Most of the Republican opposition seems to amount to:

"Obama didn't negotiate a unicorn, and I will. How, you ask? By being tough!"

This is not a serious position.

A pretty good summary of the absurdity of the congressional hearings:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_p...moniz.html

I didn't always agree with them, but pre-W Republicans had serious foreign policy thinkers. One of them even has some ties to Rice. Where are these people now?

I can see positive impacts of normalizing relationships with Iran.
I can see positive impacts of resuming trade with Iran.

What I can't see is where this agreement accomplishes anything significant with respect to nuclear weapons. Granted, in making that statement based on the expectation that Iran will try to cheat, but I don't think that's even a slightly unreasonable expectation. The argument seems to be that without this deal Iran will get a nuke, in part because sanctions are not working. But with this deal, Iran will be deterred from getting a nuke, because if they try to cheat we can reimpose sanctions. Given what is required to impose sanctions, I would expect that once lifted, sanctions will be virtually impossible to reimpose. And of course, military intervention exists as an option (and IMO a bad one) in either case.

As for possible Israeli military action, I think that is about equally likely with or without this agreement. The difference I see is that without the agreement, it would be a lot easier for us to walk away in that case than it will be with the agreement. And I see many situations where walking away would be in our national interest.

I would have preferred to see these concessions on our part tied to actions other than the nuke program--releasing hostages, terminating Iran's sponsorship of terrorist organizations, things like that--and to have them done in stages with each stage corresponding to certain prior conditions that must be met by Iran. At the end of the day, I think we accomplish more that way.

(08-05-2015 01:55 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  I would have preferred to see these concessions on our part tied to actions other than the nuke program--releasing hostages, terminating Iran's sponsorship of terrorist organizations, things like that--and to have them done in stages with each stage corresponding to certain prior conditions that must be met by Iran. At the end of the day, I think we accomplish more that way.

Iran has shown lots of bark but far less bite than several other countries the US considers allies. I don't see a big deal about this deal with Iran, primarily because this is unlikely to elevate their nuclear program either way (with or without sanctions) and they aren't as big of a threat as everyone makes them out to be.

if we were serious about cutting ties with terrorism, IMO, Pakistan should be the first country to get the boot from our list of allies.

(08-05-2015 03:58 PM)Antarius Wrote:  

(08-05-2015 01:55 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  I would have preferred to see these concessions on our part tied to actions other than the nuke program--releasing hostages, terminating Iran's sponsorship of terrorist organizations, things like that--and to have them done in stages with each stage corresponding to certain prior conditions that must be met by Iran. At the end of the day, I think we accomplish more that way.

Iran has shown lots of bark but far less bite than several other countries the US considers allies. I don't see a big deal about this deal with Iran, primarily because this is unlikely to elevate their nuclear program either way (with or without sanctions) and they aren't as big of a threat as everyone makes them out to be.
if we were serious about cutting ties with terrorism, IMO, Pakistan should be the first country to get the boot from our list of allies.

I don't think Iran is a threat to the US at all. Nor to Israel, for that matter. At least, not for a long, long time. Once you have one nuke, you don't go shooting it at anyone who has 400 to shoot back at you. Whom they threaten are the Arab countries, and this deal at best burned a lot of goodwill with them.

What Iran wants is 1) the ability to make enough noise that the big boys have to listen, and 2) leverage with its Arab neighbors. Their ultimate goal is a reprise of the ancient Persian empire, from Istanbul to Kabul to Aden to Cairo. A nuke helps them with both goals. At best this delays that a bit, but it lets them get their economy back on track in the interim.

They wanted the ability to build nukes without economic penalties, Obama wanted a piece of paper. Both sides got what they wanted. Your basic win-win?

Most of the support from Democratic partisans seems to be some combination of (1) "No one could possibly have achieved a better outcome than Obama did" and (2) "It was a choice between these exact terms, and war."

Neither of these is a serious position.

I would like to know (1) why Democratic partisans subscribe to the fallacy that because Obama (who made clear from the get-go that he didn't care what the result was as long as a pact of some kind was signed) gleefully agreed to something, those are the best possible terms that any responsible leader could have achieved; and (2) why they think that simply walking away would have led to war, or would have been a worse result than what Obama came up with.

I didn't always agree with him, but even Jimmy Carter by the end of his term had some degree of guts. Perhaps it just takes a combination of Middle Eastern terrorism and Russia invading a neighboring country to cause even the most self-deluded pacifist to pull his head out of his ass. Or maybe not...

