I'm at a loss for words as to why Greg Easterbrook, primarily a football writer, was allowed to pen this article. It's clear that he has no idea of what the actual size and capabilities of the U.S. Navy are nor the of the challenges the Sea Service currently faces.

The US Navy is Big Enough

I agree with him. Our navy is huge and powerful. It's not a budget issue, it's a procurement and spending issue. Too much money wasted on stuff (LCS, F-35 overruns, Ford Class carrier) that isn't what was promised or pretty much useless for what the Navy does.

(03-11-2015 09:01 AM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  I agree with him. Our navy is huge and powerful. It's not a budget issue, it's a procurement and spending issue. Too much money wasted on stuff (LCS, F-35 overruns, Ford Class carrier) that isn't what was promised or pretty much useless for what the Navy does.

Optempo for deployment is already running around 7-8 months for the current missions due to lack of assets. All the FFG are gone and the Navy would like to decomm the CG's as well. Procurement issues simply strain a Navy already stretched to its limits with fewer more manpower intensive units to cover an ever expanding array of missions.

Why is the array of missions expanding?

The array of missions does not have to expand to overstretch assets, it's already pretty ambitious. And it is expanding because of developments in Russia, Iran, and particularly China. How to deal with China is a huge current issue.

The real problem is a lack of mission clarity and focus to drive decision making. So we end up spending huge amounts of money on gadgets that have curb appeal, regardless of whether they have the ability to contribute to attaining any mission.

The other huge problem is the bloated bureaucracy. McKinsey did a study of military expenditures by the developed (OECD) nations. The average OECD country spends 14% of its defense budget on combat activities, 23% on combat support, and 63% on admin/overhead. That's bad enough, but the US is even worse--9% combat, 14% combat support, 77% admin/overhead. That means that if we could get our military to achieve the same efficiency as other developed countries, we could lop $100 billion off our defense budget without affecting war-fighting capability. We could probably cut the Pentagon in half, including getting rid of at least half the consultants.

The secret to having a powerful military at an affordable cost is to keep sizable portion at less than hair-trigger readiness. The other thing we can do is go to a high/low procurement mix instead of buying everything at the cutting edge of technology. We can end up with a stronger and more capable navy and military at a lower price than what we pay now, but it takes some paradigm shifts. And real estate prices in northern Virginia would take a major hit.

Cdr Salamander and the guys on the Front Porch pretty much destroyed Greg.

From 3/17/15 WSJ

Quote:Size matters. It’s as true for America’s Navy as anywhere. It is the size of our fleet that uniquely enables the United States Navy and Marine Corps to maintain presence around the globe, around the clock. That presence has kept the peace and promoted prosperity via trade across open sea lanes for nearly seven decades.

The U.S. has the most powerful Navy in the world, but comparing the size of our fleet directly to other nations’ fleets—as pundits and politicians of late have done—is fundamentally flawed. As America’s “Away Team,” the U.S. Navy protects and projects our leadership role because it can get anywhere faster, stay longer and carry everything it needs to execute its missions—all without needing anyone else’s permission.

In the first 54 days of the air campaign against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, for example, the U.S. relied solely on Navy F/A-18 Hornets flying sorties from the sovereign territory provided by the USS George H.W. Bush in the Persian Gulf. Land-based bombers were delayed until host nations granted approval.

To combat Ebola in West Africa, V-22 Ospreys put Marines on the ground the same day as President Obama’s order, providing logistical support to doctors. During Operation Tomadachi, following the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in 2011, more than 16 ships, 130 aircraft and 12,000 U.S. sailors and Marines delivered 340 tons of supplies.

Since World War II, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have secured the high seas, enabling 90% of world-wide seaborne trade and 95% of voice and data transfer carried by undersea cables to move without interruption.

But maintaining the U.S. Navy’s global presence requires continued investment in ships. President Obama’s fiscal year 2016 budget calls for $161 billion to fund our assigned missions and continue to grow our fleet. The challenging fiscal climate demands aggressive efforts to cut costs intelligently. We have and we will continue to do so, but not at the expense of maintaining presence. Cutting ships would jeopardize U.S. security and the global economy.

