Interesting Article on Arians: http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/145866...-learn-nfl

One paragraph that resonated

Quote:All things weren't equal, and that included Arizona's coaching advantage. McCarthy played it safe yet again, and it ended up costing his team another postseason in the prime of the 32-year-old Rodgers' career. He coached to put off losing as long as possible. Arians coached to win, and while it raised some eyebrows and nearly cost his team the victory, he made far more defensible decisions than his counterpart.

Also Pete Caroll just called a fake punt on his own 20 to try to continue the comeback (Carolina was up 31-0 at the half)

Lots of coaches could stand to learn from these guys. Especially ours.

Agree here. And it's not only the issue of playing the probabilities -- there is a psychological signal that is sent to your team when the head coach takes risks. It's a signal of confidence and aggression -- two keys to winning football games (or anything). I think this psychological aspect is under-appreciated.

I've been making a similar case against bunting for a long time on the baseball threads (not attempting to derail this conversation -- Walt please don't respond that point).

In the case where the overall odds are increased by the risk, the numbers speak for themselves.

But what support do you have that "a signal of confidence and aggression" makes a (positive) difference? Or does it just feel right?

(01-18-2016 09:58 AM)JOwl Wrote:  In the case where the overall odds are increased by the risk, the numbers speak for themselves.

But what support do you have that "a signal of confidence and aggression" makes a (positive) difference? Or does it just feel right?

I think it's a fine line for when this is true/untrue.

Being aggressive, for the sake of being aggressive, doesn't always signal confidence, and could actually signal a lack of confidence in a particular area of your team (e.g. being more aggressive to keep the ball on offense because the defense is playing poorly). I think when being aggressive works best in inspiring a team when the magnitude of risk does not far outweigh the reward, like trying to create points at the end of a half, rather than kneeling the ball, which we have almost all bemoaned this year.

I also think being more aggressive can inspire a team when it is the only way to send a message that you are trying win, at all costs, and other options don't accomplish that goal, like going for a fake punt when trailing. For this example, the risk/aggressiveness is a clear demonstration of trying to do all that a coach can to win the game.

I think where the aggressive attitude can backfire is when you make a decision, like Arians did to the throw the ball on 2nd down. I understand the reward is great, but that singular decision and result is what allowed Green Bay a chance to either send the game to OT or win it with a two-point conversion. I don't think that decision inspired the team, and had the results gone the other way, it would have been an EPIC blunder. And I think the team would have been left wondering why the coach didn't just run the ball, eat some more clock, and get the 3 points. That definitely would have eroded faith in Arians, IMO.

Now had McCarthy gone for two, I think that is a prime example of how a coach can inspire their players through a gutsy and risky play call. He would have put the game in the hands of Aaron Rodgers, the one player the entire team would support deciding the outcome of the game. I think either way that that decision would have shaken out would not have left a bad taste in the mouth of the Packers.

In general teams with superior talent should play more conservatively. On the other hand, teams with inferior talent need to take more chances in order to improve their odds of winning. In so doing, they also increase their chances of being blown out by a larger margin. That's the risk/reward trade-off.

Chris Brown of Smart Football has an interesting analysis here: http://smartfootball.blogspot.com/2009/0...tball.html

Evenly matched teams should probably play more conservatively at home and gamble more on the road. The longer the game goes, the more likely the home field advantage to have an impact. On that basis, McCarthy probably should have gone for two. Another thing is that, as noted, going for two puts the game squarely on Aaron Rodgers, who is probably the single player that McCarthy and Green Bay fans would most want to see in that role.