As usual, someone else said it better than I can:
"The terms which the Prime Minister brought back with him could easily have been agreed, I believe, through the ordinary diplomatic channels at any time during the summer. And I will say this, that I believe the Czechs, left to themselves and told they were going to get no help from the Western Powers, would have been able to make better terms than they have got after all this tremendous perturbation; they could hardly have had worse."
-- Winston Churchill, Oct. 5, 1938

To return to the OP, what is the alternative?

Seems to me that the arguments in favor of the deal are 1) this was the best deal anyone could have gotten, and 2) failure to get a deal means war is inevitable in the region.

I don't accept the assumption that failure to get a deal means inevitable war. And I tend to think that this is not the best deal that could have been done. I think we gave up too much for what we got. A general principle in negotiation is always be ready to walk out if necessary. I don't think we were, and that's negotiating from a weak position.

(08-05-2015 10:42 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  To return to the OP, what is the alternative?

Seems to me that the arguments in favor of the deal are 1) this was the best deal anyone could have gotten, and 2) failure to get a deal means war is inevitable in the region.

I don't accept the assumption that failure to get a deal means inevitable war. And I tend to think that this is not the best deal that could have been done. I think we gave up too much for what we got. A general principle in negotiation is always be ready to walk out if necessary. I don't think we were, and that's negotiating from a weak position.

The "Verification Protocols" are an utter joke. But even if they have a couple of months to clean out a site its next to impossible to eliminate background radiation contamination

The idea of negotiating is that both sides get what they want. Iran clearly got what it wanted and Obama argably got political capital... but the question becomes what did WE get?

I don't see that we got anything, so why give up what we had? What we end up with is Iran with a better economy, which allows them to do more business with the people who were working under the table against our embargo anyway. They get rewarded for being underhanded while we get nothing for our embargo efforts. In my mind, the same with Cuba... and the same with illegal immigrants and amnesty. We can certainly debate whether or not we had anything to lose there... or in Cuba... or with illegals... but I suspect I would have asked for/demanded some sort of economic agreement in exchange for the piece of paper. Iran (or Cuba) wouldn't care because they would have a stronger economy and the difference between buying (as a silly example) Cisco products to deliver the internet rather than Siemens would have been immaterial to that end.

We gave up the embargo... so 'whatever' they were being punished for is no more. What did we get? If we couldn't get REAL verification, and i think Iraq proved that we can't, even if we do... then we should have gotten some industry. Otherwise it naturally goes to the people already there... often illegally (by our standards)

(08-07-2015 12:58 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  The idea of negotiating is that both sides get what they want. Iran clearly got what it wanted and Obama argably got political capital... but the question becomes what did WE get?

I don't see that we got anything, so why give up what we had? What we end up with is Iran with a better economy, which allows them to do more business with the people who were working under the table against our embargo anyway. They get rewarded for being underhanded while we get nothing for our embargo efforts. In my mind, the same with Cuba... and the same with illegal immigrants and amnesty. We can certainly debate whether or not we had anything to lose there... or in Cuba... or with illegals... but I suspect I would have asked for/demanded some sort of economic agreement in exchange for the piece of paper. Iran (or Cuba) wouldn't care because they would have a stronger economy and the difference between buying (as a silly example) Cisco products to deliver the internet rather than Siemens would have been immaterial to that end.

We gave up the embargo... so 'whatever' they were being punished for is no more. What did we get? If we couldn't get REAL verification, and i think Iraq proved that we can't, even if we do... then we should have gotten some industry. Otherwise it naturally goes to the people already there... often illegally (by our standards)

I wouldn't go so far to compare this to Cuba. We gained nothing recently with the Cuba embargo - Cuba wasn't trying to destroy us (or making noise to sound like they wanted to) nor were they even close to coming close to being able to do so. The US was just behaving like a bully with them at this point. And no, we do not get to decide whether they have a democratic society or not.

On a side note, I recommend reading "A line in the sand" by James Barr.

(08-08-2015 01:16 PM)Antarius Wrote:  

(08-07-2015 12:58 PM)Hambone10 Wrote:  The idea of negotiating is that both sides get what they want. Iran clearly got what it wanted and Obama argably got political capital... but the question becomes what did WE get?