Link to OP Ed by Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy

Aren't there more Admirals than ships?

(03-11-2015 01:29 PM)NIU007 Wrote:  Why is the array of missions expanding?

One, because other branches of service (specifically the Air Force) refuse to do their jobs. And two because picking up missions like Counter Drug Ops and Disaster Response have strain men and material.

(03-17-2015 12:35 PM)HeartOfDixie Wrote:  Aren't there more Admirals than ships?

Which begs the question of whether it's more expensive to maintain an excess of ships or an excess of Admirals. And, I suspect the answer is not as intuitive as it may seem.

(03-17-2015 02:11 PM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-11-2015 01:29 PM)NIU007 Wrote:  Why is the array of missions expanding?

One, because other branches of service (specifically the Air Force) refuse to do their jobs. And two because picking up missions like Counter Drug Ops and Disaster Response have strain men and material.

Honest question, what is the air force refusing to do?

(03-17-2015 02:41 PM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:11 PM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-11-2015 01:29 PM)NIU007 Wrote:  Why is the array of missions expanding?

One, because other branches of service (specifically the Air Force) refuse to do their jobs. And two because picking up missions like Counter Drug Ops and Disaster Response have strain men and material.

Honest question, what is the air force refusing to do?

Strike, CAS and Nuclear Air Deterrence

(03-18-2015 07:13 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:41 PM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:11 PM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-11-2015 01:29 PM)NIU007 Wrote:  Why is the array of missions expanding?

One, because other branches of service (specifically the Air Force) refuse to do their jobs. And two because picking up missions like Counter Drug Ops and Disaster Response have strain men and material.

Honest question, what is the air force refusing to do?

Strike, CAS and Nuclear Air Deterrence

Are they refusing to, or is the shrinking budget making it harder to place assets at overseas bases, where needed for strike missions?

In terms of CAS, I do agree. The hatred the Air Force has for the A-10 is astounding considering how good it as at that role. I don't think the F-16 or F-35 will be able to fill that void.

(03-18-2015 09:09 AM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-18-2015 07:13 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:41 PM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:11 PM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-11-2015 01:29 PM)NIU007 Wrote:  Why is the array of missions expanding?

One, because other branches of service (specifically the Air Force) refuse to do their jobs. And two because picking up missions like Counter Drug Ops and Disaster Response have strain men and material.

Honest question, what is the air force refusing to do?

Strike, CAS and Nuclear Air Deterrence

Are they refusing to, or is the shrinking budget making it harder to place assets at overseas bases, where needed for strike missions?

In terms of CAS, I do agree. The hatred the Air Force has for the A-10 is astounding considering how good it as at that role. I don't think the F-16 or F-35 will be able to fill that void.

Strike was a mission the Air Force got out of in the 70's because even-though the US maintains a great deal of overseas air fields, the AF felt that the Navy's greater on station time would make it better suited for that mission.

The state of the B1-B and B-2 programs are telling about the Air Force's perspective regarding the Air Portion of the Nuclear Triad. While the flying service would like a new deep penetration bomber, they have thrown themselves on the alter of the F-35 and it will (hopefully) either cause an end to the Key West Agreement and/or force the AF to merge back with the Army.

I think this quote from an Army Officer best sums up the current and future state of CAS:

"The A-10 is an armor killing monster, the Apache is merely an armor killing animal, the JSF has armor killing functions. Which would you want on your side?"

If the AF successfully kills the A-10, the CAS mission will be done by drones and the AC-130.

(03-18-2015 10:17 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-18-2015 09:09 AM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-18-2015 07:13 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:41 PM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-17-2015 02:11 PM)vandiver49 Wrote:  One, because other branches of service (specifically the Air Force) refuse to do their jobs. And two because picking up missions like Counter Drug Ops and Disaster Response have strain men and material.

Honest question, what is the air force refusing to do?

Strike, CAS and Nuclear Air Deterrence

Are they refusing to, or is the shrinking budget making it harder to place assets at overseas bases, where needed for strike missions?

In terms of CAS, I do agree. The hatred the Air Force has for the A-10 is astounding considering how good it as at that role. I don't think the F-16 or F-35 will be able to fill that void.