I go back to the Rice-Texas game that ended up 31-38, with Rice driving but essentially running out of time. Should we have gone for two if we scored? Before overtime, I would have kicked and taken the tie. Note that doing so at aTm in 1994, had we scored a TD late, would have put us in the Cotton Bowl. But with overtime, the choices were 1) one play, our offense against their defense, or 2) overtime, where our offense would have to score more than our defense allowed. Given that our defense wasn't stopping them and their defense wasn't stopping us, it seems to me that the odds were much more favorable with option 1. Of course the situation would have been totally different without the earlier roughing the punter call against Rice. Arguing over whether that was a good call or not ignores the elephant in the room--in that situation, we wanted them to punt the ball to us. We should have been in safe punt, guarding against a possible fake, and no Rice player should have gotten within 10 yards of the punter.

As for the part about the gusty/risky play inspiring players, there are a lot of things to suggest that may well be the case.

(01-18-2016 12:16 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  In general teams with superior talent should play more conservatively. On the other hand, teams with inferior talent need to take more chances in order to improve their odds of winning. In so doing, they also increase their chances of being blown out by a larger margin. That's the risk/reward trade-off.

Chris Brown of Smart Football has an interesting analysis here: http://smartfootball.blogspot.com/2009/0...tball.html

Which for whatever reason, seems to be the driving force for a lot of coaches. Honestly, I fail to see the difference between losing 35-10 and 55-10; you lost. Applying your link and post to Rice, its even more baffling given our clear talent disadvantage. For example, we kicked a FG down by 52. A delta of 49 or 52 is the same thing; you lost.

As for the Arians decision, that particular one was confusing and taken on its own, was a pretty poor decision. That said, if looked at in the larger body of Arians work, it makes sense. Similar to how Belichick kicked off in OT (a head scratcher), when you look at the many other oddball decisions they make, a lot of them pan out. And thats what makes them successful.

(01-18-2016 12:25 PM)Antarius Wrote:  Honestly, I fail to see the difference between losing 35-10 and 55-10; you lost.

Honestly, I fall to see much difference between losing 10-55 and losing 10-11. They're both losses. There are times when 10-11 can do more damage to a team's psyche than 10-55. To me, there is a much bigger difference between 10-9 and 10-11 than there is between 10-11 and 10-55.

I guess I'm very much on the side of the gambler/risk-taker approach. But that doesn't necessarily mean dropping back and throwing it 70 times a game. Take risks that have a chance to work. If you can keep it within one score by playing conservatively until the fourth quarter, and then take the appropriate risks at the appropriate time, that is a very useful strategy.

You can't beat a better team playing conservatively all day. But you have to pick your spots. You can't beat anyone taking bloody stupid risks. You can't beat anyone trying to do things that your Jimmys and Joes can't execute.

(01-18-2016 12:29 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(01-18-2016 12:25 PM)Antarius Wrote:  Honestly, I fail to see the difference between losing 35-10 and 55-10; you lost.

Honestly, I fall to see much difference between losing 10-55 and losing 10-11. They're both losses. There are times when 10-11 can do more damage to a team's psyche than 10-55. To me, there is a much bigger difference between 10-9 and 10-11 than there is between 10-11 and 10-55.

I guess I'm very much on the side of the gambler/risk-taker approach. But that doesn't necessarily mean dropping back and throwing it 70 times a game. Take risks that have a chance to work. If you can keep it within one score by playing conservatively until the fourth quarter, and then take the appropriate risks at the appropriate time, that is a very useful strategy.

You can't beat a better team playing conservatively all day. But you have to pick your spots. You can't beat anyone taking bloody stupid risks. You can't beat anyone trying to do things that your Jimmys and Joes can't execute.

Agree completely.

The time I am a big risk taker is when the conservative option guarantees a loss. For example when we were down 42-14 in 4Q against Texas, the conservative approach we took guaranteed a loss. In this case, I would be pulling every trick out of the hat to try something. At worst, you lose.

I liked the fake punt by Seattle yesterday. They needed a spark, they needed to score and it was a worthwhile risk.

(01-18-2016 12:16 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  Evenly matched teams should probably play more conservatively at home and gamble more on the road. The longer the game goes, the more likely the home field advantage to have an impact. On that basis, McCarthy probably should have gone for two. Another thing is that, as noted, going for two puts the game squarely on Aaron Rodgers, who is probably the single player that McCarthy and Green Bay fans would most want to see in that role.