I don't see that we got anything, so why give up what we had? What we end up with is Iran with a better economy, which allows them to do more business with the people who were working under the table against our embargo anyway. They get rewarded for being underhanded while we get nothing for our embargo efforts. In my mind, the same with Cuba... and the same with illegal immigrants and amnesty. We can certainly debate whether or not we had anything to lose there... or in Cuba... or with illegals... but I suspect I would have asked for/demanded some sort of economic agreement in exchange for the piece of paper. Iran (or Cuba) wouldn't care because they would have a stronger economy and the difference between buying (as a silly example) Cisco products to deliver the internet rather than Siemens would have been immaterial to that end.

We gave up the embargo... so 'whatever' they were being punished for is no more. What did we get? If we couldn't get REAL verification, and i think Iraq proved that we can't, even if we do... then we should have gotten some industry. Otherwise it naturally goes to the people already there... often illegally (by our standards)

I wouldn't go so far to compare this to Cuba. We gained nothing recently with the Cuba embargo - Cuba wasn't trying to destroy us (or making noise to sound like they wanted to) nor were they even close to coming close to being able to do so. The US was just behaving like a bully with them at this point. And no, we do not get to decide whether they have a democratic society or not.

On a side note, I recommend reading "A line in the sand" by James Barr.

I'm not really sure what we're not agreeing on.

We had a good reason in the 60's to place an embargo on Cuba... and as I said, we can debate whether or not we had anything to lose in Cuba. I'd say yes in 1962, and no today... and I suspect you agree.

I suppose my point is that we should have looked at lifting the embargo on Cuba when it still had some value for us... maybe as a tourist destination... but places like Canada and Europe long ago violated our embargo and made the investments and reaped most of the rewards... just as in Iran... so lifting it now doesn't really mean much for US interests, but it means more for Canadian and European interests as the American $$ flows to Cuba, and then to them.

In (just as a WAG) 1980, we might have been able to negotiate some sort of preferential investment terms in exchange for lifting the embargo...

Not going to try and respond point by point, but wanted to respond before I head out on vacation for a week or so.

Seems like where we're most fundamentally not seeing eye to eye boils down to a few points.

1) The idea that this deal give us nothing. I’ve heard several arms control experts argue that it’s quite a strong deal with good verification. Not that it eliminates the possibility that Iran could get a bomb in the future, but makes it much harder, easier for us to know that they are cheating, and stretches breakout time long enough to make it more plausible to get a response together in time. This seems to be the consensus of non neo-cons.

2) No one seems to be acknowledging/realizing the reality of the situation with sanctions. Russia and China are itching to end them. Frankly so are some of our allies. This idea that we are going to ramp them up and get a better deal is highly dubious. If we abandon this deal, China, Russia, and maybe Europe are not re-imposing them. We can’t unilaterally impose sanctions that are strong enough. Walk away and Iran might still get most of what it gets with the deal, while we get nothing. Walker said he’d rip up the deal on day one and impose “crippling sanctions”. How does he propose to do that all by his lonesome after pissing off all our allies?

3) There’s also the idea that this might open Iran and weaken the hardliners. I’d say that’s a possible side benefit, but speculative enough to not sway anyone who doesn’t agree with (1) and (2).

Here’s an interview with Aaron Stein that reflects a lot of what I’ve read in the non-neocon press.

http://www.vox.com/2015/7/16/8974507/ira...ned-expert

I should say first that I'm not much of a believer in trade sanctions. As long as there's somebody willing to make a buck, there will always be ways around them. To the end they end up having any effect, it's not the guys in power who suffer but the ordinary people. At the end of the day, I think you accomplish more by allowing trade to take place and letting economic contact and interaction change people's minds. When I'n at CDG and the flight to Houston is leaving from Gate 40 and the flight to Havana from Gate 39, that really brings home to me the abject silliness of trade sanctions.

As a bit of an aside, I have heard Nelson Mandela say that, for all the trade sanctions levied against South Africa in the Apartheid days, what really brought it to a close was when New Zealand decided that the All-Blacks would no longer compete against the Springboks in rugby. Mandela may--or may not--have been overstating the case, but i know that he used rugby to reunite the country. I've seen enough to come to believe that international sport really does have a significant impact. I wish Americans were more into international sport.