Strike was a mission the Air Force got out of in the 70's because even-though the US maintains a great deal of overseas air fields, the AF felt that the Navy's greater on station time would make it better suited for that mission.

The state of the B1-B and B-2 programs are telling about the Air Force's perspective regarding the Air Portion of the Nuclear Triad. While the flying service would like a new deep penetration bomber, they have thrown themselves on the alter of the F-35 and it will (hopefully) either cause an end to the Key West Agreement and/or force the AF to merge back with the Army.

I think this quote from an Army Officer best sums up the current and future state of CAS:

"The A-10 is an armor killing monster, the Apache is merely an armor killing animal, the JSF has armor killing functions. Which would you want on your side?"

If the AF successfully kills the A-10, the CAS mission will be done by drones and the AC-130.

If the AF really retires the A-10, I hope somehow the army can get it. Doubtful I know with the regulations on most fixed wing stuff, but man I hate to give up the capability to just shred the enemy on the ground.

What of the B-1 and B-2 makes you think negatively about the nuclear strike role?

I appreciate your insight here. The F-35 is a nightmare for everyone, with the Marines requirements for it really boning the whole program IMO.

(03-18-2015 10:28 AM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-18-2015 10:17 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  Strike was a mission the Air Force got out of in the 70's because even-though the US maintains a great deal of overseas air fields, the AF felt that the Navy's greater on station time would make it better suited for that mission.

The state of the B1-B and B-2 programs are telling about the Air Force's perspective regarding the Air Portion of the Nuclear Triad. While the flying service would like a new deep penetration bomber, they have thrown themselves on the alter of the F-35 and it will (hopefully) either cause an end to the Key West Agreement and/or force the AF to merge back with the Army.

I think this quote from an Army Officer best sums up the current and future state of CAS:

"The A-10 is an armor killing monster, the Apache is merely an armor killing animal, the JSF has armor killing functions. Which would you want on your side?"

If the AF successfully kills the A-10, the CAS mission will be done by drones and the AC-130.

If the AF really retires the A-10, I hope somehow the army can get it. Doubtful I know with the regulations on most fixed wing stuff, but man I hate to give up the capability to just shred the enemy on the ground.

What of the B-1 and B-2 makes you think negatively about the nuclear strike role?

I appreciate your insight here. The F-35 is a nightmare for everyone, with the Marines requirements for it really boning the whole program IMO.

No problem. I interpret things based on my old's ship motto; Deeds not Words. As I said, the AF is willing to sacrifice all of its missions for the sake of preserving the F-35 and air to air combat. Now this is pure speculation on my part but part of the justification for eliminating the A-10 has been that it will free up money for more F-35 purchases. I believe that the talk of a new deep penetration bomber is similarly designed to create a funding gap, retiring B-1 and B-2 to also increase purchases of the Lightening II.

Understand that at this point the Navy is doing everything they can to extricate themselves from the purchase of the C version as they are the only users of that variant. Foreign buyers are also looking at alternatives as the price per unit continues to climb. I think the program could be saved, but only if LockMart promised that bird would cost only $100 million each and they eliminated the B and C versions. But too many countries such as England are depending on the VSTOL tech to fill the Jump Carriers they are building.

(03-18-2015 10:49 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  

(03-18-2015 10:28 AM)BleedsHuskieRed Wrote:  

(03-18-2015 10:17 AM)vandiver49 Wrote:  Strike was a mission the Air Force got out of in the 70's because even-though the US maintains a great deal of overseas air fields, the AF felt that the Navy's greater on station time would make it better suited for that mission.

The state of the B1-B and B-2 programs are telling about the Air Force's perspective regarding the Air Portion of the Nuclear Triad. While the flying service would like a new deep penetration bomber, they have thrown themselves on the alter of the F-35 and it will (hopefully) either cause an end to the Key West Agreement and/or force the AF to merge back with the Army.

I think this quote from an Army Officer best sums up the current and future state of CAS:

"The A-10 is an armor killing monster, the Apache is merely an armor killing animal, the JSF has armor killing functions. Which would you want on your side?"