So the Packers had a chance to try one play from around three yards out to win a playoff game that they had no business winning, and they didn't take it? Unbelievable. They deserved to lose.

I've never had much faith in the risk-reward calculus of football coaches. Personally, I've always been an advocate of risking it all to win the game whenever you are evenly matched on the road or are obviously overmatched. Fraidy-cat football only works when you have the advantage to begin with.

(01-18-2016 01:43 PM)Antarius Wrote:  For example when we were down 42-14 in 4Q against Texas, the conservative approach we took guaranteed a loss.

Being down 42-14 pretty much guarantees a loss. Yes we took too much time on a TD drive. But if we had rushed it, we probably would not have scored. We accomplished that drive by doing what we do best.

Where I want to see changes is that I don't want to be falling behind 42-14. I don't want to give up long bombs, I don't want to give up long punt returns, and I sure as hell don't want to see our offense give up a touchdown.

WRC and others are fond of saying they hate the wishbone/flexbone because it's a terrible offense to come from way behind with. Problem I have with that argument is that if you are selecting your offense based on coming from way behind, it seems to me that you are dead from the start. I'd rather have an offense and defense designed to prevent ever getting way behind. I'm not wedded to the wishbone/flexbone. I think it's a good scheme when you are short 5-star athletes, because you tend to recruit athletes who can play on either side of the ball, instead of specialists, and that can be a huge advantage with respect to depth. But I also see advantages to Run & Shoot and West Coast and Air Raid. I don't think it really makes a whole lot of difference which offense you run when it comes to winning games. Whichever one best fits the personnel you have is probably the best one. Offense sells tickets, and in our current revenue crunch, that's a major consideration. That matters less if you're winning. Alabama fills Bryant-Denny with on offense that is not exactly cutting edge. So too did Oklahoma in the wishbone days and Nebraska in the power I days. But probably the main consideration in selecting an offense is something that the fans want to watch. And I don't think the Meerkat does that.

(01-18-2016 04:39 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(01-18-2016 01:43 PM)Antarius Wrote:  For example when we were down 42-14 in 4Q against Texas, the conservative approach we took guaranteed a loss.

Being down 42-14 pretty much guarantees a loss. Yes we took too much time on a TD drive. But if we had rushed it, we probably would not have scored. We accomplished that drive by doing what we do best.

Where I want to see changes is that I don't want to be falling behind 42-14. I don't want to give up long bombs, I don't want to give up long punt returns, and I sure as hell don't want to see our offense give up a touchdown.

WRC and others are fond of saying they hate the wishbone/flexbone because it's a terrible offense to come from way behind with. Problem I have with that argument is that if you are selecting your offense based on coming from way behind, it seems to me that you are dead from the start. I'd rather have an offense and defense designed to prevent ever getting way behind. I'm not wedded to the wishbone/flexbone. I think it's a good scheme when you are short 5-star athletes, because you tend to recruit athletes who can play on either side of the ball, instead of specialists, and that can be a huge advantage with respect to depth. But I also see advantages to Run & Shoot and West Coast and Air Raid. I don't think it really makes a whole lot of difference which offense you run when it comes to winning games. Whichever one best fits the personnel you have is probably the best one. Offense sells tickets, and in our current revenue crunch, that's a major consideration. That matters less if you're winning. Alabama fills Bryant-Denny with on offense that is not exactly cutting edge. So too did Oklahoma in the wishbone days and Nebraska in the power I days. But probably the main consideration in selecting an offense is something that the fans want to watch. And I don't think the Meerkat does that.

To bolded point 1- why does it matter whether we scored? 42-14, 49-14 or the final 42-28 were equally lousy; we lost. Rushing would have given us a >0 chance to win (even if it was 0.0001). Not rushing gave us a 0% chance of winning. Since a loss is a loss, I see no benefit to choosing to score and guarantee a loss. IMO this is exactly playing to delay losing as opposed to playing to win. Which is

To bolded point 2 - Agree completely.