That being said, I don't think we got much in return for lifting the sanctions. This may be the strictest inspection regime ever; one would hope that it would be, at a minimum, because none of the others has ever worked--except perhaps the one between the USA and USSR, but most observers I've read think MAD had more to do with that one. Iran will almost certainly violate the terms of the agreement, which in theory triggers sanctions, but number one, sanctions don't work, and number two, nobody who is making money trading with Iran is going to vote to reimpose sanctions. We say X is a violation, Russia says no it's not, and voila, no sanctions reimposed.

Perhaps the worst thing about this agreement is that, in one fell swoop, we punted all our leverage. We don't have anything else that Iran wants, and that limits our negotiating power going forward.

I would have taken the approach that if Iran wants a nuke, they are getting a nuke, pretty much regardless of this or any other agreement. With that in mind, I would have focused on two angles.

1. Iran, you may have a nuke, but if you ever use it, or attempt to use it, or allow it to fall into the hands of terrorists, we will reserve the right to treat that as an attack on the US and respond with the full weight of our nuclear arsenal. Tehran will be vaporized, and what used to be Tehran will glow in the dark for millennia.

2. Trade lifting sanctions for eliminating state sponsorship of terrorism and/or release of US citizen hostages. To get more (such as unfreezing of assets), Iran will have to do more. Demonstrate that they are good world citizens and they will earn additional rights and privileges.

Historically, our approach to regional conflicts was twofold, 1) confine them to the region, and 2) maintain balance among the competitors so that nobody gets a clear-cut upper hand. We have gotten away from that and started trying to pick winners and losers, and most of our "winners" have turned out to be losers. In the Middle East it would seem that we have four players:

- Israel, which has a formidable nuclear arsenal, so it can take care of itself, at the same time that it is too small to pursue imperial ambitions and appears to have no such ambitions beyond self-protection and self-preservation
- Iran, which has at least on some level the desire to recreate the ancient Persian Empire from Istanbul to Kabul to Aden to Cairo
- Turkey, which really looks toward Europe to expand its sphere of influence, particularly the Balkans, and mainly seeks safety from threat to the east
- The Arabs, who have difficulty uniting around anything positive, but may unite around their hatred for (in order from greatest to least) Iran, Israel, and Turkey

As it sits right now, none of the four can dominate. With nukes, and time to build up a sufficient arsenal, Iran could dominate--certainly everyone but Israel.

One other thing. This agreement is a treaty, and as such should be subjected to "advise and consent" by the senate.

(08-10-2015 04:37 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  One other thing. This agreement is a treaty, and as such should be subjected to "advise and consent" by the senate.

I didn't really understand this "treaty that is not a treaty" bit either. On the "what", here is a long article on the surprisingly many ways in which the US can commit itself to an international agreement other than through the Constitution's treaty clause:
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/03/11/dealin...agreement/

Some key excerpts:

Quote:Senate advice and consent is much less used compared to the past (less than 10% of modern treaties go through the Senate), although it should be noted that almost all past arms control agreements have received Senate advice and consent.
...
The President could gain authority to conclude a treaty (again, in the international law sense of that term) with Iran and the P5+1 via Congress instead of the Senate alone. A simply majority vote of both Houses could enact a bill that with the President’s signature would become federal law and thus create legal authority for the United States to conclude (and perform) an Iranian treaty.

So that's the "what". But I really don't get the "why": the idea that Congress would enact a bill to authorize bypassing the treaty clause is stunning, and sad. And such a bill seems transparently unconstitutional -- after all, the government doesn't get to pass bills of attainder just by declaring that they're not bills of not attainder, or to quarter soldiers in private homes by declaring that they're not soldiers. Alas, I suspect the Supreme Court would call it a political question of relations between the political branches, in order to avoid either (1) having some backbone or (2) insisting that the other branches have some backbone.

First, have a good vacation!

(08-10-2015 03:49 PM)JustAnotherAustinOwl Wrote:  Seems like where we're most fundamentally not seeing eye to eye boils down to a few points.

1) The idea that this deal give us nothing.

2) No one seems to be acknowledging/realizing the reality of the situation with sanctions.

The reason this treaty gives us nothing is that we KNOW the restrictions won't be followed, we KNOW the verification will be circumvented, and we further KNOW that re-imposing sanctions will not happen. So regardless of the letter of the treaty, the practical effect is that we end up with no real limits on Iran. So what we got is nothing -- zilch.

What we gave up is the one bit of leverage we had over Iran's future behavior -- the sanctions currently in place. They are not perfect leverage as you point out, but they are something -- something serious enough for both Iran and the treaty advocates to consider them important.