If the AF successfully kills the A-10, the CAS mission will be done by drones and the AC-130.

If the AF really retires the A-10, I hope somehow the army can get it. Doubtful I know with the regulations on most fixed wing stuff, but man I hate to give up the capability to just shred the enemy on the ground.

What of the B-1 and B-2 makes you think negatively about the nuclear strike role?

I appreciate your insight here. The F-35 is a nightmare for everyone, with the Marines requirements for it really boning the whole program IMO.

No problem. I interpret things based on my old's ship motto; Deeds not Words. As I said, the AF is willing to sacrifice all of its missions for the sake of preserving the F-35 and air to air combat. Now this is pure speculation on my part but part of the justification for eliminating the A-10 has been that it will free up money for more F-35 purchases. I believe that the talk of a new deep penetration bomber is similarly designed to create a funding gap, retiring B-1 and B-2 to also increase purchases of the Lightening II.

Understand that at this point the Navy is doing everything they can to extricate themselves from the purchase of the C version as they are the only users of that variant. Foreign buyers are also looking at alternatives as the price per unit continues to climb. I think the program could be saved, but only if LockMart promised that bird would cost only $100 million each and they eliminated the B and C versions. But too many countries such as England are depending on the VSTOL tech to fill the Jump Carriers they are building.

I have read that in enough places to accept it as fact.

Basically the Army wants a tactical Air Force to provide CAS for their ground forces ala la Marine Corp/Navy-Marine Aviation. I can understand the Army's position given the Air Force's preference for strategic operations. The Air Force should focus on strategic strike capability (ICBM, bomber/cruise missile), continental air defense, and strategic reconnaissance. The Army should be allowed control of sub-sonic fixed wing ground recon/attack aviation assets (helicopter/A-10) and transport aircraft.

OMG, I could write probably 100 pages on this. I'm actually working on something for publication right now. I'll offer a few opinions on some issues.

A-10 is a an absolute beast in a low threat environment. It's probably of little use in an all-out war with Russia or China. But most everything else is of little use as well. And most of the things that are of much use in that environment (SSBNs, for example) are of little use otherwise.

F-35 is a huge waste of money. Every tradeoff was made in favor of maintaining a STOL (short take-off and landing) capability, which will only exist on some variants. The rest just have to put up with the additional expense and reduced functionality that was sacrificed for it. The pilot can't see behind himself because the view is blocked by what is the duct for the upward thruster in the STOL version. So we have this fancy dancy Buck Rogers helmet which supposedly shows the pilot a 360 degree view. Except that it doesn't work. Yet. Basically the conventional fighter, land attack, and V/STOL functions should be three totally different aircraft. I have friends at BAE who work on the European side, and even they think it has become a badly overblown mistake.

There are a couple of European options that I find appealing--the Eurofighter Tornado and the SAAB Gripen. The F-35 is probably going to end up costing about $180 million per airplane. The Tornado is probably in the $125-150 million range and the Gripen is probably in the $70-80 million range for the CTOL (conventional take-off and landing) version. Both Eurofighter and SAAB have conceptually developed (everything up to the prototype stage) naval versions suitable for CATOBAR (catapult takeoff, arrested recovery) or STOBAR (short take-off, arrested recovery) operations, which would probably cost about 10% more due to the need to strengthen the undercarriage and increase corrosion resistance. India and Brazil may well buy them, but it would help to have a buyer the size of the US to drive costs down for everybody. I really like the Gripen for the Marines--it can operate out of a pasture, it can take off and land in about a quarter mile, it carries a heaver weapons load than the A-4, and it can do mach 2.2 over the top. That's a really incredible performance package. I also think the Marines would dearly love to get their hands on the A-10.

It's the old saw about an elephant is a mouse designed by a committee. But then again, that same criticism could be leveled at virtually every military system. To me the classic case is the Lerici class minehunter. It was an Italian design which we liked, so we took and "adapted" it. Except that the Italian design was 600 tons and the US Osprey is 900 tons. There are other European ship designs that I like a lot--Spanish F105 and Juan Carlos, Norwegian Nansen, Danish Huitfeldt and Absalon, Dutch de Witt, UK Daring and Albion, French Mistral and Barracuda and Scorpene, to name a few. But if we tried to adapt them there would always be the danger of turning it into another Lerici situation.

