tanqtonic
Hall of Famer
Posts: 19,121
Joined: Nov 2016
Reputation: 775
I Root For: rice
Location:
|
RE: Womp Womp
(06-10-2020 12:24 PM)Redwingtom Wrote: Gleeson's Amicus Curiae is out. As expected, he totally agrees with Sullivan.
Quote:The Government seeks leave of court to dismiss its false statements charge against Defendant Michael T. Flynn. See ECF No. 198. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) controls that request.
Under Rule 48(a), the Government’s motion should be denied on two separate grounds.
First, “the requirement of judicial approval entitles the judge to obtain and evaluate the
prosecutor’s reasons.” United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Here,
the Government’s statement of reasons for seeking dismissal is pretextual. The Government
claims there is insufficient evidence to prove materiality and falsity, but even giving it the benefit
of every doubt—and recognizing its prerogative to assess the strength of its own case—this
contention “taxes the credulity of the credulous.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Government’s ostensible grounds for seeking dismissal are
conclusively disproven by its own briefs filed earlier in this very proceeding. They contradict
and ignore this Court’s prior orders, which constitute law of the case. They are riddled with
inexplicable and elementary errors of law and fact. And they depart from positions that the
Government has taken in other cases. While Rule 48(a) does not require the Government to bare
its innermost secrets, it does require a statement of its reasons for dismissal. See Ammidown, 497
F.2d at 620 (explaining that this requirement “prevent[s] abuse of the uncontrolled power of
dismissal previously enjoyed by prosecutors”). Leave of court should not be granted when the
explanations the Government puts forth are not credible as the real reasons for its dismissal of a
criminal charge.
Second, the Court should deny leave because there is clear evidence of a gross abuse of
prosecutorial power. Rule 48(a) was designed to “guard against dubious dismissals of criminal
cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants.”3
In other words, the rule empowers courts to protect the integrity of their own proceedings from prosecutors who
undertake corrupt, politically motivated dismissals. See id.; see also Ammidown, 497 F.2d at
620-622. That is what has happened here. The Government has engaged in highly irregular
conduct to benefit a political ally of the President. The facts of this case overcome the
presumption of regularity. The Court should therefore deny the Government’s motion to
dismiss, adjudicate any remaining motions, and then sentence the Defendant.
The Court has also asked me to address whether it should issue an order to show cause
why Flynn should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury. Flynn has indeed committed
perjury in these proceedings, for which he deserves punishment, and the Court has the authority
to initiate a prosecution for that crime. I respectfully recommend, however, that the Court not
exercise that authority. Rather, it should take Flynn’s perjury into account in sentencing him on
the offense to which he has already admitted guilt. This approach—rather than a separate
prosecution for perjury or contempt—aligns with the Court’s intent to treat this case, and this
Defendant, in the same way it would any other.
Quote:For the foregoing reasons, the court-appointed amicus curiae respectfully submits that the
Government’s motion to dismiss should be denied and no Order to Show Cause why Flynn
should not be held in criminal contempt should issue.
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov....23.2_3.pdf
I guess you dont know Gleeson's background, do you? First, he has already made very public statements on Flynn --- kind of disqualifies him at the start to act in the way that Sullivan tapped him for, but, we know Sullivan didnt tap him for that.
Previously, in one case before him, he served as the advocate to higher authorities to get a sentence reduction for a convicted criminal. Actually advocated for the defendant. Then turned right around, and in the same case he acted as an advocate in, served as the actual sentencing judge.
Further, look at HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2017).
There, as the trial judge, he did pretty much the same thing that Sullivan did by plopping himself into the middle of the propriety of a deferred prosecution agreement. Said he had all sorts of power to jump into the middle.
The Appellate Court spanked him pretty hard for that.
If one bothers to look up his background -- he is an interventionist tool that many times simply makes up what he should do, even if it runs contrary to the written rules of evidence, procedure, or Judicial Canons for that matter.
|
|