I think you can appreciate why rational people might consider that a bad outcome. Of course there is more to the concern than just that, but that's the nub.

As Chip noted, Iran got essentially a green light, and we got a piece of paper. If the goal was to get a piece of paper, then we won. If the goal was to not give Iran a green light, we lost.

And you don't have to be great psychologist to see that this President's priority was unequivocally the former. While the scale of consequences is different, the analogy to the Munich agreement of 1938 seems quite strong. And Churchill's assessment quoted above seems dead-on -- all you have to do is change a couple of proper nouns.

(08-10-2015 03:49 PM)JustAnotherAustinOwl Wrote:  3) There's also the idea that this might open Iran and weaken the hardliners. I’d say that's a possible side benefit, but speculative enough to not sway anyone who doesn’t agree with (1) and (2).

Beyond speculative, I'd say.
It's also a bit ironic to hear leftists resort to the same argument that they scorned in the case of apartheid South Africa, and more generally to hear leftists, whose current political mantra is the dark Satanic nature* of "corporations" and "globalization", arguing that multinational trade could ever be a force for good -- but that's for another day :)

*As I'm sure you guys know, the phrase "dark Satanic" is from the line "dark Satanic mills" in William Blake's poem "And did those feet in ancient time", which was later to set to music as the hymn "Jersusalem." That same poem/hymn also gives us the line "England's green and pleasant land" and popularized the phrase "chariot of fire" (from 2 Kings).

(08-10-2015 03:49 PM)JustAnotherAustinOwl Wrote:  Here’s an interview with Aaron Stein that reflects a lot of what I’ve read in the non-neocon press.

http://www.vox.com/2015/7/16/8974507/ira...ned-expert

Aaron Stein is a graduate student, for Pete's sake -- it's hard to credit him with mature insight into the behavior of governments. And the White House itself is sufficient proof that academic credentials are not reliable indicators of policy-making intelligence (see, e.g., B.H. Obama viz. H.S. Truman).

(08-10-2015 03:49 PM)JustAnotherAustinOwl Wrote:  Not going to try and respond point by point, but wanted to respond before I head out on vacation for a week or so.
Seems like where we're most fundamentally not seeing eye to eye boils down to a few points.
1) The idea that this deal give us nothing. I’ve heard several arms control experts argue that it’s quite a strong deal with good verification. Not that it eliminates the possibility that Iran could get a bomb in the future, but makes it much harder, easier for us to know that they are cheating, and stretches breakout time long enough to make it more plausible to get a response together in time. This seems to be the consensus of non neo-cons.
2) No one seems to be acknowledging/realizing the reality of the situation with sanctions. Russia and China are itching to end them. Frankly so are some of our allies. This idea that we are going to ramp them up and get a better deal is highly dubious. If we abandon this deal, China, Russia, and maybe Europe are not re-imposing them. We can’t unilaterally impose sanctions that are strong enough. Walk away and Iran might still get most of what it gets with the deal, while we get nothing. Walker said he’d rip up the deal on day one and impose “crippling sanctions”. How does he propose to do that all by his lonesome after pissing off all our allies?
3) There’s also the idea that this might open Iran and weaken the hardliners. I’d say that’s a possible side benefit, but speculative enough to not sway anyone who doesn’t agree with (1) and (2).
Here’s an interview with Aaron Stein that reflects a lot of what I’ve read in the non-neocon press.
http://www.vox.com/2015/7/16/8974507/ira...ned-expert

I'd say that 3) is highly speculative, but far more likely to yield a benefit than 1). 3) is the only potential good that I can see from this deal.

As for 2), China, Russia, and Europe are not re-imposing sanctions whether we walk away from this deal or not. And without their willingness to re-impose sanctions, the terms of an agreement that relies on re-imposition of sanctions to compel compliance are rendered essentially meaningless. No matter how good the inspection protocols are, with no hammer they are pretty much meaningless. And better than any other protocols in prior agreements is pretty meaningless given the success--or lack thereof--achieved by inspection protocols in other places--Iraq, North Korea, to name two examples.

At the same time, I reject the idea being put forth by some on the right that there is some sanctions regime or other action that we can take that will have an impact. There isn't. We basically punted all our leverage. Whoever did the negotiation either 1) was under orders to get a piece of paper, no matter what, or 2) had his/her head wedged firmly up his/her ass.