The first and biggest problem we have is the lack of any clear mission definition for all the armed services. The second biggest problem is the top heavy and overly administrative (as opposed to operational) organization. The combination of those two have led to a succession of really, really bad decisions.

(03-18-2015 01:13 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  OMG, I could write probably 100 pages on this. I'm actually working on something for publication right now. I'll offer a few opinions on some issues.

A-10 is a an absolute beast in a low threat environment. It's probably of little use in an all-out war with Russia or China. But most everything else is of little use as well. And most of the things that are of much use in that environment (SSBNs, for example) are of little use otherwise.

F-35 is a huge waste of money. Every tradeoff was made in favor of maintaining a STOL (short take-off and landing) capability, which will only exist on some variants. The rest just have to put up with the additional expense and reduced functionality that was sacrificed for it. The pilot can't see behind himself because the view is blocked by what is the duct for the upward thruster in the STOL version. So we have this fancy dancy Buck Rogers helmet which supposedly shows the pilot a 360 degree view. Except that it doesn't work. Yet. Basically the conventional fighter, land attack, and V/STOL functions should be three totally different aircraft. I have friends at BAE who work on the European side, and even they think it has become a badly overblown mistake.

There are a couple of European options that I find appealing--the Eurofighter Tornado and the SAAB Gripen. The F-35 is probably going to end up costing about $180 million per airplane. The Tornado is probably in the $125-150 million range and the Gripen is probably in the $70-80 million range for the CTOL (conventional take-off and landing) version. Both Eurofighter and SAAB have conceptually developed (everything up to the prototype stage) naval versions suitable for CATOBAR (catapult takeoff, arrested recovery) or STOBAR (short take-off, arrested recovery) operations, which would probably cost about 10% more due to the need to strengthen the undercarriage and increase corrosion resistance. India and Brazil may well buy them, but it would help to have a buyer the size of the US to drive costs down for everybody. I really like the Gripen for the Marines--it can operate out of a pasture, it can take off and land in about a quarter mile, it carries a heaver weapons load than the A-4, and it can do mach 2.2 over the top. That's a really incredible performance package. I also think the Marines would dearly love to get their hands on the A-10.

It's the old saw about an elephant is a mouse designed by a committee. But then again, that same criticism could be leveled at virtually every military system. To me the classic case is the Lerici class minehunter. It was an Italian design which we liked, so we took and "adapted" it. Except that the Italian design was 600 tons and the US Osprey is 900 tons. There are other European ship designs that I like a lot--Spanish F105 and Juan Carlos, Norwegian Nansen, Danish Huitfeldt and Absalon, Dutch de Witt, UK Daring and Albion, French Mistral and Barracuda and Scorpene, to name a few. But if we tried to adapt them there would always be the danger of turning it into another Lerici situation.

The first and biggest problem we have is the lack of any clear mission definition for all the armed services. The second biggest problem is the top heavy and overly administrative (as opposed to operational) organization. The combination of those two have led to a succession of really, really bad decisions.

You'll have to let us know when your article is published. Unlike some I'm not completely ready to throw in the towel on the F-35. I think with a more powerful engine the A version can be successful. The failure of the Lightening II started with the cancellation of the F-22 and the inability of the Navy to kill in VSTOL dreams of the USMC in the crib. The Navy can just keep on trucking with the F/A-18 and the ASH until the UCAV program reaches maturity.

As you are well aware that the US is never getting a foreign license without heavy modifications that ultimately nullify the cost savings, I'd prefer to go with the production lines already in service and not try to start over. That's why I like the Nat'l Security Cutter for the Navy's replacement FFG. Especially since you could build them to the Navy's standard and get the USCG on board to buy some to increase the numbers of units and decrease the cost. I'm think somewhere north of 80 ships with about 25 going to the Coast Guard. That would be enough to allow the Navy to decomm the CG's and well as the Flight I DDG's.

I completely agree with the bolded though. In fact I would say that because of a lack of clearly defined missions that the US Military has taken on too many ancillary functions.