To bolded point 3 - Offense sells tickets, but winning sells more. I'm less concerned about how we win as long as we do. The problem I have with the Meerkat is that we play boring football that fails to win any worthwhile games. If we were able to knock of 5-7 Texas or be competitive against Baylor, few, if any would complain that we are Meerkating.

Our big problem in the Texas game was that we gave them 21 points early by bad coverage on a kickoff and long pass plays.
The wishbone was working well for A&M in 1975 because they had a great defense so the other team was not scoring much and A&M controlled the clock. It came undone on the last game of the season because Arkansas managed to get ahead at the start of the game.

I agree it is best to pick the scheme that fits the best players you can get instead of trying to force players to adapt to the scheme you prefer. The fans are more interested in winning than the scheme that looks most exciting. Rice had many fans when Neely was the coach even though he was usually very conservative-so much so that he out Neylanded Neyland in the 1947 Orange Bowl.

(01-18-2016 04:39 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  

(01-18-2016 01:43 PM)Antarius Wrote:  For example when we were down 42-14 in 4Q against Texas, the conservative approach we took guaranteed a loss.

Being down 42-14 pretty much guarantees a loss. Yes we took too much time on a TD drive. But if we had rushed it, we probably would not have scored. We accomplished that drive by doing what we do best.

Where I want to see changes is that I don't want to be falling behind 42-14. I don't want to give up long bombs, I don't want to give up long punt returns, and I sure as hell don't want to see our offense give up a touchdown.

WRC and others are fond of saying they hate the wishbone/flexbone because it's a terrible offense to come from way behind with. Problem I have with that argument is that if you are selecting your offense based on coming from way behind, it seems to me that you are dead from the start. I'd rather have an offense and defense designed to prevent ever getting way behind. I'm not wedded to the wishbone/flexbone. I think it's a good scheme when you are short 5-star athletes, because you tend to recruit athletes who can play on either side of the ball, instead of specialists, and that can be a huge advantage with respect to depth. But I also see advantages to Run & Shoot and West Coast and Air Raid. I don't think it really makes a whole lot of difference which offense you run when it comes to winning games. Whichever one best fits the personnel you have is probably the best one. Offense sells tickets, and in our current revenue crunch, that's a major consideration. That matters less if you're winning. Alabama fills Bryant-Denny with on offense that is not exactly cutting edge. So too did Oklahoma in the wishbone days and Nebraska in the power I days. But probably the main consideration in selecting an offense is something that the fans want to watch. And I don't think the Meerkat does that.

The 9 and a half minute drive at Texas has drawn a lot of criticism, but it started with the game lost and out of reach, and in the end if we had scored quickly after the onside kick, the last 30 seconds could have been very interesting. We went back to what we do well, admittedly against a lot of Texas reserves, and got bit of momentum back. That drive is not what cost us the game--poor kick coverage, poor secondary play, and a really inexcusable offensive execution mistake cost us the game.

I don't particularly want an offense that can bring us back from 42-14 and make a game of it. I want a defense and a kicking game that keep us from getting behind 42-14. Give me that and I will live with whatever offense we have.

(01-19-2016 12:31 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  The 9 and a half minute drive at Texas has drawn a lot of criticism, but it started with the game lost and out of reach, and in the end if we had scored quickly after the onside kick, the last 30 seconds could have been very interesting. We went back to what we do well, admittedly against a lot of Texas reserves, and got bit of momentum back. That drive is not what cost us the game--poor kick coverage, poor secondary play, and a really inexcusable offensive execution mistake cost us the game.

I don't particularly want an offense that can bring us back from 42-14 and make a game of it. I want a defense and a kicking game that keep us from getting behind 42-14. Give me that and I will live with whatever offense we have.

