises its veto.

As I alluded to above, but I guess never actually set out, it's the shelter that the group of conferences agreed negotiating position provided to a Go5 (or would provided to a hypothetical Go4) President under pressure. The "I'd like to help, but I only have a vote in the one conference, and some of our Presidents won't budge unless the rest of the group agrees". Where the AAC position at any point in time is only six Presidents away from pulling the rug out from under Aresco.

As I mentioned before, it may be the AAC's biggest chance of getting an unequal share is if Aresco can convince the MWC to join them in a "Group of Two" ... that puts the AAC/MWC group and the remaining three, should they group up, in more level footing when it comes time for the P5 to play hardball and put the squeeze.

Of course, a structural advantage going into a negotiation doesn't guarantee a win ... it's always possible that one side in a complex negotiation blunders or loses its nerve.

If the AAC is determined to go it alone in the negotiations, that's on them ... they just shouldn't complain if the decision backfires to the advantage of the P5.

The reality is the AAC complained almost from the moment the new system came into being. Looking back, the AAC was the only conference that took a pay cut upon entering the new CFP era—meanwhile the G4 all received a massive pay raise with the advent of th CFP era—-and it came largely as a result if the AAC pay cut. It’s hard to see how negotiating alone could come out much worse for AAC than that last negotiation as part of the G5—but we I guess we will see. I think that Karl Benson interview is interesting. He seems quite pessimistic about the G5 chances to do as well financially this time around.

The only ones who took a pay cut were UConn, Cincinnati and South Florida. The other nine AAC schools took a pay raise in the CFP. UConn didn’t like their new situation so they left and now play basketball in a true power league. So let’s not act like the entire AAC took a pay cut going from the BCS to CFP because that’s not the case.

The BigEast/AAC took a paycut. Thats a simple fact. You can rationalize if you wish----but thats all it is---a rationalization. The Big East's standing in the BCS was a major reason why those newer teams jumped so quickly when the Big East offered. Im sure that was at least a factor in the Boise backing out (obviously, the lower than expected revenue from TV was the other key factor).