This is kind of the Bowe Bergdahl of international agreements. We gave up something and got nothing of value.

Owl's comment and George's implied comment about the 'real world' effects of sanctions is spot on.

The best example is Iraq.

and I'm not trying to open a can of worms, but follow me for a minute, even if you disagree somewhat with the timeline.

When he invaded Kuwait (and used chemical weapons against his own people) everyone was fine with us bombing him... and the 'cease fire' was predicated on a treaty including chemical weapons inspections. That's pretty universally agreed upon.

He didn't live up to his side of the treaty. That's also pretty universally agreed upon.

Yet because other countries had made investments in Iraq around the sanctions, they weren't prepared to live up to the 'consequences' side of the treaty... that violation of the treaty means that the reasons for the FIRST invasion were still valid and could continue... instead, we had to come up with reasons for a SECOND invasion.

There really isn't much debate about those generalities, but even if there is with regard to what happened in Iraq, why would we expect that things would be much different with regard to Iran? The moment we lift the sanctions, those who have already been dealing there under, around or in spite of the sanctions will now be able to operate in the open and they have big starts... and now WE will be operating in the open as well. SO when they violate the inspections, whose interests is it in to put the sanctions back? Once again, we'll likely have to 'prove' that they are an actual and imminent threat in order to do anything about it... and not merely that they MIGHT be or LIKELY are.


I hate to use a parent/child analogy, but kids learn pretty quickly that some parents don't enforce consequences... or that they can be manipulated if it 'hurts' them to enforce them... like having to leave the grocery store because the child is acting up.

If everyone knows we're not going to use force, then the threat to do so is absolutely meaningless... and sanctions only work if you can actually keep everyone else from violating them. We could do that in Cuba in 1962, ALMOST at great cost. We can't do that in 2015 anywhere.

(08-11-2015 10:16 AM)Hambone10 Wrote:  I hate to use a parent/child analogy, but kids learn pretty quickly that some parents don't enforce consequences...

This can't be true. Our President SAID that "Words must have meaning. Actions must have consequences." He SAID it!

(08-11-2015 10:16 AM)Hambone10 Wrote:  Owl's comment and George's implied comment about the 'real world' effects of sanctions is spot on.

The best example is Iraq.

and I'm not trying to open a can of worms, but follow me for a minute, even if you disagree somewhat with the timeline.

When he invaded Kuwait (and used chemical weapons against his own people) everyone was fine with us bombing him... and the 'cease fire' was predicated on a treaty including chemical weapons inspections. That's pretty universally agreed upon.

He didn't live up to his side of the treaty. That's also pretty universally agreed upon.

Yet because other countries had made investments in Iraq around the sanctions, they weren't prepared to live up to the 'consequences' side of the treaty... that violation of the treaty means that the reasons for the FIRST invasion were still valid and could continue... instead, we had to come up with reasons for a SECOND invasion.

There really isn't much debate about those generalities, but even if there is with regard to what happened in Iraq, why would we expect that things would be much different with regard to Iran? The moment we lift the sanctions, those who have already been dealing there under, around or in spite of the sanctions will now be able to operate in the open and they have big starts... and now WE will be operating in the open as well. SO when they violate the inspections, whose interests is it in to put the sanctions back? Once again, we'll likely have to 'prove' that they are an actual and imminent threat in order to do anything about it... and not merely that they MIGHT be or LIKELY are.


I hate to use a parent/child analogy, but kids learn pretty quickly that some parents don't enforce consequences... or that they can be manipulated if it 'hurts' them to enforce them... like having to leave the grocery store because the child is acting up.

If everyone knows we're not going to use force, then the threat to do so is absolutely meaningless... and sanctions only work if you can actually keep everyone else from violating them. We could do that in Cuba in 1962, ALMOST at great cost. We can't do that in 2015 anywhere.

And at the same time, parents need to realize that when you try to control every aspect of your childrens' lives, they will rebel, act out, and eventually start ignoring those rules. Many parents find success by acting in a reasonable manner with their children, and only coming down hard when it is absolutely necessary.

I know kids who were given total freedom and ended up worse off than if they had some structure. And I know kids who were in a house that was very strict about what they could and couldn't do and ended up worse than if they had freedom. Generally, like most things in life, it's all about moderation when raising children (or dealing with countries?).

Just playing devil's advocate with that analogy.