That has been an intense subject of study for me for many years. I think I have probably read about 100 books and at least as many articles on one-aspect-or-another of that broad topic.

I think the main sources of fascination for me are the facts that:
(1.) it was never established what, specifically, the burglars were looking for;
(2.) it was never established who, ultimately, gave the order for the burglaries (note the plural) to occur; and
(3.) the public/political aspects of the scandal hinged on the statements, perceptions, and actions of about 100 or so different people, any one of whom could have theoretically pushed Watergate (broadly defined) in a different direction if they had been aware of their "power" to do so, and if they had wanted to do so.

The sheer complexity of the affair has been noted by many of the people who were directly involved. Benjamin Bradlee, the editor-in-chief of the Washington Post, wrote in his book decades later that by April of 1973 the whole thing was so confusing he had given up trying to keep track of all the loose ends. Richard Nixon said trying to make sense of it was like looking at a kaleidoscopic image that kept changing every time he looked at it. John Dean commented in his memoir how Nixon was hopelessly incapable of absorbing all the information that he (Dean) was trying to feed him in their 1:1 meetings. Charles Colson wrote that once the Vietnam War ended in January 1973, Nixon seemed to age rapidly and failed to show the kind of interest in events, or the kind of physical/mental energy in responding to events, that he had always possessed for the years that Colson had known him. He (Nixon) just sort of shut down and failed to process any new data. God knows, Nixon paid a fearful price for that failure. A price that was not fully paid even when he died about 20 years later.