My post wasn't really to do with the type of offense. It was to do with the attitude of the leadership. Yes poor kick coverage and defense is why we were down 42-14. But once we were down 42-14, the question is how do you deal with it?

Belichick was down 28-0 to Denver at the half. The Patriots roared back to win. Seattle was down 31-0 and did everything in their power to try to win. Rice was down 42-14 and threw in the towel. That's the difference between playing to delay losing vs playing to win, IMO: Roce would benefit from a little more Arians.

(01-19-2016 07:40 AM)Antarius Wrote:  My post wasn't really to do with the type of offense. It was to do with the attitude of the leadership. Yes poor kick coverage and defense is why we were down 42-14. But once we were down 42-14, the question is how do you deal with it?
Belichick was down 28-0 to Denver at the half. The Patriots roared back to win. Seattle was down 31-0 and did everything in their power to try to win. Rice was down 42-14 and threw in the towel. That's the difference between playing to delay losing vs playing to win, IMO: Roce would benefit from a little more Arians.

But here's where you're missing the point. It IS the type of offense. Rice did not throw in the towel. They went back to what they do best and made it a much more interesting game than by all rights it should have been. I think the difference is that what you think of as doing everything in their power to win differs from what is in their power to do. Asking someone to do what he can't do is not the way to win.

The problem was giving up a kicking game touchdown and a long pass and surrendering a TD on offense.

I would agree with a more aggressive approach on both sides of the ball (or all three, counting kicking). But this is a poor example.

Just for reference, what would doing everything in their power to win look like in that situation?

(01-19-2016 08:21 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  Just for reference, what would doing everything in their power to win look like in that situation?

Acting like it was the 4th quarter and not the first. Leaving aside what we did in terms of plays, there is a marked difference between how Arizona/Seattle/New England/Rice Basketball behave when down late and how we did in football against Texas. We sauntered up to the line without a bloody care in the world for 9 and a half minutes.

(01-19-2016 08:27 AM)Antarius Wrote:  Acting like it was the 4th quarter and not the first. Leaving aside what we did in terms of plays, there is a marked difference between how Arizona/Seattle/New England/Rice Basketball behave when down late and how we did in football against Texas. We sauntered up to the line without a bloody care in the world for 9 and a half minutes.

And judging from the results, it was a pretty effective strategy. Score quickly after the onside kick and it becomes a very interesting last 30 seconds. And that's pretty amazing considering that it was 42-14 to start the quarter. "Acting like it was the 4th quarter" means, I presume, hurrying up and throwing the ball. That's not what this team does well. When they've tried it the results have pretty consistently been disastrous.

The problem wasn't the 4th quarter, it was the other three. A lot of people keep asking why don't we do X or Y, without considering that we aren't very good at X or Y. I would say that we need to do better at X or Y, but that's an execution issue. Doing X or Y when we are no good at X or Y is not a winning strategy.

But more important than doing X or Y is not falling behind 42-14 in the first place. We got it back to 42-28 and had a chance to make it 35. That's doing well above average in that situation. Of course, all we really proved with that is that Texas has serious depth issues.

(01-19-2016 08:27 AM)Antarius Wrote:  

(01-19-2016 08:21 AM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  Just for reference, what would doing everything in their power to win look like in that situation?

Acting like it was the 4th quarter and not the first. Leaving aside what we did in terms of plays, there is a marked difference between how Arizona/Seattle/New England/Rice Basketball behave when down late and how we did in football against Texas. We sauntered up to the line without a bloody care in the world for 9 and a half minutes.

Yeah, at that point we had clearly conceded the game and were just looking to get the starters off the field on a high note. You could argue that was perhaps the right move in that situation, but any attempt to justify this as part of a strategy to get back in the game is ridiculous, as clearly evident by the personnel changes that came after the conclusion of this drive.

Bruce Arians is the answer to a trivia question.

Whom did Temple fire in order to hire Jerry Berndt?


Arians' last season was 4-7. Berndt stepped back to 1-10 and then got to 7-4; then 2-9 and